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It is widely accepted that the struggle over media representation within the 
Palestinian-Israeli struggle is no less important than the struggle on the ground 
(Wolfsfeld, 1997). Although the role of the media in this struggle has been a focal 
interest for researchers, the vast majority of studies are based on content analyses (see 
Kempf & Shinar, 2014). They mostly adopt top-down approaches with macro-level 
tools of analysis which lead to a dichotomous positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ 
representation. This study, in contrast, is a qualitative language-based analysis of three 
Israeli and three Palestinian online newspapers and news websites during the 2014 
Gaza war. The study analyses a limited number of news articles from newspapers and 
news websites that are indicative of the media landscape on each side. The choice of 
these outlets is intended to present a range of possible views. The study adds to the 
effort which approaches media discourse to detect fissures and dissonances rather than 
identifying stabilities and symmetries. 
To achieve its aims, the study adopts Critical Discourse Analysis as a general 
framework and adheres to the dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1995a, b, 
2000, 2003) as an overarching approach. It takes account of transitivity (Halliday, 
1985; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), the social actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008) and 
referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) to conduct its bottom-up analysis. 
The results of this study reveal that marginal ideologies at both ends of the 
ideological spectrum in Israel compete with a hegemonic Zionist discourse. The study 
also shows that Palestinian news websites subtly exploit representations of actions and 
actors in their struggle for power, representativeness and legitimacy. More 
interestingly, the study reveals some similarities between hegemonic ideologies on the 
one hand and marginal ideologies on the other, in both societies. While the former 
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depend on common public knowledge, thus backgrounding much contextual 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview   
This study is concerned with press representations during violent conflicts. 
More particularly, it is interested in how different ideological and political trends in 
Palestine and Israel construct different realities while representing actors and actions 
in news discourse. The study goes beyond the assumption that people on each side of 
the conflict share the same socio-political stances and agree on the same historical 
narratives. This assumption leaves many of the contradictions, fissures and fractions 
in the structures of both communities hidden. Therefore, this study addresses the issue 
of representation from a critical perspective that is concerned with the internal 
political and ideological tensions in both communities and how these tensions are 
discursively articulated in news discourse. The study, for instance, analyses how the 
following clauses from the Palestinian news websites Maan and WAFA refer to 
similar events that involve Hamas-affiliated actors: 
  
[WAFA] A family of four was also killed, including the father, Osama al-Hayya, his wife Hala Abu-
Hein, and their two children Omama and Khalil.  
[Maan] Earlier on Tuesday morning, an Israeli reconnaissance drone fired missile at home of Ziad al-
Thatha deputy prime minister of the former Hamas-run government. 
 
I will explain how the different language choices above build into different 
representations and serve different political objectives. To do so, I adopt Critical 
Discourse Analysis as a general framework and adhere to the dialectical-relational 
approach (Fairclough, 1995a, b, 2000, 2003). I make use of transitivity (Halliday, 
1985; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), the social-actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008) 
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and referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) which go beyond describing the 
internal systematization of language to identify the functions it has in a socio-political 
context. Ultimately, it will be possible to explain the different discursive functions of 
micro choices and the relevance of these functions to the socio-political context. 
The scope of the study necessitates theoretical and methodological frameworks 
that go beyond mere description of language and identify its functions in a social 
context. These frameworks are thoroughly addressed in Chapter Two. In this chapter, 
I introduce the historical and political context which is relevant to the research 
questions of this study. Since the focus is on internal political and ideological 
tensions, the historical account includes a brief review of the main historical junctures 
that led to the struggle as we see it today. More precisely, the choice of historical 
events is meant to identify the trajectories that gave rise to the different ideological 
and political trends on each side, which are identified in section 1.7.  
Reconstructing the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a controversial 
process, as each account adopts one view over another. This study, therefore, has to 
choose from a vast range of resources based on the academic, political and critical 
objectives it aims to achieve. It draws on the work of a number of Palestinian, Israeli 
and international historians and journalists who handle different aspects of the 
conflict. A few of those scholars are referred to frequently due to their critical 
assessment of the historical context and the ideological trends in Palestine and Israel. 
For instance, the study draws heavily on the work of Ilan Pappe, who is one of a 
relatively small number of Jewish Israeli intellectuals to break away from the Zionist 
ideology. It also relies on the work of Avi Shlaim who presents a rigorous critical 
assessment of the historical context of the Palestine-Israel conflict. Pappe and Shalim, 
however, differ in their explanation of the political and ideological implications of the 
9 
 
history of Israel and the extent to which the Zionist hegemonic narrative is to be 
problematized (see section 1.6.1). The study also draws extensively on the work of 
Yezid Sayigh, a Palestinian researcher of Middle Eastern Studies, and Helga 
Baumgarten, a German researcher in Palestinian politics. Sayigh provides critical 
historical and political analyses of the Palestinian national movement. Baumgarten, on 
the other hand, is interested in Palestine and Israel and has written about the internal 
conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Her accounts may represent the (legal) point of 
view of the international community towards Israel/ Palestine. Finally, in presenting 
different ideological trends in Israel, the study draws on two key works that provide a 
comparative assessment of these ideologies: Laurence Silberstein (1991) and Nimni 
Ephraim (2003). The rest of the resources incorporate different views on the socio-
political and human situation in Palestine, especially the afflicted Gaza Strip.  
1.2 Scope of the study and methodological motivation 
This study proposes a new angle to perceive the socio-political context of 
Palestine-Israel by focusing on the internal political and ideological tensions on each 
side. The study attempts to make visible some discursive aspects of the conflict that 
are usually ignored when analysing major events. To this end, this study analyses 
Palestinian and Israeli journalism discourse when representing actions and actors 
during the 2014 Gaza war. Instead of focusing on hegemonic discourses in each 
community, unsurprisingly realized by positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ 
representations, primacy is given to discourse irregularities, tensions and conflicts 
amongst different newspapers in the same community. These irregularities and 
tensions are nuances that may hardly be noticed by merely reading news reports. 
Therefore, the study proposes methodological and analytical synergies for a language-
based bottom-up analysis. It analyses micro-level linguistic realizations, explains their 
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discursive functions and then interprets their contextual relevance. Ultimately, the 
study explains some aspects of the discursive mechanisms of hegemonic and marginal 
ideologies. 
1.3 Position of the analyst 
This study is a critical language analysis of journalistic discourse in Palestine 
and Israel. As a Palestinian, I do not claim to have the same distance from both sides. 
On the contrary, my research tries to highlight the devastating situation of Palestinians 
in Gaza who are being subjected to one of the most brutal sieges in modern history, 
and who have been indiscriminately attacked in three destructive wars. In a wider 
context, I attempt to give voice to my people in their struggle for freedom and 
independence. Therefore, the theoretical framework I adopt in this study allows the 
articulation of my politically-driven research interests. Yet, the methods I employ are 
capable of objective textual analysis, limiting the inevitable analyst’s bias to my 
interpretation of the findings by situating them in their socio-political context. 
Ultimately, this study provides an analytical format for investigating any complex 
conflict. It is useful for studying the subtle tensions between dominant and marginal 
ideologies, and identifying their discursive strategies that cannot be detected by 
merely reading news articles or by conducting a content analysis.  
1.4 Research questions 
To achieve its objectives, this study attempts to answer the following three 
overarching research questions and various related subsidiary questions. 
1. How does journalism discourse function in the political and ideological 




a. What are the micro-grammatical and lexical choices used in the 
representations of actions and actors in three online Israeli newspapers, 
Haaretz, Jerusalem Post and Yediot Aharonot, in the 2014 Gaza war? 
b. What are the discursive functions of these grammatical and lexical 
choices? 
c. What is the socio-political relevance of discursive functions? 
d. What political discourses do newspapers reproduce or challenge? 
e. To what extent do newspapers conform to or deviate from Zionist 
sociocultural narratives? 
2. How does journalism discourse function in the political and ideological 
conflict in Palestine, namely that between Hamas and Fatah? 
a. Which micro-grammatical and lexical choices are used in the 
representation of actions and actors on three Palestinian news websites, Maan 
News Agency, the Palestinian Information Centre and The Palestine News 
and Information Agency, in the 2014 Gaza war? 
b. What are the discursive functions of these grammatical and lexical 
choices?  
c. What is the socio-political relevance of discursive functions? 
d. What political discourses do websites reproduce or challenge? 
e. To what extent do websites conform to or deviate from the hegemonic 
sociocultural narratives in Palestine? 
3. How can transitivity and the discursive features related to it, mainly social-






1.5 Thesis structure  
This thesis consists of six chapters. In the remainder of Chapter One I 
introduce the socio-political and ideological context of Israel and Palestine. I then 
critically review the literature about journalism in Palestine and Israel in Chapter Two, 
which also includes a definition of the theoretical background of this study. In Chapter 
Three I present the analytical methods utilized to answer the research questions. 
Chapters Four and Five include analyses of Israeli online newspapers and Palestinian 
news websites, respectively. Finally, I conclude my thesis in Chapter Six.  
1.6 Historical background 
One important aspect of the contested history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
is the historical point from which the arguments that support each side’s claims should 
begin. In this study, I choose to start from the establishment of Israel in 1948, because 
many of the background issues invoked in the analysed texts are from the intervening 
period, i.e. the last 70 years.  
As a Palestinian, I do have political and ideological preferences which, 
inevitably, influence my view and re-construction of the historical context of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This, nonetheless, does not exclude the fact that there is a 
variety of historical narratives drawn from different scholars and give different 
interpretations of the conflict. These narratives are necessary to validate the claim, 
which will become clearer in further sections, that social reality and history are 
partially discursive and socially-constructed. Furthermore, since the main focus of this 
study is on internal political and ideological conflicts in Palestine and Israel, it is 
necessary to orient the reader into the ideological conflicts that accompanied or 
resulted from major historical trajectories. The objective of the following review is 
thus to shed light on the events and the socio-political challenges that gave rise to 
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different discourses in Israel. This also includes identifying some important socio-
political conditions under which different Palestinian discourses arose and developed. 
1.6.1 The establishment of Israel in 1948 
The British occupation of Palestine after World War One played a major role 
in the establishment of Israel. Britain reneged on its promise to King Hussein for an 
independent Arab nation and offered the Zionist movement political recognition in 
Palestine in 1917 (Pappe, 2006a). When the British government handed the 
Palestinian issue to the UN after World War Two, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations passed a resolution in 1947 in favor of the partition of Palestine between the 
Palestinians and the Zionist movement (Shlaim, 2000). The partition plan granted the 
Jewish minority 56 per cent of the land, which was rejected by the Palestinians. On 
the other side, some historians, such as Bregman (2003), believe that the Zionist 
leaders were very satisfied with the partition plan as it gave them a fertile coastal area 
which was three times bigger than what was suggested in previous plans. Other 
historians, however, disagree with this opinion. For instance, Shlaim (2000) argues 
that the Zionist leaders were ambivalent towards the partition plan mainly because it 
excluded Jerusalem and put forward the idea of a Palestinian state. They also 
questioned the possibility of a viable Jewish state within the UN defined borders. 
Therefore, the Zionist leaders did not think of the UN defined borders as permanent 
borders of Israel. Instead, as Gilbert (1999) suggests, they believed that the inevitable 
war with the Arab countries could be a chance to extend the borders and annex more 
lands. 
The partition plan fed the growing hostility between both sides of the conflict. 
The period between 29 November 1947 and 14 May 1948, which was later referred to 
as the first phase of the war, or the unofficial war (Shlaim, 2000), witnessed a wave of 
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confrontations between Palestinian guerrilla and Zionist forces. Palestinian guerrilla 
attacked Jewish targets and some Palestinian fighters, especially the forces led by 
Abdul Qader Al-Husseini, achieved some minor victories. This was met by a proposal 
by the Haganah to use military force against the Palestinian resistance. The proposal 
was approved by David Ben-Gurion and a decision was made to escalate the military 
conflict (ibid).   
One major landmark of this phase was the Zionists’ adoption of Plan D (ibid). 
The Zionist forces won the fighting and, consequently, hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians were moved from their towns and villages. Yet, some Israeli historians 
deny any forceful eviction of Palestinians. They claim that Palestinians left voluntarily 
in response of Arab leaders (see Katz, 2002). This claim, however, was dismissed by 
many historians who proved that violence was used at different stages to force 
Palestinians to leave. As Shlaim (2000) asserts, by implementing Plan D, Haganah 
directly and decisively contributed to the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. 
However, whether there was a political plan set in advance to expel Palestinians has 
been since then a major controversy.  
Israeli and Jewish historians, such as Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim argue that 
the use of force was a result of the unfolding events on the ground and not a 
systematic action arising from a political plan set in advance. Shlaim (2000, p. 31) 
claims that Plan D aimed to “secure all the areas allocated to the Israeli state under the 
UN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors 
leading to them”. He believes that some Palestinian populations were moved in order 
to clear “hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements” (ibid). Similarly, Morris 
(2008) claims that the expulsion of Arabs according to Plan D was intended to 
safeguard the homeland of the Jewish population before it was attacked by the Arab 
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armies. In this sense, the actions were defensive and emanating basically from the new 
reality after the first stage of confrontation between Palestinian fighters and the 
Zionist forces.  
The above historical narrative, however, came under criticism from other 
historians, some of them are Israeli and Jewish. For instance, Hirst (1977) believes 
that the Zionist actions were a result of a master plan designed to expel Palestinians 
out of their land. Similarly, Segev (2010) believes that the expulsion of 400,000 
Palestinians was a main reason of the Arab attack on Israel. He argues that there is no 
evidence that the Arab countries wanted to attack the Jewish community before the 
expulsion of Palestinians. Furthermore, Finkelstein (2001) argues that the evidence 
presented by Benny Morris himself indicates a systematic process of expulsion and 
not ad hoc and sporadic actions decided and carried out by military commanders. In 
this sense, the problem of Morris’s narrative is not factual but rather moral and 
political. He fails to frame the events in their wider context and thus keeps many of 
the political and ideological implications of the Zionist military actions hidden. 
The second phase of the war started on 14 May 1948 when David Ben-Gurion 
declared the establishment of the state of Israel. Ben-Gurion, however, decided not to 
identify the borders of the state so that other lands beyond the UN borders could be 
annexed (Shlaim, 2000). One day later, five Arab countries sent their Armies to 
Palestine to fight against the Jewish forces. The war was violent and costly for both 
sides. In the end, the Israeli forces won the war and around 810,000 Palestinians, 
according to the British government at the time, became refugees in the West Bank, 
the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Gilbert, 1999). Those who remained in 
their towns and cities were viewed by the Zionist leaders as a potential threat 
(Bregman, 2003), although the Declaration of Independence promised equal rights to 
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the Arab inhabitants (Shlaim, 2000). Different representations arose in regard of this 
historical event. This includes a dispute over the real objectives of the Arab countries 
behind attacking Israel and whether their military capabilities were a serious threat to 
Israel’s existence. 
Mainstream Israeli academic, political and media discourses represented Arabs 
and Palestinians as a monolithic ‘Other’, who wanted to destroy the tiny state of 
Israel. The war, therefore, was presented as a ‘battle for survival against 
overwhelming odds’ (Shlaim, 2000, p. 34). Shlaim, however, disagrees with this claim 
and argues that the Israeli forces outnumbered the Arab armies. Other historians also 
disputed the claim that the objective was to destroy Israel. For instance, Flapan (1987) 
believes that the king of Transjordan was not aiming at destroying Israel but rather at 
taking control of the part of Palestine that it was given to Arabs by the UN partition 
plan. Although some of these narratives dominate the Israeli public and political 
discourse, while others are limited in terms of their scope of influence, the variety of 
these narratives foregrounds the discursive nature of social reality. That is, it 
highlights the role of discourse in partially constituting what people tend to believe as 
objective reality.  
1.6.2 The 1967 war: Occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
The political context in Israel and neighbouring Arab countries after 1948 
encouraged further confrontations between the two sides. On the one hand, Israel did 
not show any serious intention to put an end to its expansionist policies. It resumed its 
violent practices against Palestinians and tried to grab more of their lands. On the 
other hand, the newly formulated Arab regimes were seeking public consent against 
their internal political rivals. To mobilize the masses, they adopted a rhetoric in which 
liberating Palestine was of pivotal interest. Both sides, therefore, represented the other 
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as an imminent threat, which led to the 1967 war between Israel on the one hand, and 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the other. In six days, Israel occupied the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (Pappe, 2006a).  
Different historical narratives arose in explaining the real intentions behind the 
1967 war. Some historians, such as Shlaim (2000), argue that Israel genuinely felt 
threatened by the Arab countries. The war was a pre-emptive action to foil Egyptian 
and Syrian military preparations on the borders and to stop Palestinian guerrilla from 
shelling Israeli towns especially in the north. However, Finkelstein (2001) asserts that 
the US intelligence could not find any evidence that Egypt wanted to attack Israel, or 
that it had the military capacity to do so. Later, senior Israeli political and military 
officials admitted that Israel was never under an existential threat (Hirst, 1977). 
Israel’s main motivation of the war, Finkelstein (2001) asserts, was to grab more 
lands. Even Benny Morris (cited in Finkelstein, 2001) implies this notion in his 
description of the general feeling in Israel after the 1948 war. Zionists believed that 
what was achieved at the time was less than the imagined promised land.  
Similar to previous events, the dispute over the 1967 war points to the fissures 
and dissonances in the Israeli narrative. While hegemonic Zionism has always 
described the war as an act of defense, some historical narratives variably challenge 
this view and emphasize Israel’s intentions to expand its borders. At the political 
level, fissures arose in the political and ideological discourses that Zionism developed 
to justify the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the construction of 
Jewish settlements in these territories.  
The right-most parties, especially Likud, considered the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip to be part of greater Israel. On the other hand, the Labour Party considered 
these territories a strategic buffer that ensures secure borders for Israel (Bregman, 
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2003). Later, the Labour Party proposed a plan in which the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip would be exchanged in any future peace settlement. They believed that giving up 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would help to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel 
(Pappe, 2006b). A smaller group in this camp, however, had moral considerations 
behind their withdrawal proposal. This group included academics, artists and scholars 
who initiated an alternative discourse that created a supportive atmosphere in Israel 
for the peace process in the 1990s. The first organized group of this kind was Mazpen 
(compass), which adopted an anti-Zionist and anti-occupation discourse. A stronger 
voice of objection came from the Communist Party, which adopted the idea of a two-
state solution (ibid.). However, the hegemonic nationalist ideology in Israel has had 
the upper hand and the mistreatment of Palestinians and the confiscation of their lands 
have continued. 
1.6.3 The first Intifada and the Oslo Peace Process  
In a context of humiliation and political uncertainty, an impressive all-
encompassing uprising known as the first Intifada broke out in 1987 across all 
occupied Palestinian territories. The Intifada imposed a new reality that Israel never 
expected. For the first time in 20 years of occupation, confrontations erupted inside 
the occupied lands and were led by a new and enthusiastic leadership. The Intifada 
also witnessed the emergence of Hamas, one of the most influential movements in 
Palestine today (Pappe, 2006a).   
The Palestinian Intifada was an important event that reversed the roles in 
Israel’s David vs Goliath romantic narrative. For the first time, Palestinians were 
internationally recognized as the victim while Israel was the perpetrator. This 
encouraged the Zionist left, and some members of the Labour Party, to propose a plan 
to reach an agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) over the 
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This step was met with a historical change in the 
Palestinian national discourse when the PLO, for the first time, talked publicly about a 
partition plan instead of its dream of one secular Palestinian state. This paved the way 
for the Oslo peace process in the 1990s and gave hope to peace camps on both sides. 
It also created an atmosphere in Israel for an alternative discourse to operate in the 
academic and socio-political spheres. This discourse integrated, though only partially, 
a Palestinian voice in narrating the history of Israel. However, hope did not last long. 
Israel did not withdraw from the occupied territories, and the agreement lost its 
political or practical value. 
In September 2000, the political deadlock that followed the failure of Camp 
David negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis created a suitable atmosphere for 
a new large-scale wave of violence. Palestinians were frustrated because the reality on 
the ground did not change after Oslo Accords. This ensured a public support for a 
confrontational approach (Pressman, 2003). Moreover, some parties on both sides 
were attempting to foil peace negotiations to achieve particular political or ideological 
goals (see section 1.7.2.2). Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa mosque was the spark that 
sit the second Intifada into motion (Pressman, 2003), and the dream of peace soon 
turned into a nightmare.  
This time the conflict was more violent. Palestinians launched military 
operations against Israeli soldiers and civilians. Israel, on the other hand, applied 
brutal measures of collective punishment against Palestinians (ibid). This was 
accompanied by big political changes in both polities. The Israeli peace camp was 
swept aside by the Zionist right-most parties that occupied the political arena and 
advocated a very extremist discourse. On the other hand, Hamas received vast support 
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amongst Palestinians. Its discourse of resistance and liberation replaced the discourse 
of peace and negotiations adopted by its rival, Fatah (ibid.).  
1.7 Present-day political and ideological background 
1.7.1 The political and ideological landscape in Israel 
Due to the persistent wars in the short history of Israel, Zionism has managed 
to mobilize the Israeli public and sustain its hegemony over Israeli politics. 
Nonetheless, the socio-political and demographic realities that resulted from the 1967 
war challenged Zionism and offered a chance for marginal ideologies to operate. In 
this section I review Zionism and the ideologies that have appeared at both ends of its 
spectrum: post-Zionism and neo-Zionism. 
1.7.1.1 Zionism 
Zionism can be seen as a form of settler-colonial nationalism that determines 
membership of the state of Israel on ethnic principles (Ram, 2003). Collective 
memory, according to Zionism, is an objective history which includes a one-sided 
historical narration of events before, during and after the creation of Israel. It presents 
a teleological view of events based on secular, nationalist and religious super 
narratives that construct Israeli identity, manufacture consensus and mobilize Jews 
outside Israel (Kimmerling as cited by Nimni, 2003, p. 5). Zionist narratives include 
only the Jewish voice, the Palestinian voice is consistently excluded and suppressed. 
When evidence of atrocities against Palestinians cannot be categorically rejected, 
Zionism justifies the use of force against Palestinians as the only way for ‘national 
revival’, ‘territorial repatriation’ and historical ‘redemption’ (Ram, 2003, p. 30). 
While trying to adapt itself to a democratic system, Zionism paradoxically and 
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ironically combines ethnocentrism with liberal principles: Jews are privileged but the 
state can also be fair to other minorities (Nimni, 2003). 
Zionism is a hegemonic ideology with which most Israelis identify (Erhlich, 
2003). Its narratives are propagated extensively in different fields, such as academia 
and media, and it has established a tight affinity between power and knowledge in 
Israel (Ram, 2003). As Pappe (2003) argues, Zionism exploits fields of information 
dissemination to forge thousands of micro-histories into one macro-master story that 
defines the political culture of Israel. Zionist macro-narratives produce, adapt and 
change the social structures which control Israelis’ knowledge. They regulate their 
social lives and determine their evaluations of events.  
Before 1967, Zionism effectively presented itself as a ‘national movement, 
humanist, liberal, and socialist, which brought modernization and progress to 
primitive Palestine […] to the benefit of everyone, Arabs and Jews alike’ (Pappe, 
2003, p. 46). It constructed a peaceful and defensive image of Israel, which was 
embraced and believed by the vast majority of the Jewish Israelis at the time. 
However, as Pappe argues, this image was shaken after, and because of, the 1967 war. 
The consequences of occupying more Palestinian and Arab lands led to the emergence 
of ‘territorial expansionism and religious fanaticism on the right, and self-doubt and 
self-hatred on the extreme left’ (ibid., p. 46). Zionism failed to persuasively explain its 
relationship with occupied lands and the Palestinian population. More challenges 
arose later, due to the Israeli involvement in several wars and confrontations. For 
instance, in 1982, a wide sector of the Israeli public rejected Israel’s ‘war of choice’ in 
Lebanon. In late 1987, as I explained earlier, Israel had to confront civilian Palestinian 
resistance. Eventually, paradoxes and contradictions in the Zionist narratives started to 
be detected in social, academic and political arenas. This forced Zionism to undergo a 
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series of changes and adaptations. More importantly, it led to the emergence of 
ideological trends that share some basic convictions with Zionism, but differ in their 
historical narratives and future policies. These trends appeared at both ends of the 
political and ideological spectrum of Zionism: post-Zionism arose from the left, neo-
Zionism arose from the right (Pappe, 2003; Silberstein, 1999). 
1.7.1.2 Post-Zionism 
Post-Zionism is one of the most significant ideological changes to take place 
in Israel’s political culture. Although the term post-Zionism is vague and used in 
different ways by different scholars, Silberstein (1999, p. 2) broadly defines it as 
academic conduct which leads to political and ideological positions ‘that problematize 
Zionist discourse and the historical narratives and social and cultural representations 
that it produced’. Unlike anti-Zionism, post-Zionism shares some basic convictions of 
Zionism, rejecting a complete dissociation from the hegemonic ideology (Erhlich, 
2003; Pappe, 2003; Ram 2003).  
The origins of post-Zionism go back to the occupation of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip in 1967. However, the socio-political environment remained 
inappropriate for effective ideological changes until the late 1980s. Supported by a 
passive public position vis-à-vis the Lebanon War in 1982, post-Zionism broke away 
from the idyllic academic conceptual paradigm designed to fit the Zionist narrative 
and enterprise (Silberstein, 1999). Academics adopted new methodologies to view and 
assess Israel’s identity in light of its history with the Palestinians (Nimni, 2003). They 
largely benefited from the failure of Zionism to provide a convincing historical 
narrative and a practical liberal policy. Those academics were later referred to as new 
historians (Silberstein, 1999). 
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The heart of post-Zionist discourse is that Israel should develop a civic identity 
with universal institutional values that encompass all of its citizens equally. It believes 
that it is impossible to have a nation-state based on the ethnicity of one group in a 
multicultural context (Nimni, 2003). However, post-Zionism lacks organization, 
structures and ideological and political coherence to articulate its objectives 
(Silberstein, 1999). The new historians disagree on how to translate their 
reconstruction of Israel’s history into future political practice. As Edward Said argues, 
post-Zionism is unable to move from analysis into perspective and to draw 
conclusions from its new critical assessment of the past (Nimni, 2003, p. 8). In 
addition, the majority of new historians were submissive to the pressure of the 
hegemonic Israeli institution. They questioned the historical context of the 
establishment of Israel but did not question the basic premises of Zionism (ibid.). A 
very few historians, such as Ilan Pappe, did break away completely from the 
convictions of Zionism and suggested political schemes based on humanist, liberal 
and democratic values.  
Due to the lack of well-established macro narratives that frame its evaluation 
of events, post-Zionism is accused of being inconsistent and sometimes contradictory, 
which is, as Nimni (2003) suggests, the case for any alternative or marginal ideology 
in the process of transition. Post-Zionism has remained confined to the structural 
boundaries of Zionism, which affects not only its scope of practice, but also its 
mechanism for influencing people’s evaluations of events. This mechanism, as I will 
discuss in later chapters, has a bottom-up direction: it tries to influence people’s 
evaluations of particular events, especially those unsatisfactorily addressed by 
Zionism, without explicitly challenging the hegemonic narrative. The term ‘bottom-
up’ is used here to refer to the direction of marginal ideologies challenging the social 
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structure. The term will also be used in a detailed analysis of micro-language choices 
and their functions in constructing the social reality (see Section 2.5.4).  
1.7.1.3 Neo-Zionism 
Neo-Zionism is ‘an exclusionary, nationalist even racist, anti-demographic 
political-culture trend, striving to heighten the fence surrounding Israeli identity’ 
(Ram, 2003, p. 28). From a neo-Zionist perspective, collective identity is based on 
affiliation to the Jewish people, rather than simply an Israeli nationality (ibid.). Unlike 
Zionism, which tries to combine secular democracy with ethnic theocracy, neo-
Zionism openly prefers the latter (Pappe, 2003). It justifies the occupation by romantic 
religious narratives that describe the West Bank as a Biblical land which is more 
important to the Israeli identity than the land occupied in 1948. Nowadays, most neo-
Zionists are settlers based in occupied Palestinian territories, as well as their 
supporters in religious and national movements in Israel, such as Likud (Ram, 2003). 
The culture of neo-Zionism is a mixture of Zionist, national and Jewish values. 
However, for neo-Zionism, the secular state is merely a necessary stage in the revival 
of religious ownership of the motherland (Ram, 2003). Neo-Zionism thus 
discriminates against secular Israeli Jews who are described as ‘Messiah donkeys’ 
(Pappe, 2003, p. 54), an allusion to the Messiah returning on his donkey to redeem the 
world at the end of days. However, in today’s Israel, the term is used to refer to 
anyone who does a ‘dirty’ job on behalf of others (Rakovski, 2003). In this sense, neo-
Zionism believes that secular Jews achieved the objective of getting Jews into 
Palestine but should not rule any more. This means that legal affiliation to Israel is 
secondary and priority is given to allegiance to the Jewish people (Ram, 2003). Neo-
Zionism has, therefore, revived the notion of the ‘new Jew’, originally a Zionist 
concept in the early years of Israel, to mobilize Jews worldwide. The ‘new Jew’ 
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represents the strong, socially successful and ready Jewish Israeli who bears arms to 
protect himself and his people (Israeli & Rosman-Stollman, 2015). By contrast, the 
‘diaspora Jew’ is passive, studious and weak (ibid.). From a (neo-)Zionist perspective, 
it is vital for Jews to ‘return’ to Israel in order to validate their Jewishness and re-own 
the land. 
Though still marginal compared with Zionism, neo-Zionism managed to 
infiltrate the social structure and the hegemonic discourse after the rise of rightist 
movements in Israel on two historical occasions. In 1977, the Likud Party won 
elections for the first time in the history of the state. This accelerated the confiscation 
of Palestinian lands and the construction of illegal settlements. It also strengthened the 
religious-national influence on Israeli politics. Around two decades later, Ariel 
Sharon’s premiership at the onset of the second Intifada initiated neo-Zionism’s 
militancy (Ram, 2003). The common convictions between neo-Zionism and Zionism 
also helped the former to take on a growing role in Israeli polity. It proposed a new 
vision for the future without problematizing the historical narratives of Zionism 
(Pappe, 2003). Neo-Zionists, therefore, managed to obtain legislative, judicial, 
military and governmental positions, thus forming a nucleus within the Israeli 
institution (Ram, 2003).  
The different relationships that post-Zionism and neo-Zionism have in relation 
to social structures necessarily influence their representations of events. While post-
Zionists take a rather cautious, inconsistent and indirect path in challenging 
hegemonic narratives (Nimni, 2003; Pappe, 2003; Ram, 2003), neo-Zionists are more 
open in articulating their propositions due to the ideological haven they enjoy. Both, 
however, have limited access to the formulation of people’s knowledge compared 
with the hegemonic Zionist ideology. Therefore, a study of how these different 
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ideologies represent events must take into account how (in)consistent they are in 
relation to social structures. This, as will be explained in further chapters, will be a 
point of departure for this study in terms of analysing ideologies according to their 
modus operandi: whether they construct knowledge that regulates people’s evaluation 
of events (hegemonic ideologies), or evaluate events in ways inconsistent with 
people’s knowledge so that, in the long run, they change people’s way of thinking 
(marginal ideologies).  
1.7.2 Political and ideological landscape in Palestine 
Before World War One, Palestinian nationalism was based on values similar to 
those of growing local Arab identities. For instance, Palestinians incorporated secular 
and religious elements in the construction of their identity, such as religious – Muslim 
and Christian – attachment and the historical continuity of the people on the land 
(Khalidi, 1997). But Palestinian nationalism underwent decisive changes due to the 
realities Zionism created in the socio-political and demographic landscape of Palestine 
(Pappe, 2006b; Sayigh, 1997; Welty, 1995). After the 1948 war, Palestinians’ 
identification with their lost homeland was the binding tie of their national sentiment. 
A collective sense of loss and the marginality of Palestinian refugees in their host 
communities motivated Palestinian political practice, leading to Palestinian 
nationalism as we see it today (Lybarger, 2007; Sayigh, 1997). 
Baumgarten (2005) argues that the Palestinian national movement has gone 
through three main stages: the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), the Palestinian 
National Liberation Movement (Fatah) and the Movement of Islamic Resistance 
(Hamas). These movements have different ideologies, approaches and political 
objectives. More importantly, as Baumgarten notes, each movement arose from its 
predecessor’s failure to achieve Palestinian national objectives.  
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MAN dominated the Palestinian national movement directly after the 
Palestinian Nakba in 1948. It was established by a number of Palestinian and Arab 
students in Beirut who identified with pan-Arab nationalism. It was a movement of 
the educated elite that never enjoyed mass support. Following the defeat of Nasserism 
after the 1967 war, MAN was dissolved and other (small) political movements 
divaricated out of it. Therefore, the discussion below will be limited to Fatah and 
Hamas, which still dominate Palestine’s current polity.  
1.7.2.1 Palestinian National Liberation Movement – Fatah 
With Nasser’s defeat in 1967, pan-Arab nationalism was brought to a close 
and Palestinians realized that the Arab states were unable to confront Israel. This 
motivated a particularistic national movement that seeks a revived Palestine by 
advocating an independent Palestinian national and political body (Sayigh, 1997). In 
1965, Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian activists, some previously affiliated to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, established the Palestinian Liberation National Movement 
(Fatah). Fatah is a secular movement that, alongside the exodus of Palestinians in 
1948, relies on Palestinians’ attachment to the land, their common suffering and 
resistance, and their quest for statehood as key elements in the construction of 
Palestinian identity (Amer, 2012). Fatah defined itself as an inclusive national 
movement with no specific ideology, aiming to adapt to new political challenges 
without losing much of its credibility (Lovlie, 2014).  
Arafat and his comrades believed that only Palestinian action based on 
Palestinian nationalist ideology could liberate Palestine. They thought that military 
struggle led by Palestinian refugees was the only way to achieve this objective 
(Baumgarten, 2005; Welty, 1995). This notion was enhanced when Fatah, with the 
help of the Jordanian army and other Palestinian movements, achieved a remarkable 
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victory against Israel in the Alkarameh Battle in 1969. The movement won the 
support of Palestinians across the diaspora and later controlled the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) (BBC, 2011). Under Fatah’s domination, the PLO 
adopted a secular discourse that emphasized Palestinian particularity framed within 
wider pan-Arab nationalism (Amer, 2012). 
The glory of Fatah did not last long. The movement encountered many 
challenges that forced it to substantially change its policies and strategies. For 
instance, a new stage in Egyptian-Israeli relations following the Camp David 
agreement in 1978 foiled Fatah’s attempts to ignite a war between Israel and the Arab 
countries. Later, the PLO’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982 deepened the isolation 
of Fatah and limited its options. More voices inside the movement called for political 
and diplomatic work instead of relying merely on military struggle. In 1988, the new 
doctrine of Fatah was formalized when the Palestinian National Council declared a 
Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967 (Baumgarten, 2005). Although the 
movement scaled down its objectives and agreed on a state alongside Israel, it did not 
give up its populist discourse that calls for liberating all Palestine. Since then, the 
movement has been trapped in a split between its rhetoric as the basis of military 
resistance and its actual diplomatic policies (ibid.). 
When Arafat returned to Palestine in 1994, following the Oslo Accords, Fatah 
became the main force of the new Palestinian polity represented by the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). The movement’s military wings were dissolved and incorporated into 
internationally supervised security forces. This resulted in a decline in the 
movement’s public support and gave its rivals a chance to question its status as the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (BBC, 2011). 
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With the outbreak of the second Intifada, a new generation within Fatah 
formed the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which were heavily involved in a military struggle 
against Israel. This was rejected by the ‘old guards’ in Fatah who insisted that military 
struggle would do harm to Palestinian national objectives (Jamal, 2005). When Yasser 
Arafat died in 2004, the conflict between the new and old leaderships was brought 
before the public. However, the old leadership dominated the movement when 
Mahmoud Abbas was elected President in 2005, thus restricting the movement 
completely to the diplomatic policies of the PA (ibid.).  
1.7.2.2 Movement of Islamic Resistance – Hamas 
Hamas was officially declared a Palestinian movement in 1988, at the onset of 
the first Palestinian Intifada. Unlike MAN and Fatah, Hamas was established in 
Palestine and experienced the Israeli occupation after 1967. The movement has, 
therefore, been dominated by the concept of resistance (Baumgarten, 2005).  
Hamas is an Islamic movement whose ideological roots go back to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It proposed Islam as the framework of a struggle (Jihad) that aims to 
liberate Palestine (Baumgarten, 2005). As part of the Islamic movement in Palestine, 
Hamas first practised a passive form of resistance: ‘social and religious mobilization 
through education, religious education and social welfare programmes’ (Amer, 2012, 
p. 120). In 1987, Hamas declared itself a movement that adopted different forms of 
resistance to the occupation (Jamal, 2005). Hence, the concept of resistance in Hamas 
doctrine refers to (organized) armed action, and popular civilian action which may 
take less violent forms. The movement maintained a strong relationship with the 
public by running institutions for social solidarity, believing that this constructs a 
social haven for military struggle against the occupation (Tamimi, 2007). 
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Hamas ideology is based on the Muslim Brotherhood’s universal Islamic 
discourse. However, the movement simplified the sophisticated ideology of the 
Brotherhood and turned it into a populist discourse that particularizes the issue of 
Palestine (Baumgarten, 2005). For instance, Hamas’ charter defines Palestine as a 
religious endowment (Waqf) whose liberation is the responsibility of all Muslims in 
the world (Hamas Covenant, Articles 11 & 15). However, the charter and other 
foundational documents use secular elements in their construction of Palestinian 
identity, such as the historical attachment to the land (Amer, 2012).  
Since Hamas’s appearance coincided with Fatah’s adoption of a political 
strategy in the late 1980s, conflict between the two movements seemed to be 
inevitable. As Baumgarten (2005) suggests, Hamas presented itself as an alternative to 
Fatah, due to the latter’s failure to achieve Palestinian national goals. The first stage of 
confrontation between the two sides was in 1994, when Hamas conducted military 
operations to foil any potential Palestinian-Israeli agreement (Jamal, 2005). This 
raised a big challenge to the PA and Fatah in their attempts to create a suitable 
atmosphere for a political settlement. Fatah claimed that Hamas gave Israel a pretext 
to disavow its peace commitments and helped the rightist Benjamin Netanyahu to gain 
power (BBC, 2011).  
With the ultimate collapse of peace negotiations in 2000, Hamas gained 
unprecedented support amongst Palestinians during the second Intifada (BBC, 2014). 
Many Palestinians cheered the military operations of Hamas and thought that the 
movement’s strategy was the only effective way to counter Israel’s actions (Tamimi, 
2007). This, alongside Palestinians’ dissatisfaction with the rampant corruption in 
Fatah and the PA, granted the movement a big victory in the Palestinian legislative 
elections in 2006 (Jamal, 2005). The movement then had to combine its resistance 
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doctrine with political pragmatism. On the one hand, it has continued to adopt an anti-
occupation stance which maintains a central role of resistance. On the other, the 
movement’s discourse has changed remarkably, from a strictly religious discourse to a 
political discourse committed to international law, human rights, social reform and 
political pluralism (Amer, 2012; Jamal, 2005). Hamas also suggested a long-term 
truce with Israel, whereby it accepts a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries 
(Baumgarten, 2005). It showed further political flexibility to end the siege of the 
movement after winning the elections (Abu Amer, 2016; Saleh, 2007). Some 
researchers believe that the changes to Hamas’ discourse are merely tactical and aim 
to break down the regional and international isolation of the movement (Amer, 2012). 
Others, however, argue that these changes are not only responsive to recent 
developments but also arise from a long history of internal struggles within the 
movement (Tamimi, 2007) 
By and large, a review of the Palestinian national movement shows that it has 
developed around its struggle with Israel. Both secular and religious ideologies define 
the nation not only in primordialist terms, but also in the accentuation of the 
Palestinian experience in exile and under Israeli occupation (Amer, 2012). Their 
legitimacy is conditioned by their ability to achieve Palestinian national goals and 
protect Palestinians from Israeli atrocities. Therefore, investigating their discourse in 
relation to the struggle with Israel is inseparable from their rivalry over 
representativeness and legitimacy. This will be a point of departure in this study when 
analysing journalism discourse from both sides of Palestinian polity.  
1.8 The Gaza Strip  
As explained in previous sections, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are geo-
political entities that resulted from the establishment of Israel in 1948. The West Bank 
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was administratively attached to Jordan in what was considered to be a strategic 
understanding with the Jordanian regime, while the Gaza Strip was designed as a huge 
receptor of refugees in an attempt to solve the demographic issues involved in creating 
a Jewish state (Pappe, 2015). After the occupation of the territories in 1967, Israel 
decided to isolate Palestinian towns and cities by establishing illegal Jewish 
settlements. The plan worked on the West Bank but failed in Gaza due to its 
geopolitical distinctiveness and high population density, and later due to its adamant 
resistance. The Strip was thus designed to be a ghetto in which Palestinians are 
subjected to impossible circumstances (ibid.).  
1.8.1 Socio- and geopolitical realities 
Gaza Strip is a 362-square-kilometre coastal territory. Around 1.85 million 
Palestinians live in Gaza, most of them refugees, making it the sixth most densely 
populated polity on earth (Cook & Copeland, 2011; PCBS, 2016). A UN report states 
that the number of Palestinians in the Strip is expected to reach 2.1 million in 2020. 
To make the Strip suitable for human life, huge efforts are needed to develop basic 
services, such as education, water and energy (United Nations TD, 2015).  
The Gaza Strip has an 11-km border with Egypt to the south, and a 51-km 
border with Israel to the east and north. In the Oslo Agreement, Israel insisted on a 0.5 
km-wide buffer zone along its borders with the Strip. In 2000, Israel unilaterally 
expanded the zone to 1.3 km, which occupied around 13 per cent of the strip’s 
territory (Salem, 2011). Due to the tightened restrictions after Israel’s withdrawal in 
2005, Gazans who enter the buffer zone are shot on sight (Sanger, 2010). In 2005 
Israel evacuated its military sites and settlements from the Strip. The then prime 
minister, Ariel Sharon, claimed that this withdrawal was a concession to grant 
Palestinians a chance to create their own state. However, Dov Weissglass, who was 
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appointed by Sharon to negotiate the withdrawal, announced that in return for its 
unilateral move, Israel was given American consent to continue its settlement 
construction in the West Bank (Chomsky, 2015). As for the Gaza Strip, Weissglass 
boasted that Palestinians there would remain ‘on a diet’ (ibid.). Consequently, Israel 
has continued to control six out of seven land crossings to the Strip, its maritime 
borders, airspace and the movement of goods and individuals (Sanger, 2010). Israel 
also controls the Strip’s electricity, telecommunications, currency and many other 
civil services. It exploits these services to blackmail the Palestinian population into 
submission and surrender (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011). In addition, Israeli forces 
regularly enter the strip and watch over it all the time with high-tech drones. The Strip 
is thus still considered by the United Nations to be an occupied territory (Sanger, 
2011). 
1.8.2 Siege of Gaza  
After Hamas achieved its democratic victory in the 2006 elections, Israel and 
the US led an international boycott against the movement and its government. The 
boycott amounted to a form of collective punishment of Palestinians in which, 
ironically, the international community sanctioned the occupied rather than the 
occupier (Roy, 2013). Israel has been closing all its crossings to the Strip, imposing 
import and export restrictions and a ban on movement from and to the Strip. This has 
led to soaring food prices, poverty and the destruction of agricultural areas. In 2009 
the UN reported that the siege was deeply affecting all aspects of civilian life, 
especially electricity, food and medicine, considering the siege to be an action outside 
international law (IRIN, 2009). Egypt also closed its crossing to the Strip in 2007, 
claiming that opening the border would deepen the geo-political rift between Gaza 
and the West Bank and burden Egypt with Gaza’s responsibility, instead of the 
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occupying force. When the Muslim Brotherhood won the Egyptian elections, Egypt 
partially relaxed some of its restrictions on the Strip (Bradley & Mitnick, 2011). 
However, shortly after the coup d’état in 2013, the crossing was again closed and the 
relations between Egypt and Gaza reached a state of unprecedented political rupture.  
The socio-political and historical context outlined above is very important 
when viewing Israeli hostility towards the Gaza Strip. Israeli military action and 
restrictions are not merely reactions to security threats from Hamas. Rather, the 
Zionist movement has always planned to reduce Palestinians life in Gaza to mere 
survival (Chomsky, 2015). Whenever Palestinians try to challenge the Israeli 
oppression, Israel reacts violently ‘to teach them a harsh lesson’ (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 
48). Therefore, what is happening in Gaza must not be dissociated from the long 
history of occupation, dispossession and imprisonment inflicted on the Palestinian 
people (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011). 
1.8.3 Hamas-Fatah conflict 
Hamas anticipated the hostile regional and international reaction to its victory 
in 2006 and asked Fatah to join a unity government. Fatah rejected this proposal and 
started to hinder Hamas’s administration of Palestinian institutions. It refused to give 
up its leadership of the security forces and ordered its members to demonstrate against 
Hamas’s delay in paying employees’ salaries. Later, US-trained Fatah and PA 
affiliated forces sought to confront Hamas and trigger a coup. Preemptively, Hamas 
formed its own security forces in Gaza and foiled these plans (Chomsky, 2015).  
In 2007, Hamas took over the PA’s security bases and headquarters. In just 
three days the movement managed to drive Fatah’s and the PA’s apparatuses out of 
the Strip, making itself the only force ruling Gaza (Elmer, 2008). Hamas announced 
that it had saved the Palestinian legitimacy by preventing a PA coup supported by 
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Israel and America. It formed a government in Gaza supported by legislative 
elections. Fatah, on the other hand, called Hamas a terrorist and murderous 
organization that caused a rift in the Palestinian national body (Deeb, 2013). Abbas 
declared a state of emergency and suspended the Palestinian charter. Later, he formed 
an internationally-backed government in the West Bank (Elmer, 2008). This turned 
what was an ideological conflict between Fatah and Hamas into a political struggle 
over legitimacy and representativeness. Each side is hegemonic in its territory and 
excludes the political practices of the other. They accuse each other of being 
responsible for the political and human crisis in the Palestinian territories (Bseiso, 
2015). In time, the conflict has become decisive in almost all political practices of 
both sides. More devastatingly, the conflict has resulted in political uncertainty and a 
crisis of legitimacy which has helped Israel to wage massive destructive wars against 
the Strip (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011). 
1.8.4 Cast Lead and Pillar of Defence: Israel’s wars against the Strip in 2008/9 
and 2012 
The 2014 Gaza war was the third official large-scale military confrontation 
between Israel and Hamas. The spiral of violence started in 2008 with the operation 
Cast Lead. Then another round of violence took place in 2012 when Israel conducted 
its operation Pillar of Defense.   
Kaposi (2014) provides a detailed and multifaceted contextualization of the 
2008/9 Gaza war. He traces the events that created an atmosphere of war back to 2005 
when Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip. The author explains how 
different perspectives arose to explain the genuine Israeli intentions behind the 
withdrawal and the consequences of this decision on the relationship with 
Palestinians. The first perspective considers the withdrawal a risky political move that, 
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in spite of its limitations, was a positive attitude from Israel towards peace. Others, the 
author continues, believe that Israel took this decision based on pragmatic 
considerations that relate to the high cost of keeping settlements and military posts in 
the Strip. Finally, a third perspective finds Israel’s disengagement with the Strip a 
mere political maneuver to grab more lands in the West Bank.  
Regardless of the Israeli intentions, Kaposi notes, the Palestinian military 
movements immediately controlled the Strip and filled the power vacuum. They 
adopted a rhetoric that represents Israel as being driven away by the military 
Palestinian resistance. They also intensified their attacks on Israeli towns in the south 
to pressure Israel and get more political achievements. 
Kaposi also describes other major events that intensified the enmity and 
created an atmosphere of violence. First, Hamas won the Palestinian elections and 
replaced Fatah, Israel’s partner in peace negotiations. This was followed by a military 
conflict between Fatah and Hamas that ended with Hamas controlling the Strip (see 
1.8.3). In describing the six-month truce prior to the war, Kaposi emphasizes that 
Israel and Hamas realized that war was just a matter of time. So both sides took 
actions to set the stage ready for the coming confrontation.  
The context of the 2008/9 as delineated by Kaposi shows the complexity and 
correlation of different contextual factors that led to the war. This might be intended 
to show that it is hard to claim with certainty who was responsible for igniting the 
war. The argument made by Kaposi is convincing in relation to the very specific 
context of the war. But in terms of its wider context, a different point of view is also 
valid. One need to know that the Palestinian military actions cannot be dissociated 
from the continuing Israeli control over the Strip (see sections 1.8.1 and 1.8.2), and 
the general practices of occupation in the Palestinian territories, including the West 
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Bank. Second, the growing frustration amongst Palestinians, and the belief that the 
military resistance is the only possible option, should be assessed in the light of the 
failure of negotiations to achieve any Palestinian objectives. Finally, it is important to 
notice the changes on Hamas’ discourse after it won the 2006 elections. The 
movement showed unprecedented pragmatism and proposed a 30-year truce with 
Israel (see 1.7.2.2). This does not mean that Hamas has no role in escalating violence. 
On the contrary, the movement emphasizes its position as leading the active (military) 
resistance. As the analysis will show, the movement represents itself as an adversary 
that can act on Israel. However, the point I am trying to make here is that events in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank should not be dissociated from the long history of 
occupation. Palestinians are still subjected to military rules that make their lives, at 
many levels, unbearable.  
In this restless context, a number of confrontations broke between Hamas and 
Israel. Israel implemented limited incursions under the pretext of demolishing tunnels, 
and Hamas launched rockets at Israeli targets. Eventually, a large-scale war started on 
27 December 2008 when Israel hit 100 targets in 220 seconds (Kaposi, 2014). The 
war lasted for 22 days, during which 1,417 Palestinians were killed, the vast majority 
of them civilians, including 313 children and 116 women. Another 5,500 Palestinians 
were injured, almost half of them women and children. Many of the casualties were 
hit by internationally prohibited white phosphorus shells. In addition, more than 
20,000 homes were completely or partially destroyed (Hasaneen, 2009). On the other 
side, three Israeli civilians and 14 soldiers were killed, some of them by friendly fire 
(ibid.).  
Contrary to the Israeli plans, the 2008/9 war boosted Hamas’s popularity in 
Gaza (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011). Hence, all the circumstances that ignited the war did 
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not change: the siege, Palestinian frustration, the political deadlock and the Israeli 
military-driven mentality. As for Hamas, the movement believed that merely 
sustaining the Israeli military actions is a victory, which motivated the movement to 
go for further military confrontations.  
In 2012 Israel assassinated the commander-in-chief of Hamas’s military wing, 
Mohammad Ja’bari. The movement reacted by launching missiles into Israel, giving 
Israel a pretext to wage its Pillar of Defence campaign. Israel killed 162 Palestinians, 
half of them women, children and the elderly, and injured more than 1,200 others. 
Similar to the previous war, Israel destroyed a huge number of homes and other 
civilian constructions (Middle East, 2012). At the same time, four Israeli civilians and 
one soldier were killed. Although the Israeli casualties were relatively very few, the 
Palestinian challenge to Israel reached unprecedented levels. For the first time in the 
history of the conflict, Palestinians managed to hit Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv (ibid.). 
Israel saw this as a serious military threat, which later paved the way for the 2014 war.  
1.8.5 2014 Gaza War 
As explained earlier, the rift between Fatah and Hamas has damaged 
Palestinian political legitimacy. It was not until 2014 that both movements agreed on a 
technocrat government unaffiliated with either side. This government could strategize 
a coordinated Palestinian policy, which was welcomed by the international 
community (Chomsky, 2015; Pappe, 2015). In addition, forming a unity government 
could refute the Israeli claim that there was no legitimate representative of 
Palestinians. It could also foil Israeli plans to deepen the geo-political division 
between Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel was, therefore, looking for a reason to 
foil the government and maintain its hegemony over the territories (ibid.).   
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In May 2014 an Israeli sniper killed two Palestinian children in the West Bank 
(Haaretz, 2014). Investigations proved that the soldier killed them for fun. 
Nonetheless, the event drew little attention since it was no more than a routine 
occurrence in Palestinian life (Chomsky, 2015). In contrast, when three Israeli settlers 
were kidnapped and killed in the West Bank a month later, Israel launched a massive 
campaign against the Palestinians. Although no Palestinian faction claimed 
responsibility (Beaumont & Crowcroft, 2014), and although some Israeli experts 
asserted that the action was carried out without the agreement of Hamas’s leadership 
(Rudoren & Ghazali, 2014), the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, blamed 
Hamas and vowed that the movement would pay a heavy price (ibid.). Netanyahu 
seized this opportunity and launched a military campaign in the West Bank which 
immediately derailed the Palestinian government. The Israeli army killed six 
Palestinians, arrested 419 others and searched thousands of locations and homes 
(Chomsky, 2015). The army also killed five Palestinians in Gaza on 7 July before 
Hamas finally reacted by launching rockets on Israel (BBC, 2014). On 8 July Israel 
launched its Operation Protective Edge against the Strip.   
The war lasted for 50 days and resulted in more than 2,200 Palestinian 
fatalities, thousands of injuries and around 20,000 totally or partially destroyed homes 
(Dearden, 2014). According to UN reports, 70 per cent of Palestinian casualties were 
civilians (Booth, 2014). The Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza reported that 
ninety Palestinian families were removed from the civil record (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 
49). Although the Israeli government insisted that its main targets were the tunnels, 
the army attacked schools, hospitals, power plants, water supplies, rescue teams and 
ambulances. As Chomsky and Pappe (2011) state about previous wars, Israel believes 
that targeting civilians will put pressure on resistance. Therefore, the whole Strip was 
40 
 
under fire, which nullifies Israel’s claim that many of the victims could move to safer 
areas (Chomsky, 2015). On the other hand, 64 Israeli soldiers and six civilians were 
killed (Dearden, 2014). Flights into and out of Israel’s main airport were suspended 
for a few days, and the Israeli economy suffered big losses.  
1.8.6 Ground invasion: the battle of Shejaiyeh 
After 12 days of artillery, aerial and naval bombardment, Israel launched its 
ground invasion. Israeli forces infiltrated the Shejaiyeh neighbourhood, located east of 
Gaza city, due to its military significance to Palestinian resistance. The Israeli army 
stated that the invasion of this area was meant to destroy a huge ‘terror fortress’ 
(Blumenthal, 2015, p. 40). 
Shejaiyeh is a densely populated area where more than 100,000 Palestinian 
residents live. In a preemptive justification, Israel claimed that it asked residents to 
leave their houses but Hamas asked them to stay. As aforementioned, this claim 
clouds the fact that there were no such safe places in the Strip. More importantly, 
Israel was aware that its actions would lead to massive human losses amongst 
Palestinians. Nonetheless, Israel focused merely on the military significance of its 
operation (Blumenthal, 2015).  
The large amount of Palestinian fire and the unexpected military tactics of 
Palestinian fighters prevented Israeli forces from achieving any military objectives. 
Many Israeli soldiers were killed and wounded in the first two days of the ground 
invasion, signalling the greatest loss for the Israeli army in such a short period. 
Moreover, Palestinian fighters managed to capture an Israeli soldier after they killed 
seven others. When the Israeli forces failed to dislodge the Palestinian resistance, they 
turned their attention to the civilian population and shelled the entire area with ‘a 
storm of explosive rain’ (ibid., p. 44). The army adopted an ‘open-fire’ policy, razing 
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Shejaiyeh to the ground. In two days, Israel killed and injured hundreds of Palestinian 
civilians (ibid.).  
Obviously, the Gaza War deepened the socio-political rift between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Palestinians highlighted their massive human losses and damage and 
recalled the long history of occupation. Israel, on the other hand, exploited all possible 
channels to present the war as an inventible reaction to terrorism (Pappe, 2015). One 
field of struggle over victim vs perpetrator representation was media discourse. There 
is very little dispute over the fact that both sides’ media were part of the struggle, and 
not merely conveyers of an objective reality. For instance, the Israeli media were 
accused of flagrantly adopting the narrative of the Israeli government in reporting the 
war, and failing to report army atrocities against Palestinian civilians (Pappe, 2015). 
Even media outlets that had different political orientations could not oppose the 
official one-sided narrative. Similarly, Palestinian media intensified the Israeli 
atrocities against civilians and focused on the disproportionate use of power.  
I believe, however, that the above claims about the Israeli and Palestinian 
media are very general and miss the internal ideological and political tensions. First, 
while the war might be justified and normalized by Zionism and neo-Zionism, it may 
challenge the moral and liberal values of post-Zionism. Second, although Hamas 
suffered serious damage to its military body, the movement, as well as a wide sector 
of the Palestinian public, still believes that it achieved a victory against Israel. In 
contrast, Fatah believes that the war only caused mass Palestinian suffering with no 
significant achievements (El-Shenawi, 2014).  
In light of the political and ideological context explained above, it can be 
argued that the representations of actions and actors in the war are associated with, 
and may be partially motivated by, the political and ideological tensions on both sides. 
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As delineated in Section 1.7, all the major events in the history of the conflict created 
a crisis for some ideological trends, but boosted others, which ultimately affected their 
discursive construction of the main aspects of the struggle. Therefore, the context 
introduced in this chapter is necessary to understand how representation in the press 
may function as a tool and field for internal conflicts. Moreover, the political and 
ideological context is a vital methodological basis for this critical study in which the 
findings of linguistic and discursive analysis are interpreted (see Section 2.5.1.1).  
In the following chapter, I move on to the theoretical framework of this study, 
where I review the general role of journalism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I also 
explain how this study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by focusing on nuances of 
representation in different media outlets in Israel and Palestine, which is intended to 
reveal tensions between different ideologies and political orientations. This includes 
reviewing the constructivist definition of discourse adopted by this study and the 
relationship between (journalism) discourse and ideologies in modern societies. 
Ultimately, the study will synthesize different theoretical bases within a coherent and 




CHAPTER 2: Journalism and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
2.1 Overview 
Based on the political and ideological context explained in Chapter One, it can 
be argued that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is an ideological struggle over the 
narratives and representations which construct the history and imagine the future of 
the people. By the same token, if we agree with the notion that each community 
contains different ideologies and political trends that function at the same time, it can 
be also argued that different ideologies and different political schemes have different 
representations of struggle. They exploit all possible means of information 
dissemination and knowledge construction, such as media, to enhance their own 
representations of conflict and challenge those of others.  
The notion of conflicting representations within Palestinian and Israeli 
societies has been investigated in the fields of politics and sociology (see Section 1.7). 
However, this notion has received little attention from (critical) discourse studies. 
More precisely, few studies have investigated internal political and ideological 
tensions in Palestine and Israel by analysing the language of news. Therefore, in this 
chapter I review the literature to situate this study and its research questions, which 
will make it possible to understand why it is necessary to conduct a critical language 
analysis of the internal political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel. This 
is followed by a thorough discussion of how the research questions are best 
investigated via a multidisciplinary critical framework. This method will adopt a 
constructivist definition of discourse that goes beyond mere description of the internal 
systematization of language into its role in the social context (see section 2.5.1). I then 
explain relevant aspects of the correlation between journalism discourse, ideology and 
the socio-political context in which ideologies function. I finally end up with a 
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theoretical and methodological layout that can answer the research questions, while at 
the same time granting the articulation of my political views as one belonging to one 
side of the struggle.   
2.2 Historical background 
The emergence and development of the Palestinian and Israeli press can hardly 
be separated from the development of the conflict between the two sides. At the onset 
of the twentieth century, Zionist activists published newspapers like Herut and 
Ha'ahdut, in 1909 and 1910, respectively, to spread cultural and religious values that 
later helped in forming the identity Zionism claimed for itself (Gentile, 2016; 
Jacobson, 2011). In spite of the British censorship on publishing, the Zionist press 
enjoyed more freedom and witnessed considerable progress. Journalism has enjoyed 
well-established institutional journalistic practices, and major newspapers such as 
Haaretz and Yediot Aharonot, founded in 1918 and 1939, respectively, have continued 
to be at the centre of today’s Israeli journalism (Gentile, 2016). Newspapers in Israel 
affiliate with different political factions and stand for different ideologies that these 
factions represent (Sheizaf, 2010). To a greater or lesser extent, Sheizaf argues, the 
preoccupation of these newspapers is not local issues, such as crime or local policies, 
but issues revolving around security, politics and diplomacy. In spite of their different 
political affiliations, Pappe (2014) asserts that all newspapers have been compliant 
with the Zionist movement and helped in obfuscating the atrocities against 
Palestinians, especially in the early stages of Israel. As such, the press in Israel has 
been always associated with disseminating Zionist values and political propaganda. 
Meanwhile, Palestinians too launched a few newspapers, such as al-Karmil 
and Filastin, in 1908 and 1911, respectively, to mediate an anti-Zionist discourse and 
sustain the growing Palestinian nationalism (Gentile, 2016). In contrast to the Israeli 
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press, however, the Palestinian press has always been confined within restrictions that 
limited its freedom and development. The Ottoman authorities monitored the press to 
maintain a pro-Ottoman discourse opposed to the growing pro-Arab nationalism 
(Najjar, 2005). Similarly, the British mandate acted firmly against all attempts to 
circulate revolutionary discourses opposing foreign rule (ibid.). With the 
establishment of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian press continued on the West Bank and 
in the Gaza Strip under the control of Jordanian and Egyptian regimes, respectively, 
and followed the rules and policies of those countries. After occupying the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel applied an emergency law which was inherited from 
the British Mandate and practised direct military censorship on all Palestinian 
newspapers (WAFAinfo, 2011). 
Major shifts in the Palestinian press occurred after the Oslo Accords. The press 
enjoyed unprecedented freedom and major newspapers, such as Alquds, Alhaya 
Aljadeeda and Alayyam, which were founded in 1951, 1994 and 1995, respectively, 
started to circulate widely within Palestinian society (Tarban, 2010). With the 
breakdown of the peace process and the growing independence and professionalism of 
Palestinian journalists, journalism entered a new era in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
2.3 Journalism and the ethno-national agenda 
In his analysis of the representation of the 2008/9 Gaza war in British 
broadsheets, Kaposi (2014) asserts that another war was taking place in the British 
media to present and understand events. It is less surprising, therefore, to learn that 
journalism, and media in general, in Palestine and Israel has become another field of 
struggle between Palestinians and Israelis (Wolfsfeld, 1997, 2003). Both sides know 
the role the media plays in shaping the perceptions of local and international 
audiences (Slater, 2007). ‘Israelis and Palestinians are both very aware that they are 
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playing to an international audience and, as always, there is a major struggle over who 
should be cast as aggressor and who as victim’ (Wolfsfeld, 2003). Media, especially 
news in the press, is a field where each side reinforces hatred against the other based 
on essentialized representations (ibid.). There is a general tendency to foreground the 
suffering of ‘Self’ by personalizing one’s own victims and backgrounding the 
suffering of the ‘Other’ by making few references to their victims and using 
anonymous statistics (ibid.). Although the different newspapers in both societies have 
different political and ideological backgrounds, Liebes (1997) asserts that political and 
ideological differences tend to narrow during blatant confrontations, and that 
journalists ‘rally around the flag’ in times of crisis. Palestinian newspapers, 
representing the weaker side, try to convince other countries to intervene and stop 
Israeli practices, thus investing media outlets as ‘equalizers’ of their political and 
military weakness (Wolfsfeld, 2003). On the other hand, Israeli media try to convince 
the world that Palestinians are using terrorism to obtain what they failed to achieve 
through negotiations (ibid.). One of the most appalling outcomes of this recruitment of 
the media is their failure to contribute to the peace process. On the contrary, Wolfsfeld 
argues, Palestinian and Israeli media have fuelled the conflict by prioritizing enmity 
rather than building trust, putting media in the service of ethno-national objectives 
based on an essentialized distinction between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. 
I will continue to use the term essentialized representation in the same sense 
as in the above studies. It is a representation that is based on socially-shared 
characteristics that associate an individual with a particular group, such as ethnicity or 
religion. It confines all further representations and judgements to out-of-context fixed 
images for social actors. For instance, Palestinian and Israeli media tend to construct 
two fixed roles for social actors. The actions of the ‘Self’ are legitimate, regardless of 
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their effect, while the actions of the ‘Other’ are illegitimate, regardless of their 
political or human legitimacy. In this sense, social actors are represented according to 
whom they are and not what they do.  
2.3.1 ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in Israeli newspapers 
In light of the above assumptions, the vast majority of research on the Israeli 
press has focused on the role of newspapers in reproducing essentialized 
representations of actors and actions. For instance, Nir and Roeh (1992) in their 
comparative analysis of Haaretz’s and Yediot Ahronoth’s coverage of the first Intifada 
found that both newspapers were very similar in articulating a hegemonic ideology 
rather than empowering public awareness of the factual importance of events. Dor 
(2004) also asserts that there is a tendency in Israeli newspapers to criminalize 
Palestinian resistance and label it as terrorism to get international support. Although 
these newspapers have different political agendas and ideological orientations, they 
produce, especially in times of confrontation, very similar representations of actors 
and actions (Rinnawi, 2007). Slightly different results are suggested by Dor (2015), 
who noticed some differences between Israeli newspapers in their coverage of the 
operation Defensive Shield during the second Intifada. These differences, however, 
are not suggestive of a deep ideological or political conflict between the newspapers. 
Rather, the author maintains that a hegemonic political discourse was the driving force 
for all the different newspapers which attempted to counter international 
condemnation by employing similar strategies of blame suppression. Other 
researchers demonstrate the direct interference of the state in newspapers in their 
reporting of Israeli military campaigns. Stein (2012), for instance, says that Israel’s 
control policy over the media led to essentialized representations in the 2008 Gaza 
war based on the selective and partial coverage of incidents. 
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Only a few studies deviate from the traditional line and focus instead on the 
differences between newspapers in Israel. Slater (2007), for instance, found that the 
leftist newspaper Haaretz is critical of some Israeli practices in the occupied 
territories regarding the construction of illegal settlements and the inhuman treatment 
of Palestinians. On the other hand, the Jerusalem Post and other rightist newspapers 
intensify the Palestinian threat, frame it as terrorism and mitigate to a great extent the 
Israeli occupation and military action (ibid.). Slater’s study, however, deals with 
editorials, which express different political views. It does not deal with news-reporting 
to investigate how the ‘objective reflection’ of one event produces different realities. 
Other researchers and scholars who are influenced by growing awareness of 
the role of the media in modern societies suggest that the media should play a positive 
role by advocating peaceful solutions. A leading work in this respect is a collection of 
studies edited by Kempf and Shinar (2014) in which different authors investigate the 
tendency of media worldwide to favour violent action. They argue that the media 
should, instead, advocate peaceful solutions by showing the high price of violence and 
antagonism. However, what Kempf and Shinar are advocating is open to a lot of 
criticism. For instance, the authors argue that a change in journalism discourse in 
Palestine and Israel should be accompanied by changing the frames of interpretation 
which audiences adhere to in their understanding of events. The authors do not say 
how these changes should be brought about though. They even admit that ‘radical 
right-wing government policies and right wing public opinion in Israel have 
increased’ (Kempf & Shinar, 2014, p. 8) which paints a gloomy picture of the future, 
let alone the ability to change the frames of interpretation.   
The socio-political and historical narratives on which the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is based have deeply influenced journalism in Israel and assigned ‘national’ 
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roles for newspapers to play. The argument, therefore, is not whether what has been 
concluded is true or not. It is about the research questions of these studies which seem 
to be confined to the notions of essentialization and dichotomous representation, 
leading to unsurprising conclusions. To break with this traditional form of enquiry, 
one needs a study that is very sensitive to the implicit and covert political and 
ideological tensions within the Israeli community. The question should not be whether 
Israeli newspapers are biased or not, as that is a naive question. Instead, the question, 
which has rarely been asked, should be about how journalism discourse is a field 
where different ideologies in Israel subtly compete. One is unlikely to find explicitly 
stated propositions in any Israeli newspaper that radically challenge the hegemonic 
Zionist ideology during a war. However, it might be rewarding to systematically 
examine textual choices that build up into different narratives, even when they cannot 
be observed by merely reading news articles. This motivates a major objective of this 
study, which includes a language-based analysis of three Israeli newspapers to detect 
some aspects of the political and ideological debate in Israel.  
2.3.2 ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in Palestinian newspapers 
Research on Palestinian media in general, and Palestinian newspapers in 
particular, has attracted less attention than that on Israeli media. Before the Oslo 
Accords, the Palestinian press was highly censored by the Israeli authority, making its 
content an unfavourable option for readers and observers (Kuttab, 1998). The press 
was unable to mediate its own political and ideological orientations and, therefore, 
researchers were reluctant to analyse the Palestinian press due to the lack of a 
minimum level of freedom of expression. After the Oslo agreement, Daraghmeh 
(2003) asserts, the lack of adequacy in reporting many events was attributed not only 
to the political agenda, but also to the lack of professional staff and well-established 
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institutional journalistic codes. It is not surprising, therefore, to find media openly 
adopting a hegemonic national discourse. In fact, the few studies conducted in this 
context support this assumption and show the Palestinian media as having a national 
position in which the ‘Self’ is victimized while the ‘Other’ is persistently demonized. 
For instance, Dajani (2003) suggests that Palestinian newspapers are confined to 
certain cultural codes that allow very little tolerance of the ‘Other’. Therefore, their 
coverage of the second Intifada was emotional and focused on Palestinian civilian 
casualties and damage to property. The aim was to defend Palestinian claims and stir 
up international condemnation of Israeli practices. This, Dajani maintains, led to 
exaggerated and inconsistent coverage of some events, due to the lack of institutional 
codes and a reliance on poorly-trained journalists.  
In a similar vein, Daraghmeh (2003) argues that Palestinian newspapers are 
mainly concerned with issues that show Israeli brutality, simply because such material 
is favoured by their audience. In addition, Daraghmeh suggests that journalists enjoy 
great freedom in covering Israeli actions, compared with the considerable censorship 
imposed on reporting internal Palestinian issues. Daraghmeh also states that different 
media outlets have different political affiliations and thus propagate their world views 
from different perspectives. Based on the political spectrum in Palestine, there are 
three kinds of press: government-run newspapers which function as mouthpieces for 
the PA, semi-independent or independent newspapers which are mostly 
internationally funded, and opposition newspapers which represent factions such as 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Democratic Front (Daraghmeh, 2003; Kuttab, 2003; 
Pitner, 2012). However, the authors claim that the different political perspectives of 
these outlets are expressed in editorials, while news reporting adopts similar strategies 
for representing the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. They all focus on, and sometimes 
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exaggerate, Israeli actions while fostering Palestinian resistance. Similar to what is 
claimed about the Israeli press, Daraghmeh says that different political affiliations 
play a minor role in times of violent confrontation.  
Essentialized representation in the Palestinian press is also detected by Steele 
(2014). The author identifies the media frames employed by online Palestinian news 
websites in their representation of Israeli Jews. Based on content analysis, Steele 
concludes that news websites ‘reinforce a stereotype and mentality that demonizes and 
dehumanizes the Israeli-Jew as “the Other”, ultimately fuelling the conflict and 
straining peace-making efforts’. The author suggests that media frames are deeply 
entrenched in the socio-political and cultural narratives on which the conflict is based. 
She, however, does not capture the role of political and ideological dynamics in news 
representations, assuming there is a similar political agenda for different news 
websites.  
Some scholars identify the changes in Palestinian journalism due to changes in 
the political context. Daraghmeh (2003), for instance, argues that after the Oslo 
Accords, the Palestinian press was openly trying to market the idea of a peaceful 
settlement based on a two-state solution. This changed dramatically during the second 
Intifada, when the Palestinian press focused on public support for all forms of 
resistance. However, no research has conducted a systematic and rigorous 
investigation of the relationship between changes in the Palestinian press and political 
dynamics within Palestinian society. Researchers have examined the content of 
newspapers merely to exemplify how the press’s coverage of events is considerably 
determined by ethno-national polarization which assumes two homogeneous groups: 
Us vs Them.  
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The majority of research has thus ignored important political and ideological 
changes within Palestinian society, especially after Hamas won the elections in 2006. 
The rise of Hamas as a main political player has deeply influenced the Palestinian 
media landscape. A few studies have conducted content analysis of some press outlets 
of the PA/ Fatah and Hamas and concluded that the media have become a field of 
struggle between two main political blocs (Pitner, 2012). While Fatah and the PA use 
their newspapers to counter the political expansion of Hamas, Hamas invests in media 
to enlist the support of the Palestinian public, especially to justify its takeover of Gaza 
in 2007 (Hamdan, 2012). The movement has adopted a strategy that not only shows 
the brutality of the Israeli occupation, but which also praises military resistance as a 
means to achieve what negotiations have failed to do, thus claiming legitimacy as an 
alternative to Fatah (Pitner, 2012; Wolfsfeld, 2003).  
These studies, however, depend on general and sometimes selective readings 
of the press, failing to capture particular discursive strategies used by different media 
outlets in representing different Palestinian political groups. More importantly, these 
studies are based on analysing editorials, thus ignoring news reporting which might 
include latent political tensions that cannot be explicitly articulated. They also take 
secular Fatah and religious Hamas discourses as a point of departure. They do not 
account for the fact that Hamas’s discourse underwent considerable changes after 
winning the elections in 2006 (Amer, 2012). For instance, as Amer asserts, the Hamas 
discourse has shifted from a radical Islamist discourse into a more national/ secular 
discourse that advocates democratic rule and political pluralism.  
This study, therefore, tries to fill a gap in the literature and change the 
traditional research layout when examining the media in Palestine and Israel. The 
question of journalism discourse in Palestine is not concerned with its biased role in 
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representing a criminalized ‘Other’ and a humanized ‘Self’. This question has been 
sufficiently answered by many studies with similar findings. The overarching question 
this study attempts to answer is whether different news outlets in Palestine give 
different representations of (Palestinian) actors and actions, and from what political 
tensions these representations arise. In times of violent confrontation, this question 
touches on sensitive issues due to the huge civilian losses on the Palestinian side. 
Hence it investigates whether the overt enmity with Israel involved in such situations 
is invested with a latent political agenda that cannot be spelled out explicitly.  
Thus far, I have been dealing with online and offline journalism discourse 
indifferently. It is important, therefore, to discuss some major characteristics of online 
journalism and then seek to justify why the study does not distinguish between 
languages of online and offline newspapers in Palestine/ Israel within the relevant 
research question. 
2.4 Online journalism 
The main focus of this study is the language of news reporting during a critical 
event in the deeply rooted Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The study seeks to understand 
how journalism discourse is intertwined with political and ideological objectives in 
both societies, and how it works to challenge them. It puts more emphasis on the 
linguistic dimension of reporting than the practices of news production and 
consumption. The study analyses reports from online news outlets because they are all 
published in English and primarily address an international audience. The role of new 
technology in news-making is thus beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, I 
briefly introduce online journalism and different views on the role of technology in 
relation to the changing the nature of the press, which ultimately justifies the choices 
of this study. 
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There is a wide belief that the Internet has changed basic traditions in the press 
and journalism, leading to a continuing debate about the position of new technology 
and the future of journalism (Paterson & Domingo, 2011; Yuan, 2012). New 
technology has created new affordances that have changed, to varying degrees, the 
way news is made, conveyed and consumed (Allan, 2006). Almost all of these 
changes relate to three main characteristics: hypertextuality, interactivity and 
immediacy, which refer, respectively, to the connectivity between non-linear texts via 
hyperlinks, the active role of the audience in the new medium – especially their ability 
to comment on some content items – and the ability of the Internet to offer immediate 
coverage of unfolding events (Allan, 2006; Steensen, 2011). These characteristics 
clearly indicate that technology has moved journalism into a new stage by modifying 
journalistic practices: eliminating old ones and creating new ones. There is, however, 
a dispute over the extent to which online journalism is related to offline journalism. 
While some researchers believe that both online and offline journalism have the same 
functions and position in society, others believe that online journalism is a completely 
different genre with a different role to play in contemporary societies. The dispute 
basically arises from a disagreement over the relationship between technology, human 
agency and the social structure in which social practices operate.  
Some researchers adopt a technologically deterministic approach (Raymond 
Williams as cited in Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012, p. 8), which suggests that new 
technology has profoundly changed the social role of journalism and its position 
within the social order. They argue that it has changed the top-down relationship 
between media and their consumers into what Jack Fuller (as cited in Ashuri, 2014, p. 
2) calls ‘the collapse of the old order’, whereby media have been transformed into 
collaborative communication models (Ashuri, 2014). The audience in these models 
55 
 
play an active role which allows them to comment on news content and express 
attitudes that could influence some journalists’ practices (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2015). 
The new technology can also identify audience preferences by counting the clicks on 
each content item, thus helping journalists to focus on content and ways of 
representation that appeal to their target audience (ibid.). This has changed the 
audience from passive consumers into co-producers in a ‘multiplicity of information 
flows’ which offer them opportunities to ‘enter and interpret the political world and 
influence the framing and setting of political agendas’ (Yuan, 2013, p. 80).  
The technological determinist approach of investigating online journalism has, 
however, been subjected to a great deal of criticism at the theoretical and analytical 
levels. It is accused of underestimating human agency in relation to technologies 
(Ashuri, 2014). Ashuri maintains that the changes in journalism are not determined by 
technology per se, but by journalists’ adapting to the new affordances. For instance, 
when printed newspapers launch online versions, ‘practitioners reproduce structures 
that secure the dominant position of their traditional organization in the mythical 
‘mediated centre’, while altering those structures that threaten it’ (ibid., p. 2). In 
applying his model to the Israeli online newspaper Ynet, Ashuri asserts that 
technology offers a reciprocal relationship between journalists/ editors and the 
audience by allowing people some space to share their stories and views. Nonetheless, 
journalists adopt the new technological affordances to maintain the traditional 
distinction between producers and consumers of news texts. Journalists still control 
the media frames that determine what stories to report and how to represent them, 
while readers are still in a ‘different world’, with their experiences excluded from 
news frames. This is realized by distinguishing between professional and non-
professional news content, keeping journalists and editors as ‘the principal source of 
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social facts and the provider of ‘true’ information and meanings at the societal level’ 
(ibid., p. 14). Similar conclusions were reached by Caspi (2011), who investigated the 
online versions of the main Israeli newspapers. Caspi believes that technology is 
adapted to sustain the traditional central role of media in Israeli society. As Jones and 
Salter (2012) put it, offline and online outlets have very similar positions in relation to 
the working social, economic and political structures of the societies in which they 
operate.  
The uncertainty in explaining online journalism arises from methodological 
and analytical shortcomings in examining online news outlets (Steensen, 2011). 
Steensen maintains that technology-oriented approaches give too much weight to the 
new affordances and ignore vital dynamics which relate to the content and context of 
the new form of news-making. This resembles to a great extent the failure of 
traditional approaches to give a satisfactory account of news on TV and in the press. 
Traditional approaches have focused on macro-contextual factors of news production, 
such as the economic and political aspects of news processing, and they have paid less 
attention to the message itself (van Dijk, 1988a, p. 1). Van Dijk has asserted that there 
is a need for new approaches that deal with what is produced as news, with reference 
to contexts of production and consumption. Similarly, Steensen calls for approaches 
that treat online journalism as part of the development of journalism and media in 
general, and not as a new paradigm that is detached from the historical and 
institutional context of the press. He suggests that to understand how online 
journalism connects media with society, one should combine discourse studies and 
textual analysis to reveal the complexity of online journalism. A rewarding 
investigation of online journalism focuses not only on the affordances of the new 
technology, but also on the discourse itself and its relation to the social structure. This 
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would account for the human agency that defines the social role of every new 
medium. Ultimately, this would unveil the ideologies behind human agency and 
explain why online journalism is used the way it is.  
Based on the above assumptions, and in light of some studies that have 
investigated the online versions of well-known offline newspapers (see Ashuri, 2014; 
Caspi, 2011; Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012), I assume that the traditional press and 
online journalism have similar journalistic and social roles, especially when reporting 
structurally entrenched issues. I believe that the representation of the Palestinian-
Israeli struggle is not determined by new technological affordances as much as the 
socio-political structure in which the press functions. That is why, as I will explain in 
later sections, any examination of the fissures and ambivalence in both sides’ 
representations should account for the latent strategies that covertly challenge the 
structures, strategies that cannot be identified by merely examining new affordances. 
As Allan (2006) puts it, no matter how its practices change, the ideological workings 
behind journalism remain active. This is a practical perspective that considers the 
integration of new affordances into news-making as an adaptation of technology to 
achieve (structurally) established objectives (Caspi, 2011). So, if traditional 
journalism and printed papers are arenas for ideologically-motivated representations 
of reality (Fowler, 1991), online newspapers maintain this function and offer political 
movements the advantage of ‘a convenient and inexpensive means of maintaining an 
ideological in-house organ’ (Caspi, 2011, p. 347).  
Finally, unlike some forms of online practice, such as blogging, which lie on 
the boundary of the field of journalism (see Jones & Slater, 2012), the newspapers and 
news websites analysed in this study are run by professional editors and journalists. 
On the one hand, the Israeli online newspapers Haaretz, Ynet and JP are not 
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independent newspapers but Internet editions of printed papers. They are ‘an 
immediate and perhaps simplistic response to the perceived threat posed by 
information websites, usually including all or at least part of the printed paper’s 
content’ (Caspi, 2011, p. 347). On the other hand, Palestinian news websites can be 
classified, according to Caspi’s model, into independent online newspapers which are 
not connected to the printed press. As the author states, the owners, editors and 
journalists have no commitment to printed versions as these websites have their own 
practices and objectives. However, Caspi identifies crucial similarities in the way the 
printed press developed and the way independent online news websites are growing 
and developing today. Therefore, I will assume that the language of online journalism 
is similar, if not identical, to that of offline journalism. 
2.5 Critical discourse analysis 
The investigation of news reporting in Palestine and Israel in light of the 
political and ideological dynamics in each community necessitates not only new 
research questions, but also distinctive theoretical and methodological frameworks 
that analyse the language of news, explain their discursive functions (what images 
they construct for actions and actors) and evaluate the linguistic and discursive 
findings in relation to the social context. Since the research questions are politically 
motivated, there is also a need for a critical approach that allows the articulation of the 
analyst’s political stance, while keeping the linguistic and discursive analyses of the 
data academically transparent and rigorous.  
The method for this study is inspired by Roger Fowler’s influential works in 
Critical Linguistics. Fowler, was first interested in stylistics, contributed to the rise of 
Critical Linguistics when he co-authored the book Language and Control in 1979, 
with Tony Trew, Bob Hodge and Gunther Kress. Their work initiated a new branch of 
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linguistics which goes beyond descriptions of systems of language into investigating 
the relationship between language use and social relations. Critical linguistics, 
therefore, was a major step in using language analysis to understand social 
phenomena. It is closely associated with Halliday’s functional grammar, which 
associates language use with social needs (Johnson & Johnson, 1998). Later, Fowler 
published other influential works that focus on Critical Linguistics as a method of 
analysing news language. For instance, in 1991 he wrote his book Language in the 
News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press, on which this study draws heavily. The 
new branch of linguistics that Fowler and his colleagues initiated played a major role 
in the development of Critical Discourse Analysis as a new overarching perspective 
that is concerned with the correlation between discourse and social reality.  
Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) is a field of study that is 
interested in analysing aspects of social life by critically examining language use. 
CDA is not a method but a school of thought that has its manifold roots in many 
disciplines of social science (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). It consists of ‘several 
identifiable ‘schools’ or ‘approaches’, each of which has its own distinct 
methodology’ (Hart, 2014, p. 2). CDA is not concerned with language per se, but with 
how social processes and structures are manifested and maintained by language and 
language use (Wodak, 1996). It aims to investigate ‘the way social power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the 
social and political context’ (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352) by ‘linking linguistic analysis to 
social analysis’ (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 206). Thus CDA has an emancipatory 
impulse that aims to resist all forms of social inequality (ibid.). To this end, it follows 
a constitutive problem-oriented and interdisciplinary approach that distinguishes it 
from other forms of discourse studies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 2). This means that 
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CDA is structurally biased, since the analyst must hold a political point of view and 
‘some particular normative-ethical perspective’ (ibid.). However, while CDA 
researchers should make their positions and interests explicit, they also need to retain 
their respective scientific methodologies when conducting analyses (ibid., p. 3). As 
Hart (2014, p. 2) argues, the disclosure of latent ideological and persuasive elements 
of language requires the ‘assistance of a systematized descriptive framework such as a 
grammar or typology’. In fact, this juxtaposition of objective analysis with subjective 
evaluation of the findings is what makes CDA a distinguishable, interdisciplinary and 
emancipatory school of thought, and not merely a method of analysis.  
2.5.1 Discourse as a social practice 
CDA adopts a functional definition of discourse having a dynamic relationship 
with social structures and focuses primarily on what people can do with discourse 
(Richardson, 2007). In this sense, discourse is a social practice, meaning that there is a 
‘dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), 
institution(s), and social structure(s), which frame it’ (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 
258). It assumes that discourse ‘is socially shaped, but it is also socially shaping, or 
constitutive’ (Fairclough, 2010, p. 92). It is socially conditioned, but it is also 
constitutive of situations, objects of knowledge, social identities and relationships 
between people and groups of people (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). This means that 
the ideologies – as part of the social structure – that underlie human action and 
interaction are not only represented but also constructed by discourse (KhosraviNik, 
2015). Moreover, if discourse is constitutive of the hegemonic ideologies that it 
reproduces and sustains, then it can also challenge and transform these ideologies 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). In other words, while discourse constructs a 
representation of reality that is consistent with the hegemonic ideology, it can also 
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construct different realities that challenge the prevalent representations of socio-
political issues, especially via mass communication discourses which may become 
fields of competing ideologies (KhosraviNik, 2015). In this study, for instance, the 
analysis of Israeli newspapers reveals how marginal post-Zionist ideology challenges 
hegemonic Zionism by constructing a different representation of the 2014 Gaza war. 
Consequently, investigating how discourse functions in constructing controversial 
issues can reveal some discursive aspects of working ideologies in a particular 
context. This is primarily based on the assumption that language plays a role in 
constructing people’s perceptions of identities and events through the normalization 
and legitimization of ideologies (Hart, 2014). 
As the critical analysis of discourse is necessarily concerned with the 
relationship between language and social structures and the assumptions that underlie 
the use of language in a specific way, two concepts are basic in any study that 
operates within the framework of CDA: context and ideology. 
2.5.1.1 Context 
Context has a basic role within CDA in linking discourse to social structures. 
As Fowler (1991) argues, the basic notion of CDA is situating texts in contexts. It 
involves ‘analysing the relationship between texts, processes, and social conditions, 
both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote 
conditions of institutions and social structures’ (Fairclough, 1989, p. 26). In fact, 
context is the starting point of CDA. The analyst first identifies ‘social wrongs’ that 
have semiotic aspects and then develops an interdisciplinary approach to address these 
wrongs (Fairclough, 2009, p. 167). Moreover, based on the functional definition of 
discourse, context is a structural built-in element of discourse. For instance, 
Fairclough refers to the actual usage of language as semiosis. He argues that social 
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processes include semiotic elements and non-semiotic elements, which have a 
dialectical relationship with each other (ibid.). Similarly, Wodak and Meyer (2009, p. 
89) define discourse as ‘a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are 
situated within specific fields of social action’. On the methodological and analytical 
levels, Wodak and Meyer (2009. 93) provide an inclusive and overarching definition 
of context that can apply to (most) critical studies: 
1. The immediate language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse; 
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres 
and discourses; 
3. The extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of 
situation’;  
4. The broader socio-political and historical context, which discursive practices are 
embedded in and related to. 
Cognitive approaches to CDA add another dimension of context that includes 
‘the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation that are 
relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse’ (van Dijk, 1998). There is 
no specific manner of moving from one dimension to another in linking language to 
context. This depends on the analytical needs and the questions addressed, which 
mostly necessitate a recursive approach (Wodak, 2007).  
2.5.1.2 Ideology 
Ideology is another key concept in the analysis of discourse as a social 
practice. Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 8) argue that the traditional definition of 
ideology as ‘a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values’ has not changed 
much. However, they suggest that the term has acquired different connotations in 
different fields of enquiry. In CDA, different approaches suggest different definitions 
63 
 
of ideology in order to suit their epistemological background. For instance, van Dijk 
(2005) believes that ideology is a world view that constitutes social cognition. He 
argues that human cognition mediates the relationship between discourse and social 
structures, and that in striving for discourse to be formulated and operated in a 
particular way, ideologies shape people’s collective perceptions of themselves and of 
their surroundings, which ultimately leads to using discourse in the way it is used. 
Fairclough (2003), in his socially-oriented approach, conceives ideologies as 
perspectivised constructions of practices. He believes that ideologies are 
‘representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and 
maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 
218). Fairclough also emphasizes the discursive aspect of ideologies. They are 
‘enacted in ways of interacting […] and inculcated in ways of being’ (ibid.). Reisigl 
and Wodak (2016) argue that CDA is particularly interested in (latent) everyday 
beliefs that shape people’s understanding of social phenomena and build into coherent 
basic assumptions that guide interpretations of events and actions. They assert that 
when these assumptions are shared by the majority, and people start to forget other 
alternatives to the status quo, the prevailing ideology becomes hegemonic.  
Hart (2014) asserts that CDA practitioners share an inclusive definition of 
ideology as a world view. Ideologies in this sense are logically coherent and 
normalized patterns of beliefs and values that guide individuals’ actions and influence 
their evaluations (ibid). More importantly, the different approaches of CDA 
foreground the discursive nature of ideologies as being – partially – constructed, 
proliferated, sustained or challenged via discourse. Therefore, the analysis of texts can 
be an ‘important aspect of ideological analysis and critique’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 
218). Systematic critical analysis of language can link the use of language to social 
64 
 
structures, explaining why language is used in the way it is, and how ideologies are 
reproduced or challenged by particular texts in particular social contexts.  
2.5.2 CDA, journalism discourse and the analysis of ideology 
Media discourse has become a focal interest of CDA in order to uncover how 
media language plays an important role in the formation of people’s perceptions of 
social realities (Fairclough, 1995a; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Hart, 2014). Based on 
the assumption that discourse provides ‘a finely articulated vehicle for differences in 
power in hierarchical social structures’ (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 10), and based on 
the functional definition of discourse as a social practice guided by ideology, CDA 
aims to identify ideologies and political interests as they are overtly or covertly 
articulated in discourse (van Dijk, 1995b). CDA primarily seeks to analyse discourse 
that is directed or consumed by social collectives, such as media discourse which 
shapes social cognition in van Dijk’s terms. However, van Dijk (1995c) argues that a 
theory that relates discourse to underlying ideologies has not yet been worked out. 
This study, therefore, introduces the ideological role of journalism discourse and then 
suggests how a textual analysis might reveal some discursive aspects of the way 
ideologies function in a given society.  
Media are amongst the most powerful ‘symbolic elites’ (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 
49) which ‘have access to and control over a vast array of both informal as well as 
public and institutional forms of text and talk’ (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 20). Since media 
are basic channels for the dissemination of information (van Dijk, 1993), and due to 
their access to symbolic capital that is not open to the public, they are important 
channels through which ideologies function in societies. As such, critical analysts 
provide a definition of journalism discourse that encompasses its ideologically based 
nature. For instance, Fowler (1991, p. 10) maintains that news discourse ‘is not a clear 
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window but a refracting, structuring medium’. He argues that due to its social, 
political and economic situatedness, news discourse always conveys a particular 
ideological angle. Fowler also highlights the role of news in constituting people’s 
mental construction of the social reality. He argues that news discourse is a 
constructive practice that is dialectically associated with ‘stereotypes’, socially-
constructed mental categories into which events and individuals are sorted (ibid., p. 
17). In similar terms, van Dijk (1988b) suggests that news is understood, and thus 
accepted or rejected, according to its consistency with cognitive frames of 
interpretation shared by a group of people. This notion is also raised by Chilton 
(2005), who asserts that discourse and human behaviour are mediated by cognitive 
processes, and that the construction of knowledge takes place in the minds of 
individuals. News, however, plays a major role in constructing these mental 
frameworks and cognitive processes, which provide interpretations of events and 
justifications of actions. Van Dijk asserts that the majority of news items usually fit 
into people’s cognitive schema. When they do not, they ‘provide the argumentative 
strategies that can handle them so that they can be discounted’ (ibid., p. 207).  
Like media in general, news discourse serves the interests of dominant groups 
(Fairclough, 1993). Not only does news sustains the dominant consensus as 
represented by prevailing cognitive frameworks, it also discourages any alternatives 
that might provide different perceptions of the reality on the basis of a more balanced 
distribution of power. It thus plays a vital role in reproducing dominant ideologies 
(van Dijk, 1988b). Although news discourse has certain functions to fulfil which 
might not necessarily be in the interest of the majority, the language of news is still 
highly persuasive (KhosraviNik, 2015). One important reason for this persuasiveness 
is the invisibility of the relationship between discourse and ideologies (Fairclough, 
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1995a). Since no news can be neutral (Fowler, 1991, p. 24), and because people are 
exposed to news on a daily basis, news discourse is assumed to play a role in 
constructing people’s social, political and educational conceptions by projecting news 
events into their lives (KhosraviNik, 2015). By comparing it to other (personal) 
discourses, news discourse has been identified as a significant source of knowledge 
(KhosraviNik 2015, p. 73). The ‘picture of the world’, which media provide, deeply 
influences people’s attitudes towards events unfolding in their social reality (ibid).  
The relationship between journalistic discourse and people’s perceptions is not 
deterministic though. Van Dijk (1995b) asserts that the audience generally retain a 
minimum autonomy and can actively engage in the use of mass communication. 
Hence, van Dijk continues, (some) news receivers are able to resist persuasive news 
discourse. If journalism discourse is, by necessity, ideologically driven, then analysing 
the language of news can be rewarding when investigating ideology and the way it 
discursively functions. More importantly, based on the role of ideology in guiding 
people’s actions and interactions, the audience’s rejection of ideologically-oriented 
news content, as van Dijk asserts, can be ideological in itself.  
So far, the main focus of CDA has been to analyse the discursive functions of 
dominant and hegemonic ideologies as manifested in journalism (amongst others) 
discourse. Many studies have tried to uncover the mechanisms via which ideologies 
regulate the lives of people. For instance, van Dijk (1995b, p. 16) defines the 
dominant ideology as a system of ‘norms and values that control the coherence and 
development of specific social attitudes’. Based on this definition, he maintains that 
news discourse has two parallel forms of ideological influence on the audience: 
influence over understanding, which results from contributing to the formation of 
knowledge, and influence over evaluation, which results from controlling the attitudes 
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of people. When entrenched in societal structures in hegemonic form, norms and 
values are no longer viewed as ideological but as self-evidently true (ibid.). This 
means that journalism discourse, amongst the discourses of other elite institutions, 
constructs people’s knowledge, which in turn shapes their attitudes and evaluations of 
unfolding events. This hegemonic discourse sustains a top-down relationship with the 
audience: more or less fixed conceptions and assumptions provide interpretations of 
people’s social reality, including their attitudes towards actions and (Self/ Other) 
actors.  
Van Dijk (1995c) developed a socio-cognitive approach to analyse ideology 
based on the above assumptions. He argues that the relationship between ideology and 
discourse is not direct, but mediated by social (collective) cognition. It follows then 
that any investigation of ideology should take into account the mental/ social 
representations shared by a group of people. These representations influence the 
knowledge and attitude of individuals (or sub-groups) which, when featuring in 
personal cognition, influence and control discourse. Van Dijk, then, constructed his 
methodology based on a two-dimensional mechanism: micro- and macro-discourse 
structures that function to establish a positive image of ‘Us’ and a negative image of 
‘Them’.  
This methodology proved to be useful in analysing specific kinds of texts in 
specific contexts, such as opinions in newspapers articles that discuss topics related to 
already discursively constructed groups, e.g. white/ black, Westerners/ (Middle) 
Easterners etc. But van Dijk does not indicate how the implicit ideological tensions 
within the same group can be spelled out via discourse structures. More importantly, 
van Dijk assumes that ideologies have a top-down direction where mental 
representations as attitudes and knowledge ‘feature the overall evaluative concepts 
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that also influence lexical choice’ (ibid., p. 143). He seems to believe that this 
mechanism of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation applies to dominant as 
well as marginal ideologies. One problem with this suggestion is that not all tensions 
in a society are explicit and classified on a dichotomous scale of representation. For 
instance, all Israelis during wars identify with the collective in-group, as explained 
earlier. It is unlikely then to find explicit discourse structures that distinguish between 
different groups of the same collective body.  
As marginal ideologies do not have solid and widespread bases in social 
structures, their challenge to the hegemonic ideology may take a bottom-up direction. 
Van Dijk himself asserts that the relationship between ideology and the mental 
management of discourse is not direct but mediated by ‘specific attitudes, knowledge 
and particular mental models of events and contexts of communication’ (ibid., p. 140). 
Consequently, journalism discourse that serves marginal ideologies may change the 
attitudes of people by constructing events differently, especially events which are not 
explained satisfactorily by the hegemonic ideology. Eventually, constructing different 
attitudes/ evaluations of a certain social reality may lead to changing people’s 
knowledge about it. Although this suggestion is too general and may vary from one 
context to another, applying it to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be adequate. By 
analogy to van Dijk’s (1995b, p. 18) exemplification, Israeli newspapers’ discourse is 
confined to dichotomous positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ representation. Ram 
(2003, p. 30) argues that Israeli journalism, amongst other practices, played an active 
role in the composition and propagation of Jewish nationalism based on the Zionist 
narrative. This narrative never adopted an alternative liberal-territorial principle but 
rather systematically excluded the Palestinians. Similarly, Pappe (2014) argues that 
some media have tried to highlight the suffering of Palestinians but without radically 
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challenging the main Zionist narrative. This means that a similar frame of 
interpretation is adopted by different media outlets.  
A deep systematic analysis, however, may reveal varying attitudes about 
specific (controversial) events and actions, which ultimately construct different 
evaluations of these actions. In the long run, these (different) evaluations might 
disturb people’s understanding of the conflict as derived from the hegemonic 
ideology. Van Dijk (1995c) himself asserts that the liberal press in Europe adopts a 
different discourse from rightist newspapers about refugees. He, however, maintains 
that the alternative discourse is realized by sporadic attempts to criticize the racist 
discourse. It does not provide radically different frames that stand in opposition to the 
majority’s consensus on ethnic affairs. That is why, as will become clearer in later 
sections, analysing Palestinian and Israeli newspapers requires a set of research 
questions and methodological synergies that take into account ideological tensions not 
only across the two societies, but also inside each society. More importantly, detecting 
competing ideologies in both societies needs a rigorous and systematic analysis that 
reveals how alternative discourses influence people’s evaluations without challenging 
their frames of interpretation. 
Kelsey’s (2014) work exemplifies this growing tendency in studying 
irregularities of representation in media discourse. By delineating the correlation 
between mythology, ideology and (media) discourse, the author makes explicit 
discourse paradoxes that result from resorting to myths to make sense of current 
issues. He examines the British media coverage of the financial crisis by analyzing the 
Mail Online representation of City bankers. He finds that some paradoxes arise when 
the newspaper negatively represents bankers as tricksters but refrains from 
systemically criticizing contemporary capitalism.  
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Although Kelsey’s work is situated in a different context, and although it uses 
different analytical tools from those used in this study, his work is illuminating due to 
the emphasis it puts on the contradictions between the micro (the textual realizations) 
and the macro (the social structures). This study follows the same route and tries to 
find tensions and irregularities between news language (at clause level) and the social 
structures. In addition, similar to Kelsey’s work, this study is interested in latent 
fissures and nuances. Therefore, the study should be sensitive to the mechanisms of 
marginal ideologies which may operate covertly in a bottom-up direction. The study 
should be designed in a way that brings together the discursive functions of different 
linguistic choices to see whether different stories arise in the newspapers, and what 
ideologies motivate and are reproduced by these differences in representation. I 
assume that this is a crucial step in developing methodologies that investigate latent 
ideological tensions in news reporting.  
2.5.3 Dialectical-relational approach 
As explained earlier, CDA adopts a functional definition of discourse. CDA 
practioners are interested in what people can do with language to analyze complex 
social problems, which necessitates theoretical and methodological multidisciplinarity 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Hart and Cap (2014) assert that this kind of critical analysis 
‘is a complex domain which is, in principle at least, without boundaries both 
methodologically and in terms of the type of data it targets’ (p. 2). This identifies one 
of the most distinctive characteristics of CDA, it allows eclectic theoretical 
frameworks that address different aspects of linguistic, discursive and social 
phenomena (Weiss & Wodak, 2003). Since CDA is not an approach in itself, but 
rather a school of thought with a socio-political attitude (van Dijk, 2009, p. 62), it is 
possible to draw on different, but compatible, analytical approaches and tools to 
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address the research questions. Any approach of CDA should go beyond mere 
description of the linguistic components of texts and defining the purposes and 
functions they serve in human affairs (Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1995a). They have 
to be systematic and, more importantly, ‘translate their theoretical claims into 
instruments and methods of analysis’ (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 14).  
Different researchers use theoretical entry points in a rather eclectic way 
(ibid.). In addition, some methods are typically associated with different approaches. 
Yet, these different approaches serve varying analytical objectives and give 
practitioners different points of departure to analyse the complex and dialectical 
relationship between discourse and social reality along a continuum ‘that links the 
‘micro’ (the linguistic) to the ‘macro’ (the social) (Hart and Cap, 2014, p. 1). Since 
this study is interested in conducting language analysis to answer questions of 
representation based on political and ideological workings in the structurally 
entrenched Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it adopts a dialectical-relational approach 
(Fairclough, 1995a, b, 2000, 2003, 2016) as a general framework based on theoretical, 
methodological and analytical considerations.  
The dialectical-relational approach, (henceforth DRA), was proposed by 
Norman Fairclough to investigate the dialectical relationship between discourse, or 
semiosis in Fairclough’s (1995a) terms, and other (non-linguistic) elements of social 
practices. At a higher level, the DRA aims to analyse the dialectical relationship 
between communicative events (e.g. a news report), social practices and social 
structures. Fairclough (1995a) argues that any social process is necessarily an 
interplay between these three levels of social reality. A dialectical relationship means 
that discourse has particular functions in reproducing or challenging these practices 
and structures, and the main aim of the DRA is to analyse these functions. Fairclough 
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(1995a, p. 55), therefore, defines three functions of discourse: it construes social 
identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief. In Wodak and Meyer 
(2016), Fairclough substitutes social relations for facets of action. Both, however, are 
the same in that they demonstrate how discourse constructs the relationships between 
people involved in a communicative event by constituting procedures (e.g. political 
texts constitute the procedure of governance and thus establish a specific relationship 
between the politician(s) and the audience). Using the term facet of action seeks to 
emphasize the notion that any social action or interaction is partially semiotic. 
Therefore, Fairclough’s three semiotic categories, discourses, styles and genres that 
correspond to discourse functions have not changed.  
The term discourse as used by Fairclough has two senses. The first refers to 
the actual usage of language, or what Fairclough (2016, p. 87) calls ‘meaning-making 
as an element of the social process’, while the second refers to the way of ‘construing 
aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective’ (ibid.). In this 
study, the first meaning will refer to actual news language as found in the analysed 
data, while the latter will be used to refer to particular world view(s) such as Zionist 
and post-Zionist discourses.  
As Wodak and Meyer (2016) demonstrate, the DRA is a structuralist approach 
with broad linguistic operationalization. In light of the complicated nature of the 
Palestinian-Israeli struggle, the DRA is useful for investigating the role of social 
structures in regulating people’s perceptions of their social context. The main concern 
is how ideologies provide particular world views via discourse, while the agency of 
social actors (which is the interest of other approaches) is of minor interest. This does 
not mean an absolute determinist role for structures over individuals. Instead, it 
emphasizes the notion that, in the Palestine-Israel context, social structures are 
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entrenched in divisive ideologies that can hardly be openly challenged, either by 
individuals or by alternative ideologies/ discourses. That is why, as discussed earlier, 
this study assumes that marginal ideologies function covertly to change people’s 
perceptions without constructing radically different world views.  
A similar categorization of the DRA and other approaches appears in Hart and 
Cap (2014), where the approaches are arranged on a cognitive–functional continuum. 
Contrary to the cognitive approaches, the DRA investigates the functions of discourse, 
outside human cognition but within institutional and social structures. This trend 
assumes a correlation between the way language is used and the function it is intended 
to serve, without delving into the mental processes of language users. In a similar 
vein, Unger (2016, p. 3) points out that the DRA is preoccupied with the relationship 
between text and social contexts, at a relatively considerable distance from cognitive 
conduct. All these characteristics of the DRA are consistent with the research 
questions and the socio-political context of this study.  
Hart and Cap (2014) introduced another useful distinction of CDA approaches 
based on their analytical attractors. The diagrams the authors use (see page 7 of Hart 
& Cap) show the DRA drawing on two analytical attractors: post-structuralism and 
systemic functional grammar. The first links the analytical objectives with the 
epistemological background of the approach. Instead of looking at how texts are 
unified by universal rules, the approach seeks to identify the distinctiveness of 
discourses and the way they evolve, change and compete. On the other hand, systemic 
functional grammar (henceforth SFG) is a basic linguistic methodology of the DRA. 
Unlike formalist methodologies, SFG links language articulation to varying functions, 
thus demonstrating part of the correlation between discourse and social context, which 
is consistent with the general commitment of CDA. More specifically, in dealing with 
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media discourse, SFG can ‘anchor social and cultural research and analysis in a 
detailed understanding of the nature of media output’ (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 16). It 
also inspired Fairclough’s three functions of discourse. The DRA is mainly interested 
in a multifunctional view of texts, as proposed by Halliday (1985) who argues that any 
text has ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. Fairclough (1995a, p. 17) 
suggests that ‘the ideational function of language is its function of generating 
representations of the world; the interpersonal function includes the functioning of 
language in the constitution of relations, and of identities’. In fact, SFG was invested 
in the first critical trends of linguistics to analyse ideological propositions in language 
(see Fowler, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1993). What is new in the DRA, however, is a 
systematic association between functions of language and particular discursive 
functions – above the level of language. This is assumed to shift controversial 
pragmatic interpretation of language into a systematic analysis of the role of language 
in real social contexts.  
The reliance of the DRA on SFG does not exclude other useful methods that 
can be applied in accordance with the research questions and objectives. This holds 
true because the DRA is not a fixed method but rather a framework which provides a 
theoretical basis on which different methods can be used according to how the object 
of research is theoretically constructed (Fairclough, 2016, p. 91). As Richardson 
(2007, p. 37) asserts, the DRA is flexible in combining a set of analytical tools to 
address different questions, thus providing an accessible method for doing CDA. 
Fairclough (1995a) himself gives isolated examples of textual analysis, such as 
vocabulary choices and metaphors, without exploiting SFG systematically. In this 
sense, SFG is not only an analytical attractor of the DRA, as Hart and Cap (2014) 
argue, but also a theoretical attractor which establishes Fairclough’s discursive 
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functions in a linguistic theory that identifies functions of language in a social context 
– outside texts themselves. It makes a lot of sense, then, that any linguistic method 
that helps in identifying textual functions can be used. 
Although the DRA has been exposed to criticism, especially in its theoretical 
and analytical shortcomings for analysing argumentation (see Reisigl, 2014), it has 
been widely recognized as a useful frame for media studies (Richardson, 2007). As 
Hart and Cap (2014, p. 9) argue, an important feature of the DRA is the 
conceptualization of discourse being merged with more recent work on context and 
production-reception dynamics in the media. This allows an adjustment to the 
analytical potential of the approach to suit the data and context of the study. The 
following is a discussion of the general epistemological and methodological 
characteristics of the DRA in relation to media discourse, while specific methods of 
analysis will be discussed in Chapter Three.  
Equivalent to the three levels of social reality identified above, Fairclough 
distinguishes between three dimensions of analysis: analysing the form and function 
of texts, analysing the way texts are produced and consumed, and analysing the wider 
socio-political structures in which texts are embedded (Richardson, 2007). The textual 
dimension involves the analysis of vocabulary, semantics and grammar, as well as 
textual organization above the sentence level, such as the overall structure of a news 
article (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 57). The significance of this analysis lies in the functions 
of the textual elements and their direct and indirect involvement in (re)producing or 
resisting systems of ideology and social power (Richardson, 2007, p. 38). Richardson 
argues that linguistic analysis should be anchored in three fundamental assumptions. 
First, the form and content of texts are interrelated. This means that differences in 
meaning entail differences in form and, conversely, different forms produce different 
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meanings. Second, following Fairclough (1995a), analysing texts moves from micro-
analysis (how propositions are structured to represent social actors, processes, actions 
and events) to macro-analysis (how clauses and propositions are structured to make 
one coherent whole). Third, as discussed above, texts are ‘multifunctional’; they serve 
ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. Although textual and discursive 
functions can be served by the same text, one of the functions might appear to be more 
important than the other (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 55). Therefore, the researcher can 
focus on one discursive function and one (equivalent) textual function. Finally, any 
analysis within the DRA, and CDA in general, is sensitive to absences as well as 
presences (ibid., p. 58).  
The second dimension of analysis is discursive analysis. Since the link 
between the textual and the social is indirect, the analysis here is concerned with 
mediating discursive practice: processes of text production, distribution and 
consumption (Fairclough, 1995a). For instance, in analysing a news report, the 
researcher may need to analyse institutional routines, such as the editorial procedures 
for producing a journalistic text and the routines of the audience receiving this text 
(see Deacon, Fenton, & Bryman, 1999; Perrin, 2013). Discursive practices are quite 
vast and interrelated. They include instruments of production and consumption as well 
as ways of storing and remembering (Blommaert as cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 75). 
Fairclough (1995a, p. 59) also talks about the transformations texts undergo through 
processes of production and consumption as a worthy aspect of investigation when 
analysing discursive practices. This notion is also dealt with from the perspective of 
intertextuality, which investigates how texts are linked to other texts in the same or in 
different contexts (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001b, p. 90). The process of transferring 
textual elements to new contexts is called recontextualization. The study of 
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recontextualization explains how textual elements acquire new meanings and, 
therefore, perform different functions (ibid). 
 Detecting changes in how texts are produced and consumed helps in 
identifying their normative and creative role in orders of discourse, whether texts 
reproduce existing boundaries of orders of discourse or work to restructure them 
(Fairclough, 1995a). By order of discourse, Fairclough (2001, p. 2) refers to ‘the way 
in which diverse genres and discourses and styles are networked together. An order of 
discourse is a social structuring of semiotic difference - a particular social ordering of 
relationships amongst different ways of making meaning, ie different discourse and 
genres and styles’. 
Richardson (2007) explains discursive practices in great detail. He 
distinguishes between a number of professional and organizational practices that play 
important roles in the way texts are produced and consumed. These explanations will 
not be referred to here because they receive little attention in this study.  
The third dimension of analysis is concerned with the material social context. 
It deals with real social actors, social relations, histories and practices that ‘while 
residing outside of the newsroom, permeate and structure the activities and outputs of 
journalism’ (Richardson, 2007, p. 114). Fairclough (1995a) classifies social practices 
into immediate context, institutional context and a wider social and cultural context. 
He also distinguishes between economic, political and cultural aspects of social 
structures that can be referred to in the critical analysis of texts with varying emphasis. 
The analysis assumes a dialectical relationship between texts and social practices. 
However, as discussed when introducing the theoretical background of the DRA, texts 
and social structures do not necessarily influence each other equally. For instance, 
since the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is deeply entrenched in different aspects of both 
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peoples’ lives, structures may have determinacy over texts. Both sides deal with each 
other according to hegemonic ideologies that allow very little room for tolerance. 
Therefore, (news) texts can hardly openly challenge the structures in which they are 
embedded. Moreover, it is political and ideological structures that are the focus of this 
study. More precisely, it is the ‘constitutive effects’ of ideologies (Richardson, 2007, 
p. 114) on journalism discourse that this study intends to reveal via language analysis. 
Richardson asserts that constitutive effects do not go unchecked by journalists. He 
says that there might be a certain resistance (ibid., p. 115) which, as explained above, 
could be motivated by another (marginal) ideology.  
The three levels of analysis are interrelated. While doing textual analysis, the 
analyst draws on relevant discursive and structural practices. More importantly, as 
Fairclough (1995a, p. 62) asserts, the framework is compatible with various different 
emphases. The focus on each of the three levels is dependent on the research questions 
and objectives. Therefore, this study will focus primarily on textual (linguistic) 
analysis and on situating the discursive functions of texts in their social context. Little 
emphasis will be put on the discursive practices of news production and consumption.  
2.5.4 Critique of CDA and Fairclough’s discursive functions 
CDA has succeeded in creating a new field of enquiry that has shifted the 
traditional description of language into a problem-oriented evaluation of the role of 
language in social life. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) assert, the criticality and 
multidisciplinarity of CDA have achieved intellectual advances that led to 
international visibility. The field has attracted the attention of many researchers from 
different backgrounds to analyse the ideologically-motivated role of discourse in the 
formation of people’s conceptions of themselves and of their surroundings. However, 
the very properties which led to the unique success of CDA have been subjected to a 
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lot of criticism. It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a survey of all the 
criticisms of and questions raised against CDA. So the study refers only to two of the 
most challenging critiques introduced by Michael Billig (2003) and Henry 
Widdowson (2004, 2007). The study highlights these critiques because, in my view, 
they are not satisfactorily answered by CDA practitioners. More importantly, these 
critiques are one of the reasons why this study adopts a bottom-up method of language 
analysis. As I sum up at the end of this section, the study addresses issues of criticality 
(the analyst’s politically-motivated involvement) and distinction between analysis and 
interpretation, as raised by Billig and Widdowson. It suggests methodological and 
analytical procedures that may help to overcome CDA’s identified shortcomings.  
Billig’s (2003) critique is mainly related to the critical role of CDA. He is 
concerned with its political impulse and possible ratification of institutionalized 
discourse. He argues that self-reflexivity should be an intrinsic feature of CDA to 
maintain its criticality and liberate it from the political economy in which it functions. 
However, Billig claims, establishing CDA as a discipline would risk its future by 
being complicit to the kind of social structure it criticizes, changing its direction from 
a radical critique of social relations into a mere critique of non-critical approaches. 
For instance, Billig finds CDA’s critique of non-critical approaches irrational, simply 
because being non-critical is what made some of them successful. More importantly, 
both critical and non-critical approaches work within the same social systems and 
share some political and economic features. Billig suggests that the abbreviation 
‘CDA’ is ‘a product of the spread of marketing discourse within academic 
institutions’, a notion that is consistently criticized by CDA practitioners, especially 
Norman Fairclough. As such, the criticality of CDA should not be defined as an 
intrinsic feature, but rather a (political) tool that is used in accordance with what the 
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analysis reveals. It seems that Billig calls for an open-ended approach to analysis that 
leaves the door open for new forms of criticism. By defining criticality as 
paradigmatic, he believes that CDA would suffer from what it criticizes in other 
approaches. These suggestions are partially reflected on by some CDA practitioners 
who discuss the critical social role of CDA when incorporating cognitive approaches 
(see Unger, 2016).  
Wodak and Meyer (2009) provided a brief answer to Billig’s concerns. They 
argue that CDA is not confined to a method, approach or field. Instead, 
interdisciplinarity is a defining feature of CDA on theoretical, methodological, 
analytical and interpretive levels. It can combine different forms of criticism based on 
the different fields it draws on. 
Wodak and Meyer’s answer opens the door for a more aggressive, though 
sensible, critique which accuses CDA of failing to distinguish between activism and 
academic conduct, thus failing to do proper discourse analysis. This is bluntly stated 
by Widdowson (2007), who claims that CDA proponents are undoubtedly activists 
and not merely analysts. He argues that since CDA practitioners are politically 
committed, their analyses cannot be valid. Widdowson also argues that there is no 
direct relationship between the semantic signification of a text and its pragmatic 
significance. Therefore, the top-down (discursive-textual) analytical preferences of 
CDA assigns specific functions to texts and limits the analysis to one specific reading 
based on the analyst’s (political) assumptions. Finally, Widdowson believes that the 
selectivity on the part of CDA analysts in applying analytical tools is problematic 
because all textual aspects contribute to meaning and thus none of these aspects 
should be excluded. 
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These criticisms are answered by different CDA advocates. For instance, Hart 
(2014, p. 10) asserts that although CDA is politically committed, ‘unbiased and 
scientifically grounded critical discourse research is perfectly possible when equipped 
with the right tools, including theories of language’. This means that CDA can 
distinguish between the academically transparent textual analysis and the 
interpretation of language functions in particular contexts. As for selectivity of 
analytical tools, the choice of any linguistic method is made according to the 
traditions the researcher is familiar with and the research questions they intend to 
answer (Unger, 2016). Nonetheless, I revisit these criticisms due to the sensitivity of 
the context of this study. There is a crucial need to be aware of my own critical 
political position as belonging to one side of the conflict. Since the study is conducted 
in an academic field, it is necessary to ensure a rigorous analysis based on well-
established linguistic phenomena.  
In light of Billig and Widdowson’s criticisms, therefore, and in attempting to 
break away from a traditional investigation of the role of journalism in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, I summarize the challenges raised against this study in three questions: 
(1) How can the study maintain academic objectivity while articulating the analyst’s 
political stance, thus distinguishing between academic research and activism? (2) How 
can the study overcome the shortcomings of a top-down (discursive-textual) design 
which limits the analysis to already identified discursive functions? (3) And how can 
the study be novel when viewing the Palestinian-Israeli journalism discourse? 
This study attempts to address some aspects of these questions at the 
methodological and analytical levels so as to provide the necessary starting points for 
more reliable critical research. The methods will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three. Here I sum up the general boundaries of this study which are assumed to 
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answer the research questions and provide answers to some of the challenges raised 
above. 
This study establishes a language-based, bottom-up analysis within the general 
framework of CDA and the methodological flexibility of the dialectical-relational 
approach. It views linguistics as an essential part of CDA. In Unger’s (2016) terms, it 
adopts a centripetal position which pulls CDA into linguistics. A language bottom-up 
analysis means that the textual analysis is first conducted without identifying prior 
discursive functions. After conducting a detailed analysis that focuses on micro-
language choices, linguistic findings are categorized according to their discursive 
functions, based on a linguistic theory that relates form to function, which are in turn 
categorized into macro-discursive strategies (these will be defined in Chapter Three). 
This means that discursive functions are systematically worked out by rigorous 
linguistic analysis. Moreover, the distinction between linguistic and discursive 
functions – as objectively obtained – on the one hand, and the role of these functions 
in their social context (the third dimension of DRA) on the other, restricts the 
analyst’s political bias to the social interpretive level. In other words, how these 
functions relate to the social context is determined by the research questions and the 
political objectives of the analyst. Such a distinction is suggested by Fairclough 
(1995a), who distinguishes between a descriptive textual level, an explanatory 
discursive level and an interpretive social level. In this study, therefore, the linguistic 
analysis and the direction of analysis from micro-linguistic choices up to discursive 
functions, then into the social context, ensures academic objectivity in spite of the 
politically-oriented objective of the research project.  
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Finally, a slight breakthrough at the theoretical level can be achieved by 
explaining how marginal ideologies operate in societies, thus helping to better 
understand the relationship between society, ideology and discourse.  
In Chapter Three all these theoretical and methodological bases are 
operationalized by a set of linguistic features. I will explain how these features are 
carefully selected and operated to meet the theoretical principles of CDA by linking 
language choices to their functions, and how they are helpful in conducting micro-
level, bottom-up analysis that accounts for linguistic nuances and their different 





CHAPTER 3: Methods of analysis and data collection 
3.1 A bottom-up critical linguistic analysis 
I discussed in the previous chapter the necessity to fill a gap in the literature by 
providing another angle to view the role of journalistic discourse in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. There is a need to bring out the internal political and ideological 
conflicts in each society, which may identify some discursive aspects of how 
hegemonic and marginal ideologies function via discourse. I also referred to criticism 
of some methodological and analytical shortcomings of CDA and Fairclough’s 
dialectical-relational approach. The criticism revolves around CDA’s twofold bias: a 
methodological bias that arises from the (top-down) discursive regulation of textual 
analysis, and a political bias that relates to the analyst’s assumptions and political 
objectives in identifying discursive functions, leading to subjective and selective 
interpretations of texts.  
To overcome the gaps identified above, I proposed a language-based analysis 
that takes a linguistic theory as a methodological base. I aim to conduct a bottom-up 
linguistic analysis that regulates discursive functions which must be encoded formally 
in grammar. Fowler (1996) argues that critical analysis may choose from different 
linguistic theories. I assume then that the function of a text is to be decided according 
to its internal semantic signification, and not via an external social interpretation. The 
discursive functions of texts are, therefore, systematically worked out by a rigorous 
linguistic analysis that sets out the findings for an objective understanding of 
grammar. At the political level, the structural bias of CDA, as a politically-motivated 
school of thought, will be limited to linking an (objective) textual and discursive 
analysis with the social context and social structures. This will be explained in later 
sections of this chapter.  
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That said, below I explain how a bottom-up analysis is assumed to answer the 
research questions of this study in light of the methodological, analytical and 
contextual requirements explained in Chapter Two. 
Based on the survey of studies in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in Chapter Two, 
investigating the macro-narratives that motivate representation in Palestinian and 
Israeli newspapers and on news websites would not result in new findings. Such 
enquiry merely focuses on representations motivated by ideological commonalities. It 
is necessary then to look for latent political and ideological tensions within each 
community, as articulated by news language. This is expected to challenge the 
prevailing assumption that internal conflicts are not vital during violent confrontations 
between the two sides. This study, therefore, adds to the effort which approaches 
media discourse to detect fissures and dissonances, rather than identifying stabilities 
and symmetries. 
Macgilchrist (2014) presents an important model in this respect. The author 
adopts a post-foundational theoretical base to analyse the representation of Africa in 
German commercial educational media. She presents a theoretical and methodological 
improvement to critical discourse studies which seeks to highlight ‘ambivalences, 
tensions, and contradictions in discourse rather than to demonstrate how discourse 
appears to be coherently dominant or consistently alternative’ (ibid., p. 388). 
Macgilchrist’s study advocates a bottom-up methodology that brings out discursive 
changes in representing Africa and challenges the hegemonic colonial discourse in 
Europe. However, the study has a specific context that limits its applicability to the 
Palestine-Israel situation. It compares texts that belong to two different periods, texts 
which were produced and informed by a colonial hegemonic discourse, and a 
reproduction of these texts which has a relative anti-colonial stance. The tensions, 
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therefore, primarily arise from comparing the original text with its reproduction. In 
this sense, it is not the type of method the author applies that shows systematically the 
change as much as the stated intentions of those who produced the texts in ‘changing 
contemporary discourse about Africa’ (ibid., p. 392). By contrast, the analysis in my 
study is meant to uncover tensions within the same text and between different 
newspapers on each side in reporting the same event. 
My study has also different definitions of tensions, fissures and dissonances. 
First and foremost, tensions arise from the contrast between micro-realizations of texts 
(linguistic choices) and the social structures in which they are embedded. Second, 
although the focus is on these tensions, it is still necessary to emphasize how and 
where hegemonic discourses are (re)produced in the texts. Examining hegemonic 
discourse maintains the comparative structure of the study. It first identifies the 
representations which are produced by hegemonic discourse. Then, which is more 
important, it compares these representations with different latent representations 
inspired by marginal ideologies. As explained in Chapter Two, it is almost impossible 
to find alternative discourses operating overtly in a state of war. Therefore, the study 
focuses on the differences between newspapers within each side to reveal how micro-
choices build up into different stories without challenging the hegemonic narratives. 
In analysing Israeli newspapers, the study attempts to show how some newspapers 
function as a platform for rightist policies, whereas others problematize these policies 
without explicitly challenging the legitimacy of the Israeli and Zionist narratives. It 
adds to the multidisciplinary efforts to investigate the ideological debate in Israel, 
mainly between Zionism, neo-Zionism and post-Zionism. On the other hand, the 
comparison of Palestinian newspapers is meant to detect the influence of the political 
rivalry between Fatah and Hamas on reporting events and how these political tensions 
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are implicitly and subtly expressed by micro-linguistic choices. It examines how a 
state of war is invested with an implicit struggle over legitimacy and 
representativeness (see Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2).  
The study is a qualitative context-sensitive treatment of a limited number of 
texts. Although frequencies of general linguistic and discursive tendencies are 
revealing, they are not part of the focus of this study. Rather, following Fowler 
(1991), it focuses on how values and ideologies that underlie news language differ 
with different forms of expression. In a highly sensitive and controversial context, 
such as the Gaza war(s), every linguistic choice is made to fit the newspapers’ vigilant 
political and ideological objectives. Consequently, every single micro-linguistic 
choice is a complete linguistic package that includes some aspects of the social reality 
and carries some ideological significance (ibid.). This understanding requires 
analytical methods that fit a basic impulse of critical linguistics, which ‘seeks, by 
studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and 
historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and 
value which are encoded in the language’ (ibid., p. 67). Moreover, it necessitates a 
special contextualization of the discursive functions of (isolated) linguistic choices in 
order to provide valid interpretations of their wider social roles. The following 
sections introduce three clause-level discursive features: transitivity, social-actor 
model and referential strategies, which are used in this study to analyse a relatively 
small number of texts. Then, it suggests a number of frameworks that have analytical 
and methodological significance in the contextualization of discursive functions. This 
includes two frameworks of systematization, aspects of representation and macro-
strategies of representation, which are a key step in this analysis. The frameworks 
88 
 
assign specific patterns to the discursive functions of linguistic choices and interpret 
the relevance of these functions in the socio-political context.  
3.2 Analytical methods at the clause level 
The analytical body of this study has two complementary sections: the 
representation of Actors and the representation of Actions. Although it is not always 
analytically possible to distinguish Actors from their actions, different analytical 
methods and categories have been developed to deal with either category with varying 
emphasis on the other, meaning that the analyst’s attitude to the tools is eclectic 
(Fowler, 1991). Accordingly, Actors are analysed using the social-actor model (van 
Leeuwen, 2008) and referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009), while actions are 
analysed using transitivity (Halliday, 1985; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). 
The choice of these categories is justified by the analytical and methodological 
interconnectedness between them on the one hand, and between them and the DRA on 
the other. Hart and Cap (2014) introduce a helpful figure in which they show the 
similar epistemic background of the DRA, the social-actor model and the discourse-
historical approach (from which referential strategies are borrowed), based on which 
they define discourse and its role in the formation of social reality. More importantly, 
transitivity is a subsystem of systemic functional grammar (SFG), which is an 
analytical and theoretical attractor of DRA. It enhances the critical dimension of 
CDA, not only because it analyses the micro-choices of texts, but also because it 
conceives language choices as socially situated and politically and ideologically 
motivated (Hart, 2014, p. 6). 
Employing discursive features at the clause level is meant to counter a 
prevailing tendency in CDA which assumes macro- (discursive) frames and moves 
down to exemplify them in texts, triggering some criticism because of its 
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methodological and political bias. In addition, a micro-analysis is consistent with my 
view of how marginal ideologies function (see Section 2.5.2).  
3.2.1 Transitivity 
For the analysis of actions and events, the study adheres to Halliday’s (1985) 
transitivity model which is a subsystem of systemic functional grammar (SFG), a 
conceptualization of the role of grammar in creating meaning. SFG does not merely 
describe grammatical structures. It also matches different grammatical configurations 
with all the possible meanings they serve by identifying the functions of language, 
broadly conceived as grammar (Halliday, 1985). This model has come to be an 
influential analytical tool in critical discourse studies in general, and in the DRA in 
particular (Hart and Cap, 2014). It has proved to be a useful model for examining the 
connections between linguistic structure and social values (Fowler, 1991). A grammar 
model, as Hart (2014) argues, allows comparing a text with other unchosen potentials. 
More importantly, it allows the analyst to compare between different grammatical 
choices, tracking their discursive functions and identifying their different ideological 
motivations.  
The main contribution of SFG is building a linguistic theory that accounts for 
the functions of language, contrary to the traditional formal approaches that merely 
describe the internal systematization of language. SFG is based on the assumption that 
segments of grammar have particular functions in the context of language use, and 
that different grammatical constructs necessarily have different functions/ meanings. 
SFG consists of three major systems: transitivity, mood and theme. Halliday 
proposed these three systems so that they account for the three types of meaning 
encoded via language. First, transitivity is concerned with ideational meaning and 
reveals how reality is constructed via discourse. This includes an emphasis on what 
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aspects of that reality are foregrounded and what aspects are backgrounded or 
suppressed. Second, the mood system is concerned with the interpersonal function of 
language. It reveals how the relationship between people involved in a communicative 
event is constructed. Finally, the theme system is concerned with the textual function 
of language. It deals with the internal organization of the elements of texts and how 
such organization performs the functions of these texts. It is important here to reiterate 
Fowler’s (1991) notion that the three functions of language are subject to social 
determinism. In other words, speakers or writers are not completely free in using 
language, rather they are invariably restricted by the immediate and wider context of 
language use.  
The same text can be analysed by three different systems, providing different 
ways of looking at language to identify its three simultaneous functions. As Halliday 
(1985) sums up, transitivity views language as representation, mood views language 
as exchange, and theme views language as a message. Yet, Halliday emphasizes that 
although the three functions of texts operate simultaneously, they vary from one text 
to another, providing three different points of departure for different kinds of analysis. 
This study, therefore, exploits transitivity as a main analytical method for 
revealing the relationship between (micro-) linguistic choices at the clause level and 
the aspects of reality these choices construct. Transitivity has been widely used in 
CDA due to its analytical potential for uncovering the relationship between grammar 
and ideology (Fowler, 1991; Halliday, 1985; Hart, 2014; Richardson, 2007). It 
‘provides systems of resources for referring to entities in the world and, crucially, the 
way that they interact with or relate to one another’ (Hart, 2014, p. 22). 
Simpson (1993, p. 88) argues that transitivity is part of the ideational function 
of language that explains how grammar encodes the mental patterns of writers and 
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speakers. It encodes people’s perceptions of reality in terms of a set of processes. For 
instance, a journalist from JP conceives the Israeli military operation in Gaza by the 
following grammatical choices.  
 
[JP] The increased presence in Gaza is aimed at destroying Hamas infrastructure. 
 
These choices necessarily involve a structuring of the contextual elements in a 
way that conveys the writer’s point of view. Unchosen grammatical potentials would 
then have different constructions of the same reality. As Halliday (1985, p. 1) 
postulates, ‘our most powerful conception of reality is that it consists of going on: of 
doing, happening, feeling, being. These ‘goings on’ are sorted out in the semantic 
system of the language and expressed through the grammar of the clause.’ 
Transitivity, therefore, is the ‘foundation of representation’, the way the clause is used 
to analyse events and situations as being of a certain type (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). It 
reflects ‘goings on’ as they take place in the inner or outer worlds of language users 
(Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). Transitivity, therefore, can ‘enable us to see how, by 
making certain grammatical choices rather than others, the producer of a text is able to 
‘foreground’ certain meanings in discourse while others are suppressed’ (Chen, 2001, 
p. 190). It can unveil a world view encoded by linguistic choices and provide a 
method of analysing ideologies that construct these world views (ibid.). In comparing 
the linguistic choices in different newspapers that cover the same event, transitivity 
can distinguish functionally between the different choices of newspapers and the 
different world views they present for the same event.  
Transitivity includes three main elements: processes, participants and 
circumstances (Hart, 2014, p. 22). Processes demonstrate the actions that appear in a 
text, participants represent who/ what does the action to whom/ what, and 
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circumstances represent time, place, manner and other contextual factors (Mills as 
cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 54). Participants are typically realized by noun phrases, 
processes are expressed by verbal groups, and circumstances are usually expressed by 
prepositional and adverbial phrases (Simpson, 1993, p. 88). I will continue using 
Thompson’s (2004) label verbal groups to refer to the linguistic realization of process 
because it refers to another constituent apart from main verb. In addition, if more than 
one main verb is used, I use Thompson’s label verbal complex to explain the process. 
Although functional analysis counts merely for the last verb, it is important to 
investigate how other verbs modify the semantic meaning of process and its 
experiential function. The following example has a process realized by the verbal 
complex starts rocketing. The experiential perspective is based on the verb rocketing, 
but I investigate how the verb starts modifies the process by contextualizing it 
temporally in relation to other events.  
 
[Ynet] Hamas starts rocketing Israel. 
 
The way the main elements of a process are articulated in relation to each 
other is a function of the writer’s or speaker’s world view (Chen, 2001, p. 191). For 
instance, the different processes below, from JP and Haaretz respectively, represent a 
military action carried out by Israeli forces during the same event: the Gaza War. 
However, the processes differ in their choices of three elements, giving two different 
realities. 
  
[JP] The air force had struck some 500 targets since the start of the ground operation, the source added.  




The two processes represent two military actions and make different 
grammatical choices. In the analysis section, I explain how these differences produce 
different representations and, when mapped with other differences, lead to different 
realities.  
Choosing from these alternatives is not random. Rather, it reflects the image 
each newspaper constructs for the social reality based on its ideological and political 
objectives (Fowler, 1991). Writers may alter the perception from which one views the 
actions without altering the material facts (Chen, 2001). But since meaning and form 
are intertwined, changes to the form of expression may involve conceptual shifts in 
the way events are perceived (Hart, 2014). When linked to other choices 
systematically, as I will show later, these choices can reveal macro-discursive 
functions and strategies about the war and conflict in general. Transitivity, therefore, 
has proved to be an efficient analytical tool for analysing the same event when 
represented in different ways, which is of great interest for the analysis of the 
language of newspapers (Fowler, 1991).  
Halliday distinguishes between six types of processes based on two main 
characteristics: whether the process takes place in the inner or outer world of the 
speaker/ writer, viz. whether it happens in or outside their mind, and whether it 
represents a dynamic action (actual doing) or a state of being (static relation). These 
are: 
 material processes;  
 relational processes;  
 verbal processes;  
 mental processes;  
 behavioural processes;  
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 existential processes.  
3.2.1.1 Material processes 
Material processes are to a greater or lesser degree the ones that demonstrate 
physical actions. They represent an entity doing an action (on/to another entity). 
Material processes, therefore, are the ones primarily investigated to see how changes 
are brought about in the (real) world which involve issues of agency and 
responsibility. The doer of the material process is called the Agent, and if the action is 
directed at/ against another participant, the second participant is called the Goal. 
While some grammatical participants have a congruent meaning, others may have 
grammatically metaphorical meaning. The former refers to the direct or typical 
relationship between form and meaning. For instance, an Agent in a material process 
is the entity that carries out the process (the action). The grammatical metaphor, on 
the other hand, refers to nonlinearity between form and meaning. The Agent, for 
instance, may be substituted by a nominalization that contains another action and 
backgrounds the doer’s identity. In this case, the nominalization is classified as an 
Agent based on its shared experiential content with the nominalized action (Ravelli, 
1988). For instance, in the following example the Agent is the nominalization the 
strike, which contains another action (e.g. the Israeli forces strike…).  
 
[Haaretz] The strike {Agent} also wounded {Material Process} 25 people {Goal}. 
  
In the analysis, following Halliday (1994), I make both the grammatically 
metaphorical meaning as well as the congruent meaning explicit. That is, I first deal 
with the nominalization as a grammatical participant, then I explain the nominalized 
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action it contains and what role it has in the experiential function of the process. For 
more explanation of nominalizations as grammatical metaphors see Hayvaert (2003). 
Material processes may also include two other grammatical participants: 
Initiator and Actor. As the following example shows, the Initiator is the participant 
that provokes the process by influencing another participant, the Actor, to do it. 
 
[JP] Hamas has ordered {Initiator} its members {Actor} to use {Material Process} remaining 
tunnels {Goal} 
 
As for the other end of the process, there is another participant which is 
indirectly affected by the action called the Recipient. This is an oblique participant 
which is realized by nominal groups indirectly linked to the process by a preposition. 
The following example includes both participants and shows how the Goal is directly 
affected by the action, while the Recipient is embedded in a prepositional phrase.  
 
[Ynet] Protesters {Agent} throwing {Material Process} stones {Goal} at a military jeep {Recipient}. 
 
Thompson distinguishes between intentional and involuntary material 
processes. Intentional material processes are intended to be carried out by the Agent, 
while involuntary actions happen against the free will of the Agent. This study will 
use the labels voluntary and involuntary to demonstrate Thompson’s classification. 
For instance, the process destroy in the first example below is voluntary, since the 
action is meant to be carried out by the Agent we, while the process came in the 
second example is involuntary because the Agent troops did not put itself deliberately 




[JP] “We {Agent}’ll destroy {Material Process} more (tunnels) {Goal} in the future {Circumstance}”.  
[Ynet] Troops {Agent} came {Material Process} under fire {Circumstance} in the neighbourhood of 
Shajaiyya {Circumstance}. 
 
And I use the labels intentional and unintentional to refer to Gross’s (2009) 
distinction between military actions that target civilians. Gross argues that both 
guerrilla groups and conventional armies know that they cannot achieve victory 
without causing harm to the other side’s civilians. Therefore, both realize that some of 
their actions will lead to civilian fatalities. In this sense, both intentional and 
unintentional military actions are voluntary; they are intended to be carried out. The 
difference, however, lies in the affected Goals of these actions. As Gross argues, ‘if 
civilian deaths served a purpose, then the perpetrator acted intentionally, whether he 
thought ill of the civilians or not. If civilian deaths served no purpose, then the 
perpetrator acted unintentionally’ (p. 322). In other words, intentional actions seek 
‘achievements’ by targeting civilians (e.g. pressuring the other side’s military forces), 
while the effect of unintentional actions might be collateral – regrettable but 
unavoidable. This distinction is not based on the will of the Agent, but on the role of 
the targeted Goal in achieving specific military and political purposes. Applying this 
distinction when analysing actions as they are represented in newspapers helps in 
identifying the writers’ attempts to justify or problematize particular military actions.  
For instance, the following processes, from JP and Haaretz respectively, refer 
to similar actions: killing Palestinian civilians. However, while the process in JP is 
represented as unintentional, thus representing the action as understandably 
unavoidable, the process in Haaretz is represented as intentional, problematizing the 
action and raising concerns over the suffering of civilians (detailed analyses in 




[JP] An air strike on Shejaia home of Khalil al-Hayya, a senior Hamas official {Agent} killed 
{Material Process} his son, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren {Goal}.  
[Haaretz] The Israel Air Force {Agent} killed {Material Process} 35 members of two Gaza families 
{Goal} in separate strikes. 
 
The process from JP represents the action as targeting the Hamas official, 
while the civilians are merely a collateral damage. This means that the army did not 
intend to act on civilians. On the contrary, the process in Haaretz does not represent 
the civilians as a collateral damage. This does not necessarily mean that the army 
intended to kill the civilians. Yet, the grammatical function of the process does not 
exclude such interpretation. It should be noted, therefore, that the distinction between 
intentional and unintentional processes is based on their grammatical function as well 
as the analyst’s interpretation of this function in the relevant context.   
Another important classification of material processes is the distinction 
between active and passive processes. These are functionally different and therefore 
there is a reason for one choice over the other. For instance, critical analysts used to 
highlight the role of passive constructions in mystifying the Agent of a process. 
However, the passive voice might also be used due to particular journalistic styles or 
information structures adopted by a given newspaper. As such, it is important to 
reiterate Fowler’s (1991) notion that there is no direct relationship between a 
linguistic realization and its discursive function(s). 
Finally, material processes can include Scope as a second participant instead of 
Goal. Scope is a participant that, unlike Goal, does not denote an actual entity in the 
real world (Thompson, 2004, p. 107). Although it functions as an independent 
participant, it does not specify a receiver of material actions. Rather, it is related to the 
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process itself by having one of the following two functions. First, it can be a 
circumstantial element that specifies an aspect of the process as an adverbial does, 
such as the Scope the Gaza Strip in the following example. 
 
[JP] Large numbers of Ground Forces {Agent} entered {Material Process} the Gaza Strip {Scope}.  
 
The Scope above is not represented as a target of the process entered but as a 
spatial circumstance that indicates its place of occurrence. This means that we rely on 
the process itself in distinguishing this kind of Scope from the Goal. If the process 
was invaded, for instance, the Gaza Strip would be a Goal because invaded includes 
the meaning of changing the state of affairs in the invaded place. 
The second type of Scope is an extension of the verb. These types of Scope are 
either ‘derived from the verb itself […], or they form a semantic unit with the verb’ 
(ibid.), such as the Scope a large-scale wave of air strikes below. 
 
[JP] The IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} a large-scale wave of air strikes {Scope}. 
 
In this example, the process launched is not factually separated from the 
Scope. In other words, a large-scale wave of air strikes is not an independent and 
identifiable participant, but rather a semantic specification of the process itself. As 
Thompson (2004, p. 107) puts it, Scope is a label given to the nominal group that 
works with the verb to express the process. The analytic relevance of Scope lies in its 
resemblance to the Goal. Scope appears in processes with transitive verbal groups, 
giving the impression that both the affecting and affected participants (doer and 
receiver) are included. However, since the Scope is not an actual participant, much 
about the receiver of the action is obfuscated. Moreover, the Scope is what identifies 
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the semantic load of the process, introducing it within particular political or 
ideological frames. For instance, the process above would differ radically if it were 
expressed as launched an indiscriminate wave of air strikes. 
3.2.1.2 Relational Processes 
Relational processes establish a more or less static relationship between two 
concepts, with the process signalling this relationship. A typical realization includes 
two nominal phrases in which one characterizes or identifies the other by the process 
‘be’ (including is, was, are and were). For instance, the concept a soldier in Golani in 
the example below identifies the concept Gabriel by the process is. 
 
[Haaretz] Gabriel is a soldier in Golani.  
 
Since relational processes are a linguistic means of characterization and 
identification (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 210), the label process does not 
indicate doing but rather, in functional terms, a continuous happening (ibid.). The 
predicator of these processes does not have to be ‘be’ though. It can be any verb that 
establishes some kind of relationship between two entities.  
Relational processes are classified into two types: attributive relational 
processes and identifying relational processes. In attributive relational processes, a 
relationship is established between two participants: Carrier and Attribute. The 
Attribute is ascribed to the Carrier, representing one of its characteristics. The 
Attribute is either an adjective or an indefinite nominal group that assigns the Carrier 





[JP] “The ground units {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} not static {Attribute}”. 
[JP] He {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a returning citizen {Attribute}. 
 
The above processes are directly encoded as relational. Others involve subtle 
transformations of dynamic material actions into states, which involves 
backgrounding some aspects of the action and a redistribution of social roles. For 
instance, the following process from Ynet has the army as a Carrier of a relational 
process, although it is the receiver of the material action that led to this state. 
 
[Ynet] The army {Carrier} suffered {Attributive Relational Process} more losses {Attribute}. 
 
Although suffered might look like a material process, it is classified as 
relational because it changes a dynamic action of doing into a stable state of being 
(see Thompson, 2013, p. 134). 
Second, identifying relational processes are those which identify one 
participant by another. Both participants, realized by definite nominal phrases, refer to 
the same entity. One of the participants belongs to a specific semantic category 
labelled Token, while the other belongs to a general semantic category labelled Value. 
The identification process is realized by either the Token identifying the Value, or the 
Value identifying the Token. Analysing these participants can show what values the 
writers draw on in their representation of entities, thus revealing some aspects of their 
underlying assumptions (Thompson, 2004. p, 98). Before I exemplify these labels, I 
refer to some other labels used to define participants in relational processes: Identified 
and Identifier. Unlike Token and Value, which are external semantic properties of the 
participants, Identified and Identifier depend on how the language event unfolds. A 
participant which is represented as given is the Identified, and a participant which 
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gives new information is the Identifier. For instance, the following example from JP 
has the pronoun you, which refers to a killed soldier, the Token/ Identified participant 
which is identified by the Value/ Identifier our hero. 
 
[Ynet] “You {Token/ Identified} ‘re {Identifying Relational Process} our hero {Value/ Identifier}”. 
 
Both kinds of relational processes are subdivided into intensive, circumstantial 
and possessive relational processes. In the case of attributive relationals, intensives are 
those in which the Attribute is represented by an adjectival or nominal group 
(Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), as the above examples show. In circumstantial 
relationals, the Attribute involves a circumstantial concept, such as time or location, as 
in from Poriya in the following process from Haaretz.  
 
[Haaretz] Shaul {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} from Poriya {Attribute}. 
 
Finally, possessive relational processes represent a relationship of ownership. 
The relationship can be encoded from the point of view of the possessor, or from the 
point view of the possessed. For instance, the following process from Haaretz has the 
Attribute two APC models possessed by the Carrier the IDF, and the Golani Brigade 
in particular: 
 
[Haaretz] The IDF, and the Golani Brigade in particular {Carrier} has {Attributive Relational Process} 
two APC models {Attribute}. 
 




3.2.1.3 Verbal Processes 
Verbal processes, or verbs of saying, are intermediate material and mental 
processes: ‘saying something is a material action that reflects mental operations’ 
(Thompson, 2004, p. 100). Every verbal process includes a Sayer participant, the one 
who or which sends the message. It can also include a Receiver, the participant to 
whom or which the saying process is directed, a Target, which is the entity at which 
the message of the verbal process is directed, and the Verbiage which is the message 
itself. These processes are very infrequent in my data. The vast majority of verbal 
processes found in the news articles analysed project other processes.  
Projected clauses are clauses which appear in reported speech, indicating what 
the original source said. Although projected clauses look like the Verbiage, in that 
they express the message, they are functionally independent clauses and should be 
analysed separately. See for example the following process from JP. The Sayer Halak, 
the verbal process told, and the Receiver the Jerusalem Post constitute a process, 
while the message He joined Golani is a separate material process. That is why I use 
the brackets [ ] to distinguish processes from each other. 
  
[JP] [Halak {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} The Jerusalem Post {Receiver}] “[He {Agent} joined 
{Material Process} Golani {Goal}]”. 
 
The analysis in this case will be interested in the material process, while the 
verbal process will be accounted for when it relates to the analysis of an indexing 
hypothesis or cascading activation (see Section 3.3.1). Another reason for excluding 
the functional role of verbal processes is that there is no considerable variation in 
using verbs of saying. Most of the verbs in my data are neutral (e.g. said and told). It 
should be noted, however, that this is not the case with all journalistic corpora (see 
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Gidengil & Everitt, 2003). Ultimately, analysing the projected processes and 
identifying the Sayer participants helps in defining social actors whose voices are 
incorporated in the news articles. 
3.2.1.4 Mental Processes 
Mental processes represent ‘goings on’ as they happen in the internal world of 
the mind and reflect some aspects of the mental states of actors. They are classified 
into four sub-types: processes of emotion (feeling), processes of cognition (deciding, 
knowing, understanding etc.), processes of desideration (wanting) and processes of 
perception (seeing, hearing etc.). These processes involve two main participants: the 
Senser in whose mental world the process occurs, and the Phenomenon which is the 
entity that triggers the happening of the mental process. See the following example 
from Haaretz. 
 
[Haaretz] “[I {Senser} ’m not hearing {Mental Process} anything about ending the operation 
{Phenomenon}]”, [said {Verbal Process} the official {Sayer}]. 
 
The analysis of mental processes, therefore, is very useful in identifying social 
actors whose subjective mental processes are incorporated into news reporting and the 
cultural and ideological values these actors draw on. 
Like verbal processes, cognition and desideration processes can project other 
processes which are analysed separately. For instance, the mental process believed 
from JP below projects an attributive relational process which is analysed separately 
from the projecting process. 
 
[JP] “[He {Senser} believed {Cognition Mental Process}] [that the connection between Israel and the 




Finally, mental processes can include another participant called Range which 
‘specifies the range or domain of the process’ (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 293). 
It is sometimes difficult to identify the Range with certainty as it refers to a variety of 
‘disparate-seeming cases’ (Thompson, 2004, p. 107).  For instance, Range appears 
only once in my data, in the following example. It refers to the participant from 
returning home which does not have one of the typical roles of a mental process.  
  
[JP] “Beaches and parties {Phenomenon} could not distract {Mental Process} a native-son {Senser} 
from returning home {Range}”. 
 
3.2.1.5 Other process types 
The last two processes in the system of transitivity are behavioural and 
existential processes. These are rare in my data, though more common in other kinds 
of data, and they will be introduced only briefly because they are not part of the 
analysis. 
Behavioural processes are those which lie in-between mental and material 
processes. They represent psychological human actions which involve mental and 
physical characteristics (see Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 251). For instance, in 
the following example from Thompson (2004, p. 104), the process laughed has a 
mental aspect which is realized by a physical doing. 
 




The main participant of this process is the Behaver, the one who/ which does 
the action. Some processes, as the example shows, involve a Range participant which 
adds a specification to the process.  
Finally, existential processes express ‘the mere existence of an entity without 
predicating anything else’ (Thompson, 2004, p. 104). The only participant in these 
processes is the Existent. As the following example from Thompson (2004, p. 105) 
shows, the subject in these processes is normally ‘there’. 
 
Maybe there’s {Existential Process} some other darker pattern {Existent}. 
 
Before I conclude this section, it is important to notice that the above 
processes and their participants ‘pertain to the semantic level and are not necessarily 
rendered explicit in the clause’ (Hart, 2014, p. 23). To put it simply, distinguishing 
between the processes is based on their meanings/ functions and not on rigid 
grammatical categorizations. For instance, as I explained in Section 3.2.1.1, the 
Recipient participant in the following process is realized by the prepositional phrase at 
the lower extremities of the rioters.  
  
[JP] The soldiers {Agent} […] fired {Material Process} at the lower extremities of the rioters 
{Recipient}. 
 
A grammatical analysis would keep the participant dissociated from the 
process fired by classifying it as a prepositional phrase. A functional analysis, in 
contrast, accounts for the semantic meaning of the prepositional phrase and makes 
explicit how the participant is indirectly affected by the process. In this sense, the 
grammatical categorizations ‘do not correspond directly with the realities they 
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describe’ but reflect one version of the reality, which could be ideologically motivated 
(ibid., p. 19). The differences identified in how the newspapers use these processes 
reflect how different realities of the same event are packaged into different 
grammatical categories. The differences involve not only variations of the same 
process (e.g. active vs passive material processes), but also different processes that 
represent the same event.  
The above understanding of the relationship between events and the way they 
are constructed via language helps in analysing metaphorical processes by identifying 
their non-metaphorical meanings. The analyst needs to identify the functions of using 
a metaphor to represent a particular event. Then they compare these functions with 
those of a typical non-metaphorical choice available to the writer. In this way, the 
analyst can identify aspects of the event the metaphor foregrounds and those it 
backgrounds. For instance, the process sweeping in the following example from JP 
refers to a military action.  
 
[JP] The IDF {Agent} was sweeping {Material Process} the area {Goal}. 
 
As a Palestinian, I know that this action may include checkpoints, the invasion 
of houses and arresting people randomly. However, these meanings are not included 
within the semantic scope of the verbal group sweep. I, therefore, classify a process 
according to the material event it represents, then I refer to how its function is 
adjusted by the metaphor. 
In sum, transitivity analysis is meant to uncover the mental representations of 
journalists by analysing the way they are articulated via grammatical choices. It is 
mainly concerned with how writers express their mental conception of events by a set 
of goings on. As a sub-system of systemic functional grammar, transitivity analysis 
107 
 
can systematically identify the meanings/ functions of grammatical choices and their 
role in constructing the reality in a particular way. When choices of different 
newspapers are compared and contrasted, the ideologies that motivate the different 
mental representations are identified.  
In this section I also discussed grammatical metaphor as referring to the 
nonlinear relationship between form and function, which can introduce a tension 
between a text’s wording and a text’s meaning (Devrim, 2015). The tension can 
background some aspects of the process, such as the agency of social actors on 
actions. An example is nominalizations that have Agent role.  
Broadly speaking, language choices that involve the representation of 
processes as self-engendered can be analyzed from the ergative perspective. Ergativity 
involves the analysis of processes by focusing on the fact that the process may happen 
by itself or be caused to happen (Thompson, 2004, p. 135). For instance, the 
participant Operation Protective Edge in the following example has, according to 
transitivity, Agent role.  
 
[Ynet] Operation Protective Edge {Agent} started {Material Process} on Thursday night 
{Circumstance}. 
 
However, we know that Operation Protective Edge cannot happen by itself, so 
another participant must be involved. A re-wording of the process would be, for 
instance:  
 





In transitivity analysis this conflation between Agent and Goal roles remains 
obfuscated. According to ergativity, however, the participant Medium is suggested to 
distinguish between both roles. Analyzing the same process from an ergative 
perspective would be: 
 
Operation Protective Edge {Medium} started {Material Process} on Thursday night {Circumstance}.  
 
3.2.2 Reference to Social Actors 
It was suggested above that transitivity deals with both social actors (as 
participants) and actions (as processes). However, the options open to language users 
in representing social actors extend ‘beyond the functional participant categories of 
SFG’ (Hart, 2014, p. 33). There is a need to elaborate analytical methods that describe 
more comprehensively all possible ways of referring to social actors. This need arises 
from the role of referring in associating or dissociating social actors with actions, 
social groups and social values. For instance, the reference terrorists in the following 
example is essential for viewing the event and the associated actors. 
 
[Ynet] Nine terrorists {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in a security incident {Circumstance}. 
 
The reference by itself represents the actors negatively. This becomes more 
ideological when little contextual information is provided, so that the reader relies on 
the reference to determine their judgemental position. As such, references to social 
actors are micro-argumentative schemes that have a decisive role in rendering actions 
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legitimate or illegitimate (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). The relationship between the 
lexical choices of referring and social roles is comprehensively outlined by two 
inventories: the social-actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008) and referential strategies 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). The social-actor model identifies how a social role can be 
variably articulated by a number of textual choices, while referential strategies outline 
the different social roles and emotive and judgemental values a particular textual 
realization may have.   
3.2.2.1 Social-actor Model 
Van Leeuwen’s (2008) social-actor model is a comprehensive inventory 
developed to analyse the representation of social actors by a network of socio-
semantic categorizations. The term socio-semantic means the meaning potential of 
grammar, viz. what social roles a specific structural articulation can ascribe to social 
actors (ibid.). This inventory starts from the social and investigates how a specific role 
is variably constructed in a text by different linguistic realizations. It is thus concerned 
with the functions particular linguistic choices have in relation to the distribution and 
presentation of social roles. That is why van Leeuwen argues that it is almost 
impossible to find direct relationships between linguistic realizations and social roles. 
In other words, it is not possible to find a particular social role exclusively realized by 
a limited set of linguistic choices. For instance, as I explain below, one of the 
categories of the social-actor model is passivation. Social actors can be passivised as 
the receivers of actions by a number of textual realizations. In the first example, 
below, 2,600 Hamas targets is passivised by having a Goal role. In the second, 
however, Hamas is passivised in a prepositional phrase, which has a Recipient 




[JP] The IDF {Agent} has struck {Material Process} 2,600 Hamas […] targets {Goal}.  
[JP] Israel {Agent} expanded {Material Process} its operation {Scope} against Hamas {Recipient}. 
 
No study, van Leeuwen asserts, should limit itself to strict linguistic 
categorizations. More importantly, ‘there need not [be] congruence between the roles 
that social actors actually play in social practices and the grammatical roles they are 
given in texts’ (ibid., p. 32). This is a basic interest of critical studies which try to 
unveil how discursive constructions of social roles can be manipulative and 
ideologically motivated, and not factually based.   
Van Leeuwen proposes a detailed network of socio-semantic roles which 
account for the most occurring social roles and their textual realizations. The network 
is comprehensive and detailed, different studies choose relevant categorizations and 
exclude others. Van Leeuwen developed his categories based on other specific texts. 
So I have chosen the categories that occur in my data. These include Exclusion/ 
Inclusion, Activation/ Passivation, Functionalization/ Identification, Objectivation, 
Nomination, Indetermination, Individualization and Collectivisation. It is worth 
mentioning here that these categories are in a hierarchy, so some of the distinctions 
only apply to one specific category of actor representation. All definitions below are 
based on van Leeuwen (2008).  
Exclusion/ Inclusion 
Exclusion/ inclusion are the basic and most important categories that identify 
whether social actors are referred to in a text or not. In a state of war, the exclusion of 
a group of actors that is directly affecting or affected by the war raises many questions 
about the reasons why the journalist wants them omitted from the representation. The 
most powerful kind of exclusion is the one that excludes actors and their activities 
completely, leaving no traces of their identity or influence of their actions. This is 
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highly important to this study because, as van Leeuwen (2008, p. 29) suggests, 
exclusion can play a role in the critical comparison of different representations of the 
same event. In this study, exclusion is identified when a newspaper represents a group 
of actors as playing a crucial role in the war while another newspaper categorically 
excludes them.  
Less radical forms of exclusion are suppression and backgrounding. The first 
refers to categorically omitting social actors but referring to their actions or activities. 
One typical example of this kind is the passive processes with agent deletion where 
the doer is not mentioned, neither in the passive process nor in any other process in 
the text. Backgrounding, on the other hand, is the least radical form of exclusion. In 
this case, the social actors are not referred to by typical linguistic realizations (e.g. a 
foregrounded Agent of a material process) but mentioned elsewhere in the text, either 
in the same process (a backgrounded Agent of a passive material process) or in a 
different process. 
Opposite to exclusion, social actors can be included in texts. As the following 
socio-semantic categories show, social actors can be allocated different social roles, 
articulated by varying textual realizations. 
Activation/ Passivation 
Activation refers to the endowment of social actors with active or dynamic 
forces in an activity. Unlike active processes of transitivity (see Section 3.2.1.1), 
activation here refers to the social role and not the grammatical realization. In this 
sense, actors can be activated as backgrounded doers in passive clauses. A distinction 
is thus always necessary between labels that indicate social roles and those that refer 
to grammatical participants. Actors can be activated clearly, as Agents in material 
processes, or opaquely by transformations that involve backgrounding their identity. 
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For instance, the doer of the process were killed from Haaretz below is represented by 
the nominalization Israeli bombardment.  
 
[Haaretz] 100 people {Goal} were killed {Material Process} by Israeli bombardments {Agent}. 
 
The role of the analysis is to uncover the functions of the existent choice and 
compare it with other choices available to the writer.  
Passivation, on the other hand, is the representation of social actors as 
receiving or undertaking the activity. Typical realizations of passivation appear in 
participation roles, such as the Goal 100 people in the previous example. However, 
the role of actors as direct receivers of the action might not be clear. For instance, the 
social actors affected by the Israeli action in the following example are represented as 
an indirect goal by the Recipient against Hamas. 
 
[JP] Israel {Agent} expanded {Material Process} its operation {Scope} against Hamas {Recipient}. 
 
Functionalization/ Identification 
Functionalization occurs when social actors are referred to in terms of what 
they do. Since what social actors do may be evaluated, this category has a deep impact 
on relating social actors to social, cultural and ideological values. For instance, the 
nomination IDF soldiers refers to the actors in terms of their military role, which 
connotes positive meanings in Israeli society (this will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four). This ideologically-laden representation of the actors would necessarily 
impact on the perception of their actions. 
 




Identification, on the other hand, occurs when social actors are represented in 
terms of what, more or less, they permanently are. This is another site of evaluative or 
pejorative representations based on essentializing discursive categorizations, such as 
terrorists in the previous example. These representations draw on out-of-context 
narratives and ideological assumptions, and at the same time reproduce these 
narratives and assumptions.  
Van Leeuwen proposes subcategories of identification, two of which are 
relevant to this study: classification and relational identification. Classification is 
references to social actors by associating them with social classes in a given society 
(e.g. classes of age, sex and ethnicity), while relational identification identifies social 
actors in terms of their relationship to other social actors. Both have an impact on the 
way social actors are viewed and the way events involving them are evaluated.  
Objectivation 
Unlike the categories mentioned above, objectivation is references to social 
actors by textual articulations that do not include the semantic feature ‘+human’. It 
includes metonymical references that substitute the social actors by entities associated 
with them. Two subcategories of objectivation are crucial to this study: spatialization 
and instrumentalization. Spatialization is the substitution of social actors by places 
with which they are closely associated, while instrumentalization is references to 
social actors by the instruments they use in carrying out actions. For instance, the 
social actor who carried out the action in the following clause from Maan is replaced 
by the instrument they used, rockets, while the social actors who received the action 
are substituted by the place where they live, Israel. 
 





Nomination is references to social actors via their unique identities, mostly 
realized by proper names. This, as van Leeuwen argues, is dependent on the attention 
the writer wants to draw to those actors. For instance, people whose stories or 
identities matter are referred to by their proper names, while less important people 
fulfil passing and functional roles (p. 40). That said, including or excluding references 
to social actors by their names would necessarily influence the degree of engagement 
on the part of the reader. See for instance the following process from Haaretz in 
which a Palestinian family attacked by Israeli forces is referred to by their proper 
name. 
 




Two of the most recurring references to social actors are those which represent 
them as individuals or groups. The value of individuality in some spheres of society 
and the value of conformity in others make these references very important to CDA 
(van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 37). In general terms, elite people, and those whose stories are 
worth reporting, are usually individualized, while ordinary people are usually 
collectivized.  
The individualization and collectivization of social actors are part and parcel 
of how events in the war are meant to be constructed and conveyed to the audience. 
This also directly influences the degree of sympathy and engagement of the audience 
for and with the reported social actors. There is, however, no direct relationship 
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between the reference (individualization/ collectivization) and discursive functions. 
Questions about whom and in what context a reference is used can help in defining the 
function of each reference.  
Indetermination  
Indetermination is references to social actors while keeping their individual 
identities unspecified. Social actors are referred to in a way that makes it hard to know 
their relationship to actions and other social actors. The reader’s assessment of events 
would thus be dependent on that of the writer, since the former has little information 
about the social actors involved. Critical analysis aims first to identify those actors, 
where possible, and reveal the functions of this choice of referring.   
3.2.2.2 Referential Strategies 
Referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) are linguistic and rhetorical 
tools with which individuals and groups are identified (Richardson, 2007). The 
analysis of referential strategies is based on three assumptions: referring to social 
actors in a certain way is a matter of choice (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001a), the way social 
actors are referred to carries value judgements, and referential strategies ‘establish 
coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and 
represented’ (Richardson, 2007, p. 50).  
In simple terms, the analysis of referential strategies is assumed to reveal what 
is in a name. The main distinctive characteristic of analysing referential strategies is a 
detailed account of all possible denotations and connotations a noun phrase that refers 
to social actors may have. Unlike the social-actor model which moves from the social 
to the textual (how a social role is variably represented by different textual realizations 
with different discursive functions), referential strategies move from the textual to the 
social: what meanings, connotations and social values a particular reference has. For 
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instance, the social-actor model labels both Palestinians and the family in the 
following examples as collectivizing references. However, it is the analysis of 
referential strategies that highlight the difference between the two references (e.g. 
family is emotionally evocative since it conveys meanings of innocence and 
vulnerability). 
 
[Ynet] Israeli attacks {Agent} on Gaza {Circumstance} have killed {Material {Process} at least 60 
Palestinians {Goal}. 
[Haaretz] Fighter jets {Agent} blew up {Material Process} the home {Goal} on Sunday night 
{Circumstance}] [while the family {Agent} was eating {Material Process} its Iftar meal {Goal}]. 
 
In analysing referential strategies, special attention is paid to two important 
tropes: metonymies and synecdoches. I referred to metonymies in the previous section 
when I explained van Leeuwen’s socio-semantic categories of spatialization and 
instrumentalization. I emphasize here that these references are ‘substitutions involving 
two semantically (and materially or cognitively) adjacent fields of reference’ (Reisigl 
& Wodak, 2001a, p. 57). Social actors, therefore, are not clearly stated but represented 
by referring to a place or an object associated with them. Synecdoches, on the other 
hand, are ‘substitutions within one and the same field of reference: a term is replaced 
by another term, the extension is either semantically wider or semantically narrower’ 
(ibid.). For instance, Israel in the following example is a collectivizing reference (a 
wider semantic extension) that refers to a smaller group of actors.  
 
[PIC] Israel {Agent} is deliberately targeting {Material Process} Gazan civilians and children {Goal}. 
 
These tropes might be used as tools of generalization and essentialization by 
associating a whole community with the actions of a smaller group of actors. They can 
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also background the social actors involved or keep them in the semantic background 
(ibid.).  
All three discursive features introduced above, transitivity, social-actor model 
and referential strategies, deal with clause-level grammatical and lexical choices. As 
units of analysis, processes and lexical choices are analysed independently. This raises 
a challenge in framing the functions of these isolated micro-choices. The following 
section introduces two different frameworks used to systematize the relationship 
between textual choices, their discursive functions and the context in which they 
operate.  
3.3 Frameworks of Systematization and Interpretation 
3.3.1 Indexing hypothesis and cascading activation 
Based on the role of the press in modern societies, every newspaper 
necessarily has its own political objectives that serve or challenge particular political 
parties and, at a wider level, particular ideologies (see Section 2.5.2). However, the 
political objectives of newspapers and their role in reproducing/ challenging 
sociocultural narratives are not always stated as part of a newspaper’s agenda but 
propagated under the disguise of objective reporting. This applies to Israeli 
newspapers which have no direct affiliations to political parties (see Section 3.4.1).  
It is necessary then to investigate the political discourse each newspaper draws 
on in order to reveal their (competing) interests in foregrounding particular political 
views and suppressing others. On the other hand, one of the concerns of this study is 
to uncover the ideological debate within Israeli society. One aspect of this debate is 
the (non)conformity of news discourse with the dominant sociocultural narratives. 
Therefore, the study employs the indexing hypothesis (Bennett, 1990) and cascading 
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activation (Entman, 2003, 2004), respectively, to detect the influence of political 
discourse and sociocultural narratives on the formation of news language.  
The indexing hypothesis is a framework proposed by W. Lance Bennett (1990) 
to examine the relationship between the press and the state. The framework focuses 
‘on the journalistic practices of tying – or indexing – story frames to their sources and 
to the viewpoints found within official decision circles, a technique that reflects levels 
of official conflict and consensus’ (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010, p. 411). In this study, the 
indexing hypothesis is used to identify the political preferences of newspapers by 
identifying the politicians’ world views as they are incorporated in news articles. 
On the other hand, cascading activation is proposed by Entman (2003, 2004) 
to investigate the sociocultural narratives activated by news to explain events within 
conventional out-of-context frames of interpretations, mostly confined to the 
dominant ideology. Entman (2003, p. 422) emphasizes that the more a news frame is 
congruent with the dominant political culture, the more it is successful in affirming 
particular representations. In this study, the investigation of national culture in news is 
based on analysing representations that are reported by ordinary people. These 
representations can reveal dominant ideological convictions and how they 
manufacture people’s perceptions of their social context. It is important to note that 
people’s re-articulation of these narratives is not necessarily conscious. Rather, 
narratives are best envisaged as integrated into the fabric of the thinking of people 
who ultimately reproduce them as natural representations of reality. 
In sum, the indexing hypothesis and cascading activation are principally used 
to distinguish between two voices: the voice of politicians which reflects the political 
preferences of newspapers, and the voice of ordinary people which reflects the 
national narratives that newspapers reproduce. The study follows Gavriely-Nuri 
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(2010) in her critical employment of these frameworks. However, unlike Gavriely-
Nuri who employs frameworks for macro-level analysis (analysis of TV video clips), 
this study uses frameworks to interpret the findings of other micro-level methods of 
analysis. After using transitivity, social-actor model and referential strategies, the 
study identifies and explains the (in)congruence between newspapers, political 
discourse and hegemonic national narratives. Moreover, since the analysis aims to 
uncover the political and ideological differences between newspapers, I coin the label 
cascading interruption to refer to newspapers’ deviation from hegemonic narratives. 
This is especially helpful in analysing Israeli newspapers. It aims at a subtle 
investigation of the discursive strategies via which some newspapers covertly 
challenge the hegemonic national culture.  
3.3.2 Aspects of representation and macro-strategies of representation  
One concern of this study is to overcome the analytical bias of (some) CDA 
approaches in analysing the discursive functions of texts, especially when dealing 
with micro-linguistic choices (see Section 2.5.4). It proposes that textual analysis 
regulates discursive analysis which, in turn, is interpreted in the socio-political 
context. To make this explicit, the study systematizes the analysis and findings within 
two discursive and contextual frameworks: aspects of representation and macro-
strategies of representation. 
Aspects of representation are mappings of all the grammatical configurations 
and linguistic choices that have the same discursive functions in relation to a specific 
group of actors or specific event. Each aspect of representation is the sum of micro-
textual choices distributed in and across texts. These are discursive, they mediate 
between language choices and the social context. For instance, one aspect of 
representation in this study is Palestinian civilians are the main/ only receivers of 
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Israeli military action. It includes all grammatical and lexical choices that functionally 
foreground the effects of actions on civilians, such as passive clauses and active 
clauses which have nominalizations as Agents. This means that the examples used in 
the analysis need not belong to the same process type because different process types 
may have the same discursive function. The examples, however, start with the most 
typical then move on to the least typical realizations that serve a particular function. In 
this sense, discursive functions are based on linguistic theory (transitivity in this case) 
which considerably minimizes the subjective interpretation of language choices.  
All similar aspects of representation are summed up to form macro-strategies 
of representation. The term is borrowed from Unger (2013) and refers to groupings of 
discursive strategies which may eventually lead to particular constructions of actors, 
events and social phenomena. Macro-strategies link the discursive to the context. In 
other words, they identify the contextual function of aspects of representation based 
on the discursive function itself (e.g. foregrounding vs backgrounding) and on the 
analyst’s awareness of the context. As Fairclough (2003) explains, this is an 
interpretive level which situates the discursive functions of texts in their contexts. 
Therefore, two factors decide the choice of names of macro-strategies. First, the name 
of each macro-strategy should demonstrate its different aspects of representations. 
Second, the name is meant to give a logical order to aspects of representation when 
they seem to be correlated in the socio-political context. Although these strategies and 
their names might be based on the analyst’s (biased) orientation of discursive 
functions into particular contexts, they are neither random nor selective. Instead, they 
arise directly from aspects of representation which, in turn, are based on linguistic 
theory. In this way, the analysis shifts systematically and consistently from the textual 
to the social. For instance, in analysing Palestinian newspapers I identify one macro-
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strategy as Palestinian civilians are the victims of military action. This is worked out 
from different aspects of representation, such as Palestinian civilians are the main/ 
only receivers of Israeli military action, the war is massively disproportionate, and 
most of the victims are vulnerable social actors. One could suggest that these aspects 
might form another macro-strategy, but it cannot be claimed that the one identified 
here is wrong or invalid.  
3.4 Israeli and Palestinian online newspapers and news websites: background 
and position in political and media landscapes 
To answer the research questions about internal political and ideological 
tensions in Palestine and Israel as manifested in journalistic discourse, it is necessary 
to analyse different media outlets that are indicative of the media landscape on each 
side. In this section I introduce the three Israeli online newspapers and three 
Palestinian news websites dealt with in this study and identify their general positions 
in the political and media landscapes.  
3.4.1 Israeli online newspapers 
3.4.1.1 Haaretz 
Haaretz is one of the oldest newspapers in Israel. It was first published in 1919 
and run by Russian socialist Zionists (Open Source Centre, 2008). Haaretz describes 
itself as ‘an independent daily newspaper with a broadly liberal outlook both on 
domestic issues and on international affairs’ (Haaretz, 2001). It has been widely 
associated with journalistic quality and drawn the attention of the social and political 
elite as the only paper in Israel committed to supporting civil rights and promoting 
democratic values (Sheizaf, 2010; Tadmor, 2013). Schult (2008) argues that Haaretz’s 
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deviation from the usual political line of the media in Israel has made its English 
website very popular with an international audience.  
Haaretz has always reflected some aspects of the Palestinians’ suffering under 
occupation. However, as Sheizaf (2010) argues, the paper’s foregrounding of 
Palestinian rights mainly appears in editorials in which the newspaper shows its 
opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu and his rightist ministers, while news recently has 
been less occupied with the daily problems of occupation in the Palestinian territories. 
Medad and Pollak (2013) claim that Haaretz has an ideological agenda behind its 
controversial treatment of some issues in the occupied territories. The authors use the 
term far left pejoratively in describing Haaretz’s critical attitude to the occupation. 
They claim that Haarezt lacks a professional code and national affiliation due to its 
dissociation from Zionism.  
In spite of Haaretz’s clear position on the left of the political map in Israel, the 
newspaper does not exclude other political views (Slater, 2007). It offers space to 
members of political and military mainstream establishments. In addition, some 
reporters and commentators in Haaretz have centrist or rightist orientations (ibid.).  
3.4.1.2 Yediot Aharonot  
Yediot Aharonot is one of the most widely circulated tabloids in Israel. It is a 
centrist newspaper which defines itself as the ‘nation’s newspaper’, one that focuses 
on military and security issues as well as internal issues that concern the middle class 
(Sheizaf, 2010; Open Source Centre, 2008). The newspaper launched its online 
edition Ynet in 2006, which is independent from the printed paper edition and has a 
separate and autonomous editorial board (Doron & Lev-On, 2012). Nonetheless, Ynet 
is committed to the general policies and journalistic practices of Yediot Aharonot 
(Ynetnews, 2015). It is the most popular news website in Israel and soon paralleled 
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the long-term status of Yediot Aharonot in the printed press (Ashuri, 2014; Doron 
& Lev-On, 2012).  
In striving for the widest readership possible, Yediot Aharonot and its online 
version offer a wide range of views from left to right (BBC, 2006). However, the 
general policy of the newspaper is pro-establishment (Madmoni-Gerber, 2009). For 
instance, the newspaper is well known for its sharp criticism of Netanyahu and his 
staff (Sheizaf, 2010). However, unlike Haaretz, Yediot Aharonot criticizes Netanyahu 
over internal issues in order to appeal to more readers and compete in the media 
market (ibid.). In this sense, the newspaper does not provide any substantial critique 
of the mainstream Zionist political culture, especially the dominant narratives about 
the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. The newspaper prioritizes reporting and 
commenting on issues concerning Jewish Israelis, while reporting on minorities, 
especially Arab Israelis, is mostly limited to crime and ‘disorder’ events (Open Source 
Centre, 2008).  
3.4.1.3 Jerusalem Post 
The Jerusalem Post (JP) is an Israeli broadsheet newspaper published only in 
English and French. Originally a left-wing newspaper, JP underwent a radical shift to 
the right after being taken over by the Hollinger Group, which owns other newspapers 
in the US and the UK (BBC, 2006). Although the newspaper is believed to have 
shifted slightly towards the centre in 2004, it is distinguished by a tough line on 
security and issues related to the conflict with the Palestinians (ibid.). Although its 
editorial policy seems to tolerate some diversity, it openly supports right-wing 
governments (Newman, 2002). 
JP has a smaller readership share than other newspapers because it does not 
publish in Hebrew. However, it has ‘a large sphere of influence because it is usually 
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read by diplomats and foreign journalists based in Israel’ (Gentile, 2016). In addition, 
it identifies an ethno-national function for itself as a newspaper that links Israel to 
Jews outside Israel. It is parochial in addressing issues about Jews at the expense of a 
broader coverage of world news (BBC, 2006).  
3.4.2 Palestinian news websites 
3.4.2.1 Palestinian Information Centre 
The Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) is a Hamas-affiliated online news 
website that was launched in 1997. It publishes in eight languages, including English. 
Although PIC is an essential part of Hamas’s media operation, it does not claim any 
factional role. Instead, it describes itself as an independent Palestinian organization 
that promotes ‘awareness about Palestine, the Palestinians, and the Palestinian issue 
and to balance the often distorted picture presented in the mainstream media’ 
(Palestinian Information Centre, 2016). It does not say, however, what the distorted 
picture is that other media outlets produce, neither does it specify the ideological or 
political bases of its presumed accurate picture.  
Alongside other media outlets affiliated to Hamas, PIC has played an 
important role in the Palestinian internal conflict. It was a tool that helped Hamas 
establish its regime in Gaza by propagating its political and ideological agenda and 
demonizing its rival, Fatah and the PA, as an illegitimate representative of 
Palestinians (Oukal, 2012). 
3.4.2.2 Palestine News and Information Agency 
The Palestine News and information Agency (WAFA) is the PA’s official news 
agency that delivers news in Arabic, Hebrew, English and French (Abu Sada, 2016). 
The Agency was established in 1972 by the PLO to counter the flow of news from the 
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Israeli side and to function as an independent Palestinian media stage (Khalidi, 2014). 
After the establishment of the PA, it became part of the PA’s official media body.  
When Hamas overthrew Fatah and the PA in Gaza in 2007, WAFA exclusively 
adopted Fatah’s political agenda and dissociated itself from other members of the 
PLO. Alongside other affiliated media outlets, WAFA has played an important role in 
representing the PA and Fatah as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians, 
demonizing Hamas as a separatist movement that causes harm to the Palestinian 
national cause (Oukal, 2012). 
3.4.2.3 Maan News Agency 
The Maan News Agency (Maan) is part of the Maan Network which is the 
‘largest independent TV, radio and online media group in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip’ (Maannews, 2016). It publishes in Arabic and English and is one of the most 
visited news websites in Palestine (ibid.). By publishing in English, the news website 
conveys news to international readers and provides a stage for Palestinians to address 
the international community. However, the news website does not specify any 
national role it is meant to play, neither does it refer to the effects of the struggle with 
Israel on its journalistic practices. On the contrary, it refers to its cooperation with 
some Israeli mobile providers to offer an SMS breaking news service to its 
subscribers. In describing its mission, Maan says that it is preoccupied with internal 
political, economic and cultural events, as well as developments in Israel (ibid.). It 
represents Palestinian and Israeli affairs as adjacent but not necessarily overlapping. 
In other words, struggle as a defining feature of the socio-political reality of 
Palestinians is not a point of departure for Maan’s journalistic practices.   
The Maan network is funded by the Danish and Dutch governments and has a 
liberal stance towards socio-political issues. Its editorial board believes that the 
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Palestinian media, and even official TV channels, provide incomplete and 
ideologically-laden representations of events based on the interests of the political 
factions they serve (Sienkiewicz, 2010). Maan, therefore, attempts to fill this gap and 
‘consolidate freedom of expression and media pluralism as keys to promoting 
democracy and human rights’ (Maannews, 2016). Nonetheless, the Hamas-affiliated 
media specialist Sadeq Ameen (2008) says that Maan plays a role in Palestinian 
political strife. He accuses Maan of propagating the PA’s political agenda and 
backgrounding or demonizing Hamas during the Palestinian internal crisis in 2007.  
3.5 Criteria for data selection  
The 2014 Gaza War lasted for 51 days. Hundreds of news reports were 
produced by each news outlet to cover the war’s rapidly unfolding events. For an in-
depth qualitative analysis, the study chooses to focus on a key event in the war: the 
ground invasion of Shejayyah neighbourhood on 20 July 2014 (see Section 1.8.6). The 
study is interested in investigating how the various newspapers and news websites 
differ in their representations of this major event. It does not matter whether the news 
articles from each news outlet are representative of its general tendency or not. The 
concern of this study is with how each outlet deals with this event and the war in 
general, in light of its complicated military, political and human realities. The ground 
invasion was a very controversial event and linguistic choices are believed to be 
deeply entrenched within the political and ideological objectives of both newspapers 
and news websites. The focus on a limited number of articles relating to one specific 
event enables me to examine how – analytically independent – micro-linguistic 
choices package different aspects of the same social reality.  
I choose to analyse 12 news articles from each news outlet taken from the first 
three days of the ground invasion: 20–22 July 2014. The choice of articles is based on 
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their chronological appearance in the newspapers and on news websites, so the first 
four articles are chosen from each day. The articles should be directly related to the 
events of the war. Other articles that deal with the war indirectly, such as international 
reactions and demonstrations in some Arab and Western countries, are excluded. The 
total number of news articles analysed is 72.  
In this chapter I have delineated the discursive features used to conduct a 
clause-level analysis based on the theoretical, methodological and contextual 
requirements of this study. I have explained how transitivity, the social-actor model 
and referential strategies are used to identify linguistic nuances in order to reveal 
subtle political and ideological tensions between different media outlets by linking 
grammatical and lexical choices with their functions. I have also explained how two 
frameworks, indexing hypothesis and cascading activation, are employed to identify 
the political orientations of newspapers and the socio-political narratives they draw on 
and reproduce. Finally, I have demonstrated how linguistic analysis regulates, 
respectively, the discursive explanation and contextual interpretation of linguistic 
choices by systematizing them within aspects of representation and macro-strategies 
of representation.  
In this chapter I also justify the criteria for data selection. Since the focus is on 
irregularities and fissures of representation within Palestinian and Israeli societies, the 
selected newspapers and news websites are indicative of the media as well as the 
political and ideological landscapes. Besides, the choice of a limited number of news 
articles is justified by the focus on a qualitative study that investigates the role of 
ideology in representing a particular event.  
With this I conclude the first three chapters in which the political and 
ideological context of the study, its theoretical bases and its methodology are 
128 
 
explained. In the next two chapters I introduce the analysis. I present first the analysis 
of Israeli online newspapers in Chapter Four, and then the analysis of Palestinian 




CHAPTER 4: Analysis of Israeli online newspapers.  
This chapter is the first of two main chapters of analysis. Here I analyse the 
micro-linguistic choices of three Israeli newspapers, Haaretz, Jerusalem Post (JP) and 
Yediot Aharonot (Ynet), and then identify the discursive functions of these choices and 
their political and ideological relevance. As I explained in Chapter Two, I analyse the 
grammatical and lexical choices used to represent actions and actors. I also distinguish 
between the linguistic choices reported from politicians and ordinary people. 
Consistent with the research questions, emphasis is put on the differences between 
these newspapers in order to identify how they compete in the political and 
ideological context of Israel. 
Linguistic choices that have similar discursive functions are grouped into 
aspects of representation, which are in turn grouped into a set of macro-strategies of 
representation (see Section 3.3.2). However, for the sake of a smoother and engaging 
presentation of the study, I start with the salient macro-strategies in order to highlight 
the differences between the newspapers. Each macro-strategy is explained in terms of 
its aspects of representation, while reference is made to the linguistic choices that 
make up the aspects of representation by providing indicative examples. This layout 
of presentation does not contradict the bottom-up direction of the study because the 
macro-strategies are findings that are worked out from the analysis itself. 
The analysis identifies seven macro-strategies that show differences between 
the newspapers in representing pivotal aspects of the conflict. The first and second 
macro-strategies show that JP and Ynet represent the war as a legitimate response to 
the Palestinian threat, while Haaretz focuses on the destructive consequences of the 
war for Palestinian civilians. The third macro-strategy shows that JP and Ynet 
normalize the war by backgrounding its effects on Israeli actors. In contrast, as the 
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fourth strategy shows, Haaretz deviates from the hegemonic political culture and 
highlights the suffering of Israeli soldiers. The fifth strategy shows the differences 
between the newspapers in representing the Palestinians in the West Bank. While JP 
and Ynet include stereotypical representations that associate Palestinians with 
violence, Haaretz includes a context-bound representation that links what happens in 
the West Bank with Israeli atrocities in the (Gaza) Strip. Finally, the sixth and seventh 
strategies show the differences between Ynet and Haaretz in representing different 
groups in Israel. Ynet employs representations that essentialize the differences 
between Arabs and Jews on ethnic bases, while Haaretz employs political distinctions 
without referring to the ethnicities of social actors.  
By mapping the contextual relevance of all the strategies in the concluding 
section of this chapter, and by providing a further interpretation of the political and 
ideological relevance of the findings in Chapter Six, one can see that they are 
consistent and may reflect well-established discursive tendencies.  
4.1 The war is an inevitable, legitimate and efficient military action against a 
threat from Hamas.  
The first salient macro-strategy features variably in JP and Ynet and represents 
the war as a legitimate action against an imminent danger from Hamas. It also 
advocates military action as leading efficiently to desirable results by protecting the 
Israeli people. As the different aspects of representation below show, this macro-
strategy constructs a complex, and sometimes contradictory, image for Israel; 
although Israel is threatened by a serious enemy, it enjoys military superiority 





4.1.1 Hamas is posing an imminent threat. 
The central aspect of representation that legitimizes attacking the Gaza Strip is 
the representation of Hamas as posing an imminent threat to Israel. Different 
grammatical and lexical choices in JP and Ynet emphasize two of Hamas’s actions 
associated with violence and danger: launching rockets and using tunnels. The first 
and most typical realization is material processes in which Hamas is a doer of actions 
directed at Israeli civilians. The processes are mostly quoted from Israeli military and 
political officials. They do not represent specific events but refer to a general and 
undifferentiated threat against all Israelis. 
  
(1) [Ynet] Hamas {Agent} starts rocketing {Material Process} Israel {Goal}. 
(2) [JP] “Rockets {Agent} are attacking {Material Process} it (Israel) {Goal}”. 
 
The collectivizing metonymical reference Israel conceals important contextual 
information about the Goal. It does not say when, how or whom is particularly 
affected by the actions. Rather, it confines the threat to collectivized Israelis by 
transferring “isolated situations of experience with individuals to a whole group” 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001a, p. 109). Ynet refers explicitly to Hamas as a doer of the 
action and uses the verbal complex starts rocketing that suggests a sequential order of 
events: Hamas starts its violent actions, then Israel reacts. The simple present tense of 
starts generalizes this understanding from this specific war into a general conflict 
between the two sides. JP, on the other hand, focalizes the danger of Hamas’s actions 
by substituting the actors with the instrument rockets. The present continuous verbal 
group are attacking emphasizes the immediacy and urgency of the action, and thus 
legitimizes the Israeli reaction.  
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JP uses further grammatical constructions that associate the collective Israelis 
with danger. First, the newspaper includes transitive and intransitive material 
processes in which Israeli civilians are the Agent. The processes are mostly 
involuntary and describe the displacement of actors due to military action. 
 
(3) [JP] Residents of the council's 15 kibbutzim and 13 moshavim {Agent} are facing {Material 
Process} different levels of danger {Goal} based on their location {Circumstance}. 
(4) [JP] As much as 75% of the residents {Agent} have relocated {Material Process} to areas farther 
from the Gaza Strip and the rockets, mortars, and tunnel threat {Circumstance}. 
 
In example (3), the Circumstance based on their location associates proximity 
to the Gaza Strip with danger; the closer civilians are to Gaza, the more danger they 
face. This function is also served in example (4). The place Gaza Strip is 
grammatically equivalent to rockets, mortars and tunnel threat, assuming the same 
functional role of these semantically different references. Moreover, the use of the 
spatializing metonymy Gaza Strip to refer to Palestinians confers the alleged threat of 
one group of social actors onto collective Gazans. Representing the Strip as a 
monolithic threatening entity, while referring at the same time to smaller Israeli towns 
and cities, obfuscates the fact that the Gaza Strip is only 1.7 per cent of Israel’s size 
(based on Israel’s borders before the 1967 War).  
JP also includes relational processes that foreground the alleged threat of 
Hamas against collective Israelis. For instance, the Attribute in mortal danger in the 
following example represents an imminent threat intensified by the adjective mortal. 
The threat motif and the geographical proximity between Gaza and Israeli places is 




(5) [JP] Israeli citizens on the front lines {Carrier} will remain {Attributive Relational Process} in 
mortal danger {Attribute}. 
              Proximization between two entities or two (groups of) social actors is 
thoroughly discussed in cognitive approaches to CDA. For instance, Hart (2016, p. 
168) explains how spatial proximization ‘relies on a script involving an interaction 
between an ANTAGONIST and a PROTAGONIST’. The ANTAGONIST is represented 
as ‘entering the PROTAGONIST’S ground, or ‘territory’, resulting in corporeal harm to 
the PROTAGONIST’. In the example above, the role of ANTAGONIST is implied as 
Gaza/ Gaza resistance, while the role of PROTAGONIST is filled by Israeli citizens. 
This representation highlights the threat of the ANTAGONIST and the victimhood of 
the PROTAGONIST, and justifies the need to take an action to prevent the threat.  
JP also includes quoted mental processes that represent Hamas as doing 
illegitimate actions. Unlike material processes, mental processes do not represent what 
happens in the outer world. They expose Hamas’s inner world to the public and 
inform the reader not only of the movement’s actions but also of its intentions.  
 
(6) [JP] “They {Senser} don’t want {Mental Process} one (a cease-fire) {Phenomenon}”. 
 
In contrast, Haaretz refers to specific actions and represents their direct effect 
on Israeli civilians. For instance, the process was killed represents an action in one 
time and place that affects an individualized and identified Goal her father. 
 




Second, the three Israeli newspapers use transitive material processes in which 
Hamas acts on an inanimate Goal tunnels. Some processes in JP and Ynet passivize 
Israeli civilians as indirect receivers of actions. 
 
(8) [JP] Hamas has ordered {Initiator} its members {Actor} to use {Material Process} remaining 
tunnels {Goal} for immediate cross-border attacks {Circumstance} against Israeli civilians and military 
targets {Recipient}.  
(9) [Ynet] [A terrorist organization {Agent} has seen fit to dig {Material Process} tunnels {Goal}] [and 
come {material} through those tunnels {Circumstance} with handcuffs and tranquilizer drugs 
{Circumstance}], [prepared to try to capture {Material Process} Israeli citizens {Goal}]. 
 
In JP, the civilians are embedded in a prepositional phrase as a Recipient, 
while in Ynet they are a Goal of a subsequent process. These processes are quoted 
from Israeli and American politicians, respectively, and represent external realities. 
Although the actions did not actually happen, the processes construct a world view in 
which Hamas is associated with terrorizing actions targeting collective Israelis, 
reproducing the image Zionism constructs for Israel as a ‘nation under threat’ (Jones 
& Murphy, 2002). In contrast, the processes in Haaretz represent what allegedly 
happened, and not what is intended by Hamas to happen. Therefore, the processes do 
not represent the actions as directly affecting Israeli civilians. 
 
(10) [Haaretz] Hamas {Agent}, [the army (Sayer) said {Verbal Process}], has over the past decade 
{Circumstance} considerably upgraded {Material Process} its tunnelling capabilities {Goal}.  
 
Finally, JP and Ynet associate Hamas with a threat by using relational 
processes. These processes frame the realities represented by material processes and 
introduce them as propositions. For instance, the Attribute obvious in example (11) 
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represents the threat as a state of affairs. In example (12) the process proposes the 
action required to counter this threat by establishing a causative relationship between 
Hamas’s actions and Israel’s war. 
 
(11) [JP] For the council head {Circumstance} the threat {carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} 
obvious {Attribute}. 
(12) [Ynet] The aim {Value/ Identified} is {Identifying Relational Process} to remove the threat of 
terror {Token/ Identifier}.  
 
In sum, the first aspect of representation foregrounds Hamas as 
indiscriminately threatening Israel. It is a contextualization of the war that gives 
legitimacy to Israeli actions, as the following aspect of representation shows. This, 
however, backgrounds the wider context of the war, especially violent Israeli actions 
prior to the military campaign (see Section 1.8.5).  
4.1.2 The Israeli army is mainly acting against sources of threat. 
Another salient aspect of representation in JP and Ynet that serves to 
legitimize the war is the representation of the Israeli army as acting mainly against 
sources of threat. This aspect is basically realized by transitive material processes that 
foreground the Israeli army and its agency over actions targeting Palestinian fighters. 
 
 (13) [JP] The IDF {Agent} has struck {Material Process} 2,600 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets 
{Goal} since the start of Operation Protective Edge {Circumstance}. 
(14) [Ynet] “We {Agent} hit {Material Process} the leadership of Hamas’ military wing {Goal}”. 
 
The reference 2,600 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in JP conflates animate 
and inanimate Goals. The nomination target presupposes that the Goal is deliberately 
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attacked since it belongs to the enemy identified by the collectivizing nomination 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Similarly, the collectivizing reference the leadership of 
Hamas’ military wing in Ynet refers to a general Goal, which does not specify whom 
the social actors are. Nonetheless, the mere reference implies that the action is 
legitimate. 
Similar processes in Ynet foreground Israeli agency and represent the 
Palestinian fighters as submissive. For instance, the verbal group caught in example 
(15) represents the action as non-challenging and constructs the army as militarily 
superior to submissive fighters.  
 
(15) [Ynet ] “In the last day {Circumstance} we {Agent} caught {Material Process} 13 terrorists 
{Goal}”. 
 
Ynet also emphasizes the desirable consequences of the actions by 
foregrounding the Goal in passive material processes. 
  
(16) [Ynet] Nine terrorists {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in a security incident 
{Circumstance}. 
 
The vast majority of passive processes are reported from the army and do not 
provide further information about the actors targeted or their activities. Nonetheless, 
the functionalizing reference terrorists presupposes that they are legitimate goals. It 
associates the fighters with danger and threat by evoking a ‘series of nuances in the 
reader’s or listener’s mind, which are linked emotionally with previous experiences’ 
(Reyes, 2011, p. 788).  
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Active material processes that have similar functions in Haaretz are relatively 
infrequent. As the following example shows, almost all of the processes are quoted 
from Benjamin Netanyahu and represent general actions.  
 
(17) [Haaretz] “We {Agent} target {Material Process} only the sources of terror {Goal}”.  
 
Although such processes have a role in the experiential function of Haaretz’s 
news reports, other representations challenge their discursive functions.  
 
(18) [Haaretz] [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu {Sayer} on Sunday {Circumstance} defended 
{Verbal Process} the military actions {Matter}] [that {Agent} resulted in {Material Process} some 60 
Palestinian deaths, mostly civilians, in Gaza's Shujaiyeh neighbourhood {Goal}].  
 
Haaretz does not challenge the truth value of Netanyahu’s claims, but it subtly 
introduces counter-representations that construct a different reality. The newspaper 
identifies the Matter participant by a subsequent material process in which Palestinian 
civilians are the Goal of military action.  
Representing the Israeli army as acting on sources of threat in JP and Ynet is 
also realized by material processes with inanimate Goals. The majority of these 
processes represent the army as acting against tunnels. They are either active and 
foreground the agency of the army, or passive and foreground the military 
significance of the actions. Similar to previous instances, the majority of these 
processes are reported from Israeli military sources. 
 
(19) [Ynet] “We {Agent} locate {Material Process} the terror tunnels and rocket launchers {Goal}”.  




(21) [Ynet] [IDF officials {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} Sunday {Circumstance}] [that Israeli ground 
forces {Agent} have significantly damaged {Material Process} the tunnels {Goal}].   
(22) [JP] [23 tunnels {Goal} have been destroyed {Material Process}] [and 183 terrorists {Goal} killed 
{Material Process}]. 
 
JP also includes processes that represent high-tech military equipment and its 
role in protecting Israeli soldiers and civilians. This is mainly realized by material 
processes with metonymical Agents, such as the system and the Iron Dome system in 
the following examples, in which the instrument replaces the actors.  
 
(23) [JP] The system {Agent} successfully blocked {Material Process} an anti-tank missile {Goal}.  
(24) [JP] At least two rockets {Goal} were shot down {Material Process} by the Iron Dome system 
{Agent} over metropolitan Tel Aviv {Circumstance}. 
 
In the following example, the action of intercepting rockets is nominalized and 
represented by the Phenomenon rocket interception.  
 
(25) [JP] Rocket interceptions {Phenomenon} were also heard {Mental Process} above Bat Yam, 
Holon, and Rishon Letzion {Circumstance}. 
 
The mental process heard represents the action from the (inner) view of the 
Israeli civilians. It puts them in close proximity to the Iron Dome and its success in 
preventing an imminent danger.  
4.1.3 The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government are in 
control of events. 
The third aspect of representation in JP and Ynet represents Netanyahu and his 
government as controlling and deciding the course of actions. This is realized by 
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material processes that foreground the agency of politicians over what the army is 
doing in the Strip.  
 
(26) [JP] Israel {Agent} sent {Material Process} ground forces {Goal} into the Gaza Strip 
{Circumstance}. 
(27) [Ynet] “[We {Agent} must execute {Material Process} it {Goal}]” [said {Verbal Process} Finance 
Minister Yair Lapid {Sayer}]. 
 
The process sent in example (26) is non-violent and backgrounds the military 
role of the ground forces in the Gaza Strip. It describes the agency of the politicians 
over the army but backgrounds the effect of the action over Palestinians. The Actor is 
referred to by the collectivizing nomination Israel, assuming a consensus behind the 
decision to send ground forces to the Gaza Strip. Another ideological representation 
appears in example (27), which has the Agent we. This inclusive pronoun constructs a 
conflated group of ‘Self’ by blurring the boundaries between Netanyahu and his 
rightist government, the army and the Israeli people. Similar representations also 
appear in JP. As the example below shows, some of these processes represent external 
realities.  
 
(28) [JP] “We (Israelis) {Agent} do not want to harm {Material Process} even one innocent civilian 
{Goal}”.  
 
The process is realized by the verbal complex do not want to harm, which 
represents an intended future action. The process subtly conflates the external reality, 




JP also includes material processes that allocate the politicians an Initiator 
role. These processes represent the politician’s direct agency over the army and its 
actions. For instance, the army’s action to prepare in the following clause is not 
carried out by its free will. It is rather an action initiated by Netanyahu. 
 
(29) [JP] [Netanyahu {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [he {Initiator} has directed {Process:-} the army 
{Actor} to prepare {Material Process} for the possibility of a significant expansion of the ground 
operation {Circumstance}].  
 
Finally, JP and Ynet include attributive relational processes which are mostly 
quoted from the politicians themselves. They stand for the politicians’ point of view 
and represent them as being in control of the course of events.  
 
(30) [JP] “I {Carrier} am {Attributive Relational Process} sure {Attribute}”. 
(31) [Ynet] “We {Carrier} have {Attributive Relational Process} a mission {Attribute}”. 
 
The Attribute sure in JP characterizes Netanyahu and allocates him higher 
ground to judge events and take decisions. This process is an example of epistemic 
modality of truth (Fowler, 1991, p. 85), which refers to speakers committing 
themselves to the truth of their proposition. According to the scale of this type of 
modality, the process expresses absolute confidence on the part of Netanyahu.  
In Ynet, the clause is a possessive relational process that establishes a state of 
belonging between we and a mission. The relationship represents the action as 
inevitable, whereas the reference mission backgrounds its violent and destructive 
effects on Palestinians.  
Haaretz, in contrast, does not include processes that characterize politicians 
positively or conflate them with the Israeli people. Contrary to example (31) from 
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Ynet, a possessive relational process in Haaretz establishes a relationship between the 
Attribute more pressing matters, which highlights the (negative) repercussions of the 
war, and the individualized Netanyahu. This is emphasized by a necessary future 
action represented by the material process to deal with. 
 
(32) [Haaretz] [Netanyahu {Carrier} now has {Attributive Relational Process} more pressing matters 
{Attribute}] [to deal with {Material Process}]. 
 
The same representation appears in a mental process that distinguishes the 
leadership from the Israeli public and foregrounds the challenges raised by the war. It 
exposes the inner world of politicians and downplays their certainty about events. 
Similar to the above example, it associates what the army did with a necessary future 
action that has not been fulfilled yet. 
 
(33) [Haaretz] Israeli political and military leaders {Senser} will need to decide {Mental Process} how 
to proceed with the operation {Phenomenon}. 
 
These examples indicate how the processes in Haaretz represent not only what 
happened but also what ought to happen. They subtly introduce the challenges and 
negative consequences of the war for Israel, rather than merely celebrating its military 
significance.   
4.1.4 The war has little effect on Palestinian civilians. 
The last aspect of representation that serves to legitimize the war is 
backgrounding the effects of military action on civilian society in Gaza. The three 
Israeli newspapers include grammatical and lexical choices that background the 
suffering of Palestinian civilians. However, in later sections, I will explain how 
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Haaretz and Ynet represent Palestinian civilians as receivers of military action. 
Therefore, this aspect of representation is particularly distinctive of JP. 
This aspect of representation is first realized by material processes which have 
circumstantial Scope. They merely present where actions took place, with no 
reference to the social actors affected.  
 
(34) [JP] Large forces {Agent} entered {Material Process} Gaza {Scope} overnight {Circumstance}. 
 (35) [Ynet] Large infantry forces {Agent} entered {Material Process} Gaza {Scope} overnight 
{Circumstance}. 
(36) [Haaretz] The IDF {Agent} continued searching {Material Process} the area {Scope} for DNA 
evidence {Circumstance}. 
 
The processes entered and continued searching represent actions in terms of 
‘motion and location’, in which ‘the destructive nature of the processes is glossed 
over’ (Hart, 2014, p. 30). Actions are represented as moving into Palestinian cities 
‘rather than acting upon their Palestinian populations’ and are significantly chosen 
from among other alternatives such as ‘invaded’ or ‘attacked’, which would have 
conveyed the violent nature of the actions (Richardson, 2007, p. 59).  
Other processes in JP have inanimate Goals and background the military 
nature of actions. For instance, the process coordinate in the following example 
represents the action as a less obviously physical act.  
 
(37) [JP] Which (IDF sensors of shooter-cycle centres) {Agent} coordinate {Material Process} air 
strikes {Goal} against terrorists {Recipient}. 
  
The Goal air strikes is a nominalization that contains another process. It 
backgrounds the doer, the effect of the nominalized action, and the contextual 
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information surrounding it. In a similar vein, JP uses the process sweeping to refer to 
the military action in the West Bank.  
 
(38) [JP] The IDF {Agent} was sweeping {Material Process} the area {Goal} for the suspect 
{Circumstance}. 
 
By drawing on the domestic semantic field of cleaning, the metaphor 
normalizes the action and represents it as a necessity against an oddity. As I noted 
earlier, these actions usually include curfews, random detention and road closures. It 
is unlikely, however, that the process sweeping conveys to an international reader the 
true nature of the action.  
Affected Palestinian civilians are also backgrounded in JP and Ynet by using 
transitive material processes with Scope as a continuation of the process. Functionally, 
the verbs in these processes are empty, while the semantic load is conveyed by the 
Scope (see Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 193). As the following examples show, 
these constructions allow exclusion of the affected social actors. They exemplify what 
Fairclough (1989, p. 54) calls a discursive strategy of manipulation, in which 
emphasis is put on the idea that the action is done, regardless of its effect on social 
actors.  
 
(39) [JP] The IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} a large-scale wave of air strikes {Scope}. 
(40) [Ynet] IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} its ground incursion {Scope}. 
 
In more subtle representations in JP, the Scope conceptually shifts the way 
actions are viewed (see Section 3.2.1). For instance, example (41) below is quoted 
from an Israeli politician. Although they still refer to the domain of war, lexical 
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choices such as security and quiet represent aggression as an act of peacekeeping 
(Hart, 2014, p. 29), instantiating ‘the semantic blurring between peace and war’ in the 
Israeli hegemonic discourse after the 1967 War (Gavriely-Nuri, 2015, p. 58). 
 
(41) [JP] “[We {Agent} restore {Material Process} security and quiet {Scope}]”, [Bennet {Sayer} said 
{Verbal Process}]. 
 
Second, JP and Ynet background the effects of military action on civilians by 
using intransitive material processes. As the following examples show, these 
processes categorically exclude the social actors affected and explicate contextual 
information about the actions themselves. 
 
(42) [JP] “They {Agent} are fighting {Material Process} for a supreme goal {Circumstance}”. 
(43) [Ynet] Many different units {Agent} operate {Material Process} in the area {Circumstance}.   
 
JP also includes processes in which the army has an Initiator role, acting on 
civilians who have an Actor role. These processes represent actions intended to save 
Palestinians’ lives.  
 
(44) [JP] [The IDF {Initiator} called on {Process:-} residents of the area {Actor} to take {Material 
Process} the opportunity of the cease-fire {Scope}] [to vacate {Material Process} Shejaia {Goal}] [and 
make their way {Material Process} to Gaza City {Circumstance}].   
 
The example above foregrounds the positive action of the army in giving an 
opportunity to the residents to leave and go to safer places nearby. The representation, 
however, does not refer to the massive suffering of the civilians before and after the 
very short cease-fire. 
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Finally, JP backgrounds the effects on civilians by using relational processes. 
For instance, the process below identifies civilians as mass casualties in Shejaia. 
Although this reference expresses the large number of victims, it does not provide 
detailed information about them. Knowing that no other processes serve further 
identification, necessary information remains excluded.  
 
(45) [JP] The mass casualties in Shejaia {Token/ Identified} appeared to be {Identifying Relational 
Process} the heaviest {Value/ Identifier}.  
 
The verbal complex appeared to be serves as an epistemic hedge by putting 
the process on a scale of likelihood. This, in addition to backgrounding necessary 
contextual information, leads to a speculative mode of representation in which the 
newspaper maintains a distance from the sufferers, resulting in what Chouliaraki 
(2006, p. 97) calls ‘compassion fatigue – the audience’s indifference towards distant 
suffering’.  
4.2 The war is causing huge damage to civilian society in Gaza. 
The previous macro-strategy involves the intensification of Hamas’s threat and 
the ability of military action to counter the movement’s danger. One of the important 
aspects of representation that is necessary to validate this strategy is backgrounding 
the effect of the war on Palestinian civilians. In contrast, a macro-strategy in Haaretz 
and Ynet highlights the effects of the war on civil society in Gaza. The newspapers 
include an aspect of representation that shows the effects of Israeli military action on 
Palestinian civilians. However, Haaretz and Ynet put variable emphasis on the 
victimhood of civilians. While Ynet adopts a generalizing and less informative 
representation of the victims, Haaretz covers different aspects of the civilians 
146 
 
suffering. It refers exclusively to civilian victims due to the ground invasion of 
Shejaiyeh, emphasizing that most of the victims belong to vulnerable social classes, 
and it refers to the insufficient medical and rescue services dealing with the mounting 
causalities in the Strip.  
4.2.1 Civilians are receivers of military action. 
Different grammatical constructions in Haaretz and Ynet represent civilians as 
receivers of military action. First, the newspapers include transitive material processes 
in which Palestinian civilians are the Goal. Almost all of the processes in Ynet are 
devoid of emotional references. For instance, although the Goal at least 60 
Palestinians in the following clause is generic and may inclusively refer to civilians, 
the action of killing is not problematized.  
 
(46) [Ynet] Israeli attacks {Agent} on Gaza {Recipient} have killed {Material Process} at least 60 
Palestinians {Goal}. 
 
The doer of the action is substituted by the nominalization Israeli attacks, 
which contains another process, attacking, about which little information is provided. 
Although the Israeli agency over both actions, attacking and killing, can still be 
recovered from the co-text and the context, the nominalization leads to a conceptual 
shift of reference. Knowing that no other processes emphasize the agency of Israeli 
forces, the process represents the action as having no particular purpose (see Section 
3.2.1.1). The civilians are thus ‘collateral damage’ of an unintentional action. This 
representation hinders any involvement on the part of the reader because, as 
Chouliaraki (2006) explains, recipients of news feel powerless about misfortune to 
other actors when the doer of the action and their purposes are not clearly stated. 
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Similarly, Haaretz uses processes that background the agency and the 
intentionality of the forces regarding the actions. As the following examples show, 
some processes appear in passive constructions with Agent deletion, while others have 
nominalizations as Agent.  
 
(47) [Haaretz] 436 Gazans {Goal} had been killed {Material Process} since the beginning of the 
operation {Circumstance}. 
(48) [Haaretz] The strike {Agent} also wounded {Material Process} 25 people {Goal}. 
 
The Goals of some of these processes provide further information about the 
victims. For instance, the Goal in example (49) is modified by the proper name Ahmed 
Abu Sanima, which highlights the experience of those actors and brings them closer to 
the reader. 
 
(49) [Haaretz] The third and fourth (warning missiles) {Agent} hit {Material Process} the house of 
Ahmed Abu Sanima {Goal}. 
  
Similarly, the Goal in the following example is referred to by the classification 
categorization two men, their wives, and six children aged 9 months to 15 years. It 
associates civilians with social classes that are clearly illegitimate targets, which 
highlights their innocence and vulnerability.  
 
(50) [Haaretz] Two men, their wives, and six children aged 9 months to 15 years {Goal} were killed 
{Material Process}. 
 
More surprisingly, Haaretz includes material processes in which Israeli forces 




(51) [Haaretz] The Israel Air force {Agent} killed {Material Process} 35 members of two Gaza 
families {Goal} in separate strikes {Circumstance}. 
 
Foregrounding the doer does not necessarily mean that the action is intentional 
and aiming at a specific goal, but it does not exclude such an interpretation either. 
Furthermore, the nomination families emphasizes the innocence and vulnerability of 
the victims, which may raise questions about how the army is conducting military 
action.  
Highlighting the effect of actions on civilians also appears in material 
processes which have inanimate Goals that refer to civilian properties. In Ynet, the 
processes completely background the civilians affected. For instance, the process 
damaged below represents an action affecting the Goal, several houses, with no 
reference to the civilians who live in these houses. This, in Chouliaraki’s (2006) 
terms, is a scene of suffering without a sufferer that excludes the resultative attributes 
of the victims.  
 
(52) [Ynet] Tank shells {Agent} damaged {Material Process} several houses {Goal} along the eastern 
border of the territory {Circumstance}.  
 
The metonymical Agent tank shells substitutes the actual doer and 
backgrounds its intentionality in causing damage to civilians’ houses. The action is 
thus not problematized. Similarly, the only process in Haaretz of this kind 
backgrounds Israeli intentionality by using the metonymy fighter jets in an Agent role. 
 
(53) [Haaretz] [Fighter jets {Agent} blew up {Material Process} the home {Goal} on Sunday night 




However, the subsequent clause while the family was eating its Iftar meal, 
which represents the civilians as doers of a domestic action, contextualizes the first 
process. It describes a vulnerable domestic action (eating a meal after a day of fasting) 
during which the family was attacked and killed. This instantiates what Chouliaraki 
(2006, p. 99) calls a conceptual complexity, ‘semantic relationships that explain, 
elaborate on and evaluate the events’. Although the violent military action blew up 
affects an inanimate Goal, the conceptual complexity served by a subordinate clause, 
as well as the reference the family, emphasizes the civilians’ innocence, vulnerability 
and detachment from any military action. Only one process in Ynet refers to civilians. 
However, this reference is embedded in a coordinate clause and represented as 
unproblematic.  
 
(54) [Ynet] [The IDF {Agent} bombed {Material Process} the house {Goal}] [in which he {Agent} was 
staying {Material Process}], [and his wife and son {Goal} were also killed {Material Process}]. 
 
While the intentional process bombed is active, the process that describes the 
killing of the wife and son is passive. The processes could have a different function if 
introduced, for instance, as the IDF bombed the house in which he was staying and 
killed his wife and his son, in which the processes are part of one clause instead of 
being realized in two clauses with different functions. Moreover, the relational 
identifying reference his wife and son identifies the victims in terms of their 
relationship to the legitimate target (a Hamas leader). This represents the victims as 
unavoidable collateral damage.  
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Haaretz also explicates the effect of actions on civilians by representing their 
actions. As the following example shows, the actions of civilians reflect the hardship 
they encounter due to the war.  
 
(55) [Haaretz] The Siyyam family {Agent}, however, began to evacuate {Material Process} its home 
{Goal}. 
 
In addition, Haaretz includes mental processes that represent the inner world 
of the victims and expose their states of mind. For instance, the mental process below 
represents the confusion of the families in responding to the alleged warning missiles 
and their failure to act properly. It highlights further aspects of their suffering and 
associates them with weakness, innocence and victimhood. 
  
(56) [Haaretz] None of the three families {Senser} knew {Mental Process} which of the families the 
missiles were meant to warn {Phenomenon}. 
 
In sum, Haaretz and Ynet are distinguished from JP by referring to the effects 
of the military action on Palestinian civilians. However, Ynet does not include 
representations that influence the legitimacy of the war and a positive image of 
military action in terms of solving the ‘security’ threats. This is realized by keeping a 
considerable distance from the victims and backgrounding the Israeli intentionality 
over the actions. In contrast, Haaretz includes processes that highlight important 
contextual information about the victims. It also includes some processes that subtly 
foreground the intention of the Israeli forces in targeting civilians, which may give the 




4.2.2 The Israeli attack on Shejaiyeh led to mass suffering. 
This aspect of representation appears in Haaretz and foregrounds the effects of 
military action on Shejaiyeh residents during the first days of the ground invasion. 
Although the invasion led to large numbers of civilian fatalities, this aspect is not 
found in JP and Ynet. 
The suffering of Shejaiyeh people is foregrounded by using different 
grammatical and lexical choices. First, Haaretz includes material processes that 
represent the desperate search by civilians for safer areas. Although the civilians are 
Agents in these processes, they do the actions involuntarily under the direct effect of 
military action.  
 
(57) [Haaretz] Thousands of people {Agent} from Shujaiyeh {Circumstance} have streamed out 
{Material Process} of their homes to the centre of Gaza City {Circumstance}. 
 
Other material processes have collectivized civilians as Goals of military 
action. Almost all of these processes background the Israeli forces as a doer. For 
instance, the Goal many people in example (58) is acted upon by the nominalization 
the artillery fire, representing mass civilian suffering with little emphasis on Israeli 
agency.  
 
(58) [Haaretz] [The artillery fire {Agent} had grown {Material Process} massive {Resultative 
Attribute} by Sunday morning {Circumstance}], [trapping {Material Process} many people {Goal} 
inside {Circumstance}].  
  
Similarly, example (59) has many bodies as a foregrounded Goal with no 




(59) [Haaretz] many bodies {Goal} were removed {Material Process} from the area {Circumstance}.  
 
In more shocking representations in Haaretz, the Agent of material processes 
refers to killed civilians. These processes are involuntary and represent the resultative 
attributes of civilians as receivers of actions.  
 
(60) [Haaretz] The dead {Agent} lying {Material Process} in the street {Circumstance}.  
 
Although Haaretz focuses on foregrounding the human aspect of the war with 
little problematization of the reasons behind the attack, one process subtly links the 
attack on Shejaiyeh to the military losses of the Israeli army.  
 
(61) [Haaretz] [The bombardment of Shujaiyeh {Agent} came {Material Process} on a tough day 
{Circumstance} for the Israel Defence Forces {Circumstance}] [in which {Circumstance} 13 soldiers 
{Goal} were killed {Material Process}].  
 
The Agent the bombardment of Shujaiyeh is a nominalization that obfuscates 
the doer of the nominalized action. The Circumstance and the subsequent process 
contextualize the action in another event: killing 13 soldiers. This representation does 
not necessarily mean that Israel attacked Shejaiyeh because 13 soldiers were killed. 
Nonetheless, if the reader is not provided with further explanation, they might 
consider the two events to be contingent, something which is adamantly rejected by 
the army (see Section 1.8.6).  
In contrast, Ynet and JP almost background completely the mass suffering of 
Palestinians in Shejaiyeh. A few processes in Ynet orient the reader to the attack and 
its general effect on civilians. For instance, the affected social actors in example (62) 
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are substituted by the metonymy the Saja'iyya neighbourhood of Gaza City and 
represented as an Agent of the involuntary process came. This backgrounds the Israeli 
agency and conceals many of the massive effects of the war on civilians. 
 
(62) [Ynet] The Shaja'iyya neighbourhood of Gaza City {Agent} came {Material Process} under heavy 
IDF artillery bombardment {Circumstance} overnight Saturday {Circumstance}. 
 
Another process in Ynet backgrounds the effect of the attack by presenting a 
desirable external reality. The process does not represent what happened, it introduces 
what was intended to happen. 
 
(63) [Ynet] The heavy artillery fire on Shaja'iyya and the air force sorties {Actor} were intended 
{Process:-} to isolate {Material Process} the area of operations {Goal}. 
 
The process justifies the use of massive fire by the intended objective, to 
isolate the area of operations. It also presupposes that civilian fatalities are 
unintentional since they were not part of the intended objective. Ynet also includes 
quoted and reported processes that give contrasting representations of the attack. One 
material process which is reported from an Israeli source represents the army as acting 
on a legitimate Goal 100 targets.  
 
(64) [Ynet] [He {Sayer} further said {Verbal Process}] [that 100 targets {Goal} were attacked 
{Material Process} in the Shuja'iyya neighbourhood {Circumstance}]. 
 
In contrast, a relational process quoted from a Palestinian source identifies the 




(65) [Ynet] “The massacre of civilians in Shaja'iyya {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a war 
crime {Attribute}”. 
 
Notice, however, that the processes do not have the same discursive function. 
While the material process represents a specific action, whether it actually happened 
or not, the relational process represents a proposition made by the source. In other 
words, the material process represents an event, while the relational process represents 
a subjective evaluation of that event. 
JP, on the other hand, excludes completely the effects of the attack on 
Palestinian civilians and represents it as targeting sources of threat. For instance, the 
process launched below has the Scope a large-scale wave of air strikes, which makes 
no reference to the social actors affected.  
 
(66) [JP] [The IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} a large-scale wave of air strikes {Scope} in 
Shejaia, northeast in Gaza overnight {Circumstance}], [hitting {Material Process} 100 targets {Goal} 
there {Circumstance} in the past 24 hours {Circumstance}], [including {Identifying Relational 
Process} weapons, and Hamas infrastructure sites {Token/ Identifier}].  
 
The Circumstance in Shejaiyeh represents the afflicted place as a mere 
location. This is contextualized by the subsequent process of hitting and the Goal of 
100 targets, which is identified by the relational process as weapons, and Hamas 
infrastructure sites. 
4.2.3 Many Palestinian victims belong to vulnerable social groups. 
One of the distinctive aspects of representation in Haaretz highlights the 
effects of the war on women and children. The newspaper represents both groups as 
specifically illegitimate targets due to their innocence and vulnerability, which is 
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mainly realized by identifying relational processes. As the examples below show, the 
processes provide a detailed identification that provides necessary information about 
the victims. This includes their sex, age, place of residence and, to a lesser degree, 
their names. 
 
(67) [Haaretz] In addition to Sahmoud, the dead {Value/ Identified} included {Identifying Relational 
Process} a woman of 60, one of her sons, four of her daughters-in-law and 19 grandchildren aged four 
months to 14 years {Token/ Identifier}.  
(68) [Haaretz] The dead {Value/ Identified} include {Identifying Relational Process} a 15-year-old girl 
in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip {Token/ Identifier}. 
 
More emotion-laden representations appear in attributive relational processes 
that refer to distinctive and highly vulnerable characteristics of the victims. For 
instance, the Carrier two of the women in the following clause refers to a vulnerable 
social class. This meaning is intensified by the very sensitive and provoking Attribute 
pregnant that calls up universal human qualities, pregnancy and motherhood, creating 
what Chouliaraki (2006, p. 124) calls a condition in which ‘the sufferer symbolizes a 
‘universal’ human state of existence’.  
 
(69) [Haaretz] Two of the women {Carrier} were {Attributive Relational Process} pregnant 
{Attribute}. 
 
As mentioned above, Haaretz does not put particular emphasis on Israeli 
agency or intentionality in carrying out these actions. Nonetheless, by representing a 
counter reality to what the Israeli government claims to be true, Haaretz implicitly 
questions the truth value of the claims behind the war. It shows that the actions mainly 
affect the civilian society with no significant political or military achievements. 
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Ultimately, this may raise major concerns about the war and the way it is 
implemented.  
4.2.4 Medical and rescue teams are unable to provide sufficient help for civilians.  
The last aspect of representation that represents the war as affecting deeply 
civilian society foregrounds the hardship of the Palestinian medical and rescue teams. 
This appears in transitive material processes which have animate and inanimate Goals 
that refer to civilians and civilian property. The processes are mostly quoted from 
Palestinian medical staff, giving them space to tell their stories about a very 
devastating human aspect of the war. As the following examples show, the processes 
represent the inability of medical and rescue teams to act efficiently and provide help 
for afflicted civilians.  
 
(70) [Haaretz] [Palestinian rescue workers {Agent} laboured {Material Process} throughout the night 
{Circumstance}] [to rescue {Material Process} the wounded {Goal}].   
(71) [Haaretz] “Medical teams {Agent} can’t reach {Material Process} the houses {Goal}”. 
 
The challenges facing medical and rescue teams are also represented by 
possessive relational processes. The attributes in these processes highlight their 
inability to deal with mounting casualties under worsening circumstances. Similar to 
material processes, the agency of the Israeli forces is backgrounded.  
 
(72) [Haaretz] [Medical teams {Carrier} were having {Attributive Relational Process} trouble 
{Attribute}] [reaching {Material Process} every necessary location {Goal}].  
(73) [Haaretz] [Staff {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [the hospital {Carrier} was having {Attributive 





In sum, all the above aspects of representation in Haaretz represent the war as 
profoundly affecting civilian society in Gaza. They represent civilians in different 
times and spaces before, during and after they are attacked. The multiplicity of 
temporality and spatiality complicates the reporting by connecting events to each 
other. It transfers isolated processes into a coherent mode of representation that gives 
a panoramic view of the war. Ultimately, this constructs an image of mass suffering in 
Gaza and fosters pity on the part of the reader. Pity, as Chouliaraki (2006) argues, can 
motivate the audience to choose a future course of action to end the victims’ suffering. 
In contrast, referring to Palestinian suffering in Ynet is limited and lacks important 
contextual information. The representations unfold in one singular time and one 
general space. Hence different aspects of the events which could trigger the sympathy 
of the reader are glossed over. This also undermines the agency of Israeli forces and 
their direct role in causing massive human suffering. Finally, JP excludes any 
representation of Palestinian suffering. The image it constructs for the army as 
conducting a legitimate war against terror is hardly challenged.  
4.3 The war is a normal social practice.  
Another pivotal macro strategy in JP and Ynet normalizes the war and 
constructs it as a necessary aspect of the sociocultural fabric of Israel. The different 
aspects of representation background the undesirable consequences of the war for 
Israeli society, especially soldiers, and conceptually shift negative actions into 
positive and socially-appreciated practices. As the analysis below shows, some 
aspects of representation reveal the ideological objectives of the newspapers by 




4.3.1 Palestinian military action has little effect on Israeli soldiers. 
JP’s reporting is distinguished by downplaying the effect of Palestinian 
military action on Israeli soldiers. The newspaper has relatively few instances in 
which soldiers are represented as receivers of military action. Lieberman (2013) and 
Haber (2015) believe that backgrounding the losses of the Israeli army is a strict 
strategy in Israeli military institutions that aims to maintain Israeli deterrence as well 
as public support for the war. When complete exclusion of the soldiers affected is not 
possible, JP, and to a lesser degree Ynet, employs subtle representations that alter the 
roles of social actors. For instance, the transitive and violent action of killing in JP, 
below, is represented by the agentless and natural process died.  
 
(74) [JP] He {Agent} died {Material Process} on Sunday {Circumstance}. 
 
The use of agentless verbs such as died might be a usual rephrasing of other 
verbs that the journalist avoids repeating. However, the verb has a particular value in 
JP due to the absence of other processes that represent the agency of Palestinian 
fighters. Similarly, the process came under fire in Ynet backgrounds the agency of 
Palestinian fighters and the effects of their action on Israeli soldiers.  
 
(75) [Ynet] Troops {Agent} came {Material process} under fire {Circumstance} in the neighbourhood 
of Shajaiyya {Circumstance}.  
 




This aspect of representation assigns killed soldiers military roles appreciated 
by the Israeli public, which backgrounds the context of their suffering. It is first 
realized by relational processes that represent military roles positively without 
referring to actual undesirable events. The following examples are indicative of the 
majority of these process, which are quoted from the friends and relatives of killed 
soldiers and include evaluative nominal Attributes.  
 
(76) [JP] “Rahav {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a lone soldier {Attribute}”. 
(77) [Ynet] “Yuval {Carrier} became {Attributive Relational Process} a commando like the rest of the 
family {Attribute}”. 
 
In an editorial published on 23 July 2014, JP defines lone soldiers as ‘men and 
women who leave “the good life” in the Diaspora to defend the Jewish state’. This 
definition has its roots in the Zionist celebration of the ‘new Jew’ who returns from 
the diaspora to defend Israel (Almog, 2000; Israeli & Roseman-Stollman, 2015). 
Similarly, Ynet’s Attribute a commando like the rest of the family draws on public 
appreciation for militarism. Since the majority of Israeli people serve in the army, 
military service is considered an important shared experience for social actors to 
validate their national commitment and transcendence from adulthood into maturity. It 
is military service that identifies their collective identity and classifies who is a ‘good’ 
citizen. (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010; Israeli & Roseman-Stollman, 2015; Klein, 1999). 
In JP, this aspect of representation is also realized by material processes. For 
example, the process joined Golani below is functionally and pragmatically equivalent 
to the subsequent process lived the dream. The grammatical and functional parallelism 




(78) [JP] [Halak {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} the Jerusalem Post {Receiver}] “[He {Agent} joined 
{Material Process} Golani {Goal}] [and lived {Material Process} the dream {Scope}]”. 
 
More ideologically, JP includes processes that conceptually shift negative 
actions into positive practices. In the following process, the undesirable action of 
killing, in which soldiers are the Goal, is substituted by the desirable action of 
sacrificing in which the soldiers are the Agent. The voluntary process made and the 
positive Scope the ultimate sacrifice background the undesirable consequences of the 
action and construct, instead, a socially appreciated act of heroism. 
 
(79) [JP] “They {Agent} made {Material Process} the ultimate sacrifice {Scope}”. 
 
JP is also distinguished by using these representations in referring to working 
forces. The processes are usually quoted from officials who represent soldiers without 
indicating any contextual military reality. These representations are similar to the ones 
quoted from ordinary people, in that they draw on the Zionist ethos and emphasize the 
courage of soldiers. For instance, the relational process below constructs a proposition 
by which the speaker refers to the soldiers’ positive inherent characteristics. 
  
(80) “They {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} unbelievably impressive, courageous, 
determined, full of faith and values {Attribute}”. 
 
The Attribute full of faith and values does not specify which faith and values 
the speaker means. Nonetheless, they are assumed to be part of the ideology that most 
Israelis identify with. The same function is served by the following mental process 
which exposes the inner world of the Senser as triggered by the Phenomenon at the 




(81) [JP] “I {Senser} stand in wonder {Mental Process} at the motivation of our soldiers, both the 
regular soldiers and reservists {Phenomenon}”. 
 
Like the previous instances, the mental process links the soldiers’ appreciated 
performance not only to their personal characteristics, such as courage, but also to 
ideological values that construct their personalities and drive their behaviour.  
4.3.3 Soldiers are successful civilians. 
A more ideological aspect of representation in JP and Ynet represents killed 
soldiers as successful civilians. The representation backgrounds all undesirable events 
associated with soldiers’ suffering and constructs an image of successful, lively and 
loved young people. Since representations are part of war reporting, they are not 
completely dissociated from the military role of soldiers. Rather, they establish a 
contingent relationship between militarism and social success. This is first realized by 
material processes in which soldiers are doers of domestic civilian actions. These 
processes are mostly reported from ordinary people and describe actions of physical 
or academic success. For instance, the processes below represent a killed soldier as an 
athlete and a student, respectively. 
 
(82) [JP] He {Agent} won {Material Process} a national championship {Goal} as the captain of Kiryat 
Tivon {Circumstance}. 
(83) [Ynet] He {Agent} graduated {Material Process} from Herzog high school {Circumstance}. 
 
Second, JP and Ynet use attributive and identifying relational processes that 
characterize and identify killed soldiers with positive attributes and social roles. The 
majority of attributive relational processes are intensive; they characterize soldiers by 
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using adjectival and nominal Attributes. The adjectival Attributes are emotional and 
lively. They are dissociated from the military context in which the soldiers were 
killed.  
 
(84) [JP] “He {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} happy {Attribute}”. 
(85) [Ynet] “You {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} angry with me {Attribute}”. 
 
The recurrent pronoun you in Ynet is indicative of an informal conversational 
style (Tannen, 2005). It produces an emotional representation with less informative 
functions. On the other hand, the nominal Attributes represent soldiers as kind and 
soft boys and young actors. Both references are examples of classification 
categorization. They associate the soldiers with social classes based on their (young) 
age.  
 
 (86) [JP] “Sean {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a gentle kind boy {Attribute}”. 
(87) [Ynet] “Adar {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a young man with a huge soul 
{Attribute}”. 
 
Although this might suggest vulnerability on the part of soldiers, another set of 
processes challenge this vulnerability and represent soldiers as role models and 
heroes. This draws on the image of the mythical new Jewish Israeli who is soft on the 
inside but thorny on the outside (Klein, 1999). 
 
(88) [JP] “Sean {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a sweet and kind example to everyone 
else {Attribute}”. 
(89) [Ynet] “You {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} a leader from birth, responsible and a 




Similarly, the majority of identifying relational processes in JP and Ynet are 
intensive and circumstantial identifying processes. Intensive relational processes have 
a decoding mode of identification in which soldiers are identified by general semantic 
categories. The processes are quoted from ordinary people and represent soldiers as 
boys, sons and heroes.  
 
(90) [JP] Carmeli {Token/ Identified} was {Identifying Relational Process} the son of Israeli parents, 
Alon and Dalya {Value/ Identifier}. 
(91) [Ynet] “You {Token/ Identifier} are {Identifying Relational Process} our hero {Value/ 
Identifier}”. 
 
Value participants in these processes background the military context and 
exclude the undesirable suffering of soldiers as receivers of military action. More 
importantly, relational processes reflect representational ambivalences due to 
incorporating tough and soft elements in representing killed soldiers. They represent 
soldiers as boys and sons, who are presumably vulnerable social actors, and as heroes.  
Researchers have suggested different explanations for these ambivalences. For 
instance, Klein (1999) believes that there is a tension between the growing role of 
parenting in the military in Israel on the one hand, and Zionist culture that creates 
pressure for heroism on the other. He argues that Israeli journalism discourse draws 
on ideological narratives but at the same time adapts to new social values. Similarly, 
Israeli and Rosman-Stollman (2015) attribute the combination of soft and tough 
elements to universal changes in the perception of masculinity and militarism. The 
authors argue that tough elements prevail in high-level intensity conflicts such as the 
2014 Gaza War, whereas soft elements prevail in low-level intensity conflicts such as 
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the 1982 Lebanon War. However, Israeli and Stollman do not link these external 
factors to the dynamics of ideology or the political orientations of the different media 
outlets they investigate. They do not examine any potential differences between 
newspapers, nor do they subdivide soldiers into fine categorizations (e.g. killed vs 
working soldier) to see if each sub-group is represented differently.  
This study, in contrast, shows that combining soft and tough elements in a 
hero image appears only in JP and Ynet in their representations of killed soldiers. 
Their representations invoke the image of the mythical new Israeli Jew who is best 
incarnated by the Israeli soldier (see Section 1.7.1.3), which normalizes the soldiers’ 
suffering in order maintain public consent for further wars (Almog, 2000; Gavriely-
Nuri, 2010). Civilian characteristics, therefore, are not completely dissociated from 
militarism. Rather, they reflect how the ‘public experience is enveloped in ceremonial 
endeavour dominated by soldiering and military professionals’ (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 
138). Characteristics such as leader and patriot indicate how the orientations of the 
public are defined in terms of readiness for war. This is a cultural aspect of militarism 
which reflects its centrality in Israeli society (Klein, 1999). Ultimately, the 
representations construct wars as necessary and unavoidable societal processes 
(Kimmerling, 2008, p. 138). In contrast, Haaretz, does not incorporate these elements 
in its representation of killed soldiers. Its representation is mostly confined to the 
military context and does not draw on mythical characteristics. This reveals that the 
representation of soldiers is based, in addition to external factors, on internal factors 
that have to do with the ideology each newspaper serves and the political objectives it 
works to fulfil. 
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In addition to the above representations, JP is also distinguished by 
highlighting the image of ‘returning Jews’ and their positive role in Israel. This 
appears in material processes which have killed soldiers as Agents.  
 
(92) [JP] He {Agent} returned {Material} to Israel {Circumstance}.  
 
The process of ‘returning’ is not merely a physical act of changing one’s 
location. As explained in Section 1.7.1.3, the ‘returning Jew’ plays an essential role in 
the nationalistic-religious discourse of Zionism and, more recently, neo-Zionism. 
Since the soldier’s place of birth is the US, his return to Israel means a Jewish return 
to Jewish land. In a mental process, the state of mind of the soldier is exposed, 
revealing his commitment to return despite the distractions in the diaspora.  
 
(93) [JP] “Beaches and parties {Phenomenon} could not distract {Mental Process} a native-son 
{Senser} from returning home {Range}”. 
 
Such representations frame militancy within romantic narratives and obfuscate 
the relevant socio-political and economic realities. For instance, while JP introduces a 
national and religious explanation of why some Jews choose to fight in the Israeli 
army, it massively backgrounds the fact that Israel offers those soldiers special 
financial and social privileges which might be the reason for their service.    
Other processes in JP represent the role of those soldiers after they come to 
Israel. For instance, the processes helped turn in example (94) below describes a 
positive social role for a soldier that positively influences his local community. The 
reference the Carmelis collectivizes the soldier with other family members, meaning 
that his role is not only military but also social and shared by other social actors. The 
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process highlights the civilian role of killed soldiers and subtly contextualizes his 
death, constructing a contingent relationship between success in civilian life and 
service in the Israeli army.  
 
(94) [JP] The Carmelis {Agent} helped turn {Material Process} the small town {Goal} into a tight-knit 
community {Resultative Attribute}. 
 
This notion is also foregrounded by the Phenomenon giving back to the 
community in the following mental process. Similar to example (93), the process 
magnifies the soldier’s unique and appreciated experience by bringing the reader 
closer to his state of mind.   
 
(95) [Ynet] “[Yuval {Senser} loved {Mental Process} life {Phenomenon}], [loved {Mental Process} 
giving back to the community {Phenomenon}]. 
 
Unlike JP and Ynet, very rarely does Haaretz quote ordinary people’s 
characterizations of soldiers. As the following macro-strategy shows, almost all 
processes are confined to the military context and do not have any positive or 
evaluative characterization.  
4.4 The war has negative consequences for Israel. 
In a stark contrast to JP and Ynet, Haaretz does not have macro-strategies that 
normalize the war. On the contrary, the newspaper includes a counter macro-strategy 
that highlights the negative consequences of military action for Israeli soldiers. To a 
lesser degree, some representations in this strategy are also found in Ynet. This adds to 
previous findings that Ynet has the most representational ambivalences that may 
reflect ideological uncertainties.  
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4.4.1 Palestinian fighters act on Israeli soldiers. 
This aspect of representation is context-bound and represents soldiers as 
variably affected by the military action. Undesirable consequences are foregrounded, 
either by representing a challenging military context or by representing resultative 
attributes on the part of soldiers. Ynet and Haaretz represent the hardships 
encountered by Israeli soldiers in the first days of the ground invasion by using 
relational processes. For instance, the Attribute involved in massive fighting in the 
following example provides contextual information about the Carrier the Ergoz unit. 
The challenging context is inferred from the adjective massive.  
 
(96) [Ynet] The Ergoz unit {Carrier} was involved {Attributive Relational Process} in massive fighting 
{Attribute}. 
 
Similarly, the following clause from Haaretz represents a military action by a 
relational process which backgrounds the doer and the resultative attribute of the 
soldier. Yet, the subsequent material process hit and the Circumstances at the battle in 
Gaza’s Shujaiyeh neighbourhood indicate, though indirectly, that the soldier is 
affected by the military action. 
 
(97) [Haaretz] [The 21-year-old Golani sergeant {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} in a 
vehicle {Attribute}] [hit {Material Process} at the battle {Circumstance} in Gaza’s Shujaiyeh 
neighbourhood {Circumstance}]. 
 
Other relational processes foreground the undesirable consequences of the war 
by representing the collective losses of the Israeli army. This is different from the 
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image constructed in JP which represents Hamas as the main party that suffers 
damage to its military capability. 
 
(98) [Ynet] The army {Carrier} suffered {Attributive Relational Process} more losses {Attribute}. 
(99) [Haaretz] The infantry brigade {Token/ Identified} suffered {Identifying Relational Process} the 
heaviest casualties {Value/ Identifier}. 
 
Second, Haaretz and Ynet include processes that represent wounded soldiers 
who are completely excluded from JP. This is realized by material processes in which 
soldiers are Goals. As the following examples show, almost all the processes are 
passive, with agent deletion.  
 
(100) [Haaretz] Gabriel {Goal} had been wounded {Material Process} in action in Gaza 
{Circumstance}. 
(101) [Ynet] Overnight Monday {Circumstance}, three soldiers {Goal} were severely wounded 
{Material Process}.   
 
Other representations background completely the fighters’ agency and 
foreground the resultative attributes of soldiers. For instance, the following material 
process in Haaretz has the wounded soldiers as Agents of the involuntary process are 
coming. The reference the wounded and the Circumstance with greater frequency 
highlight the soldiers’ undesirable image as receivers of military action. 
 





Similarly, the following process in Ynet represents military action by a 
relational process. The wounded soldiers are a Carrier participant, which is equivalent 
to an Agent in material processes.  
 
(103) [Ynet] Four {Carrier} sustained {Attributive Relational Process} military injuries {Attribute}. 
 
The noun injuries and the verb injure have the same core meaning and are at 
the same level of abstraction. The Attribute is thus indicative of the negative effect of 
the actions on soldiers.   
Other relational processes in Haaretz and Ynet do not refer to the military 
action that led to the soldiers’ injuries, but they do represent their health status. For 
instance, the Attribute in a moderate condition in example (104) represents a soldier 
in terms of his bodily characteristics that resulted from military action. 
 
(104) [Ynet] He {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} initially {Circumstance} in a moderate 
condition {Attribute}.  
 
Similarly, the adjectival Attributive fine in the following process from Haaretz 
represents the health status of a wounded soldier. Unlike the adjectival Attributes in 
JP, it does not represent positive personal characteristics. 
 
(105) [Haaretz] [The doctors {Sayer} said {Verbal Process] “[he {Carrier} ’s going to be {Attributive 
Relational Process} fine {Attribute}]”. 
 
The processes in Haaretz and Ynet do not specify the exact injuries of 
wounded soldiers. This might be due to the firm censorship imposed on the media in 
reporting Israeli casualties (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010). Nonetheless, representing wounded 
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soldiers constructs a context-bound and multi-dimensional image of the war. In 
Haaretz, this image is particularly important because it is not counterbalanced by any 
representations of military achievements of the war. Gavriely-Nuri (2010) asserts that 
such an image can shake the public’s support for the war and raise questions about its 
usefulness. 
Haaretz and Ynet are also distinguished from JP by reporting a controversial 
and sensitive event: capturing an Israeli soldier. Interestingly, both newspapers 
represent the event by using material processes quoted or reported from a Palestinian 
military source.  
 
(106) [Ynet] [Hamas’ military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades {Sayer} claimed {Verbal 
Process} Sunday evening {Circumstance}] [that the organization {Agent} had successfully kidnapped 
{Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal} in the Gaza Strip {Circumstance}]. 
(107) [Haaretz] [Hamas’ military wing {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} Sunday {Circumstance}] [that it 
{Agent} had abducted {Material Process} a soldier {Goal} during the battle in Shujaiyeh 
{Circumstance}]. 
 
They use neutral references as they are used by Palestinians, Hamas’ military 
wing (the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades), and foreground Palestinian fighters as the 
doer of the action to the Israeli soldier. This is one of the most disturbing images for 
the Israeli public that the army and politicians had tried to avoid. For instance, a 
process reported in Haaretz shows how an Israeli official backgrounds much of the 
undesirable event. He employs a relational process that backgrounds the doer of the 
action and hedges its undesirable consequence by using the Attribute missing instead 




 (108) [Haaretz] [The army {Sayer} also declared {Verbal Process}] [that the seventh soldier, 
identified as Sgt. Oron Shaul, {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} “missing” {Attribute}]. 
 
Haaretz and Ynet also include frequent processes that represent specific events 
in which soldiers are killed. The majority of these processes are passive constructions. 
For instance, the following processes foreground the Goal and highlight the results of 
the action, while the doer is activated in subsequent processes.  
 
(109) [Haaretz] [Four {Goal} were killed {Material Process} by terrorists {Agent}] [who {Agent} 
infiltrated {Material Process} Israel {Goal} from Gaza {Circumstance} through a tunnel 
{Circumstance}].  
(110) [Ynet] [He {Goal} was killed {Material Process} in the incident {Circumstance} Monday 
morning {Circumstance}] [in which {Circumstance} terrorists {Agent} infiltrated {Material Process} 
Israel {Goal}]. 
 
This is a roundabout representation of actions. A more direct representation, 
for instance, would be terrorists infiltrated through a tunnel and killed the soldier(s). 
Nonetheless, the link between killing soldiers and infiltrating through tunnels can still 
be recovered. Although the processes do not negate the possibility that the tunnels are 
used for other purposes, it is important to notice how they represent what actually 
happened. In contrast, as the first macro-strategy above shows, JP includes external 
realities that represent tunnels as merely targeting civilians. 
Haaretz is also distinguished by using lexical choices that foreground 
provoking resultative attributes on the part of killed soldiers. For instance, the process 
burned and the adverb badly in example (111) construct a disturbing image that is not 




(111) [Haaretz] The soldiers {Goal} inside {Circumstance} were badly burned {Material Process}. 
 
Finally, foregrounding the effects of military action on Israeli soldiers is 
realized by material processes which have inanimate Goals. The Goals, such as the 
armored personnel carrier (APC) in example (112), refer to Israeli military 
equipment. Some processes have Recipient actors embedded in further processes such 
as carrying Keidar and his men in example (113).  
 
(112) [Ynet] Anti-tank missile {Agent} hit {Material Process} the armored personnel carrier (APC) 
{Goal}. 
(113) [Haaretz] [One of the cells {Agent}, however, managed to fire {Material Process} an anti-tank 
missile {Goal} at the military jeep {Recipient}] [carrying {Material Process} Keidar and his men 
{Goal}]. 
 
Before I conclude this section, it is important to notice the differences between 
the three Israeli newspapers when using the reference terrorists. The analysis so far 
shows that JP and Ynet use terrorist(s) interchangeably with other references. 
Although it is a functionalizing reference, JP and Ynet use terrorist(s) as an 
identification strategy; it refers to all Palestinian fighters, regardless of what exactly 
they do. For instance, I explained in previous sections that little contextual 
information is provided when the army targets terrorists. The reference itself 
functions as a micro-argumentative scheme that essentializes the ‘Other’ and 
represents the action of the ‘Self’ as legitimate. In contrast, very few examples in 
Haaretz refer to fighters as terrorists. As example (109) shows, almost all of these 
instances refer to fighters who crossed the border into Israeli sites. This does not mean 
that Haaretz legitimizes other actions carried out by fighters, but it shows a less 
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essentializing and more context-sensitive reference which accounts not only for whom 
the actors are but also what they do. 
Another distinctive feature of Haaretz’s language choices is maintaining the 
military role of killed Israeli soldiers. For instance, example (114) is the only 
attributive relational process that has a nominal Attribute in Haaretz. It identifies a 
killed soldier in terms of his military role, a soldier in Golani, the infantry brigade, 
which serves identifying functions. The rest of the processes, as example (115) shows, 
have circumstantial Attributes that contextualize the representation in a military 
context.  
 
(114) [Haaretz] Gabriel {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a soldier in Golani, the infantry 
brigade {Attribute}. 
(115) [Haaretz] [The seven soldiers {Carrier} were {Attributive Relational Process} amongst the 
ground forces {Attribute}] [attacking {Material Process} Gaza {Goal}].  
 
The Attribute amongst the ground forces is contextualized by the material 
process attacking Gaza, in which the metonymy Gaza refers to fighters and civilians 
alike. The attacking action, therefore, is not celebrated as a military achievement. This 
may imply that war is an absurd action; soldiers are killed in a war that mainly affects 
civilians on the other side. Obviously this conclusion is not reached from this process 
only, but it is the sum of the different aspects of representation and macro-strategies 
discussed so far in Haaretz. 
4.5 Palestinians in the West Bank are responsible for violence: de-contextualized 
representation.  
Analysing the representations of events and actors in the West Bank reveals 
further differences between the newspapers. JP and Ynet include a macro-strategy that 
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stereotypically demonizes Palestinians. As the following aspect of representation 
shows, both newspapers represent the Palestinians as responsible for violence. JP, 
however, includes further ideological representations that subtly represent the 
Palestinian territories as part of Israel. 
4.5.1 Palestinians are doers of violent actions. 
JP and Ynet use grammatical and lexical choices that represent Palestinian 
civilians as doers of violent actions. This is mainly realized by transitive material 
processes which have inanimate Goals. In some processes, as example (117) shows, 
Israeli forces are passivized as a Recipient that is indirectly affected by an action.  
 
(116) [JP] A group {Agent} was throwing {Material Process} fire-bombs {Goal} during a riot 
{Circumstance}. 
(117) [Ynet] Protesters {Agent} throwing {Material Process} stones {Goal} at a military jeep 
{Recipient}. 
 
The newspapers also activate Palestinian civilians even when they are 
receivers of Israeli actions. For instance, in reporting an event in which the Israeli 
forces killed a Palestinian man, JP and Ynet use the following material processes. 
 
(118) [JP] A Palestinian man {Goal} [who {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} part of a 
group {Attribute}] [that {Agent} was throwing {Material Process} fire-bombs {Goal} during a riot 
{Circumstance}] was killed {Material Process} by IDF soldiers {Agent} in the West Bank town of al-
Ram {Circumstance}. 
(119) [Ynet] [Medics {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [soldiers {Agent} shot {Material Process}] [and 
killed {Material Process} a Palestinian man {Goal}] [while {Circumstance} dispersing {Material 





Both newspapers contextualize killing the man in processes that activate 
Palestinian protestors as doers of violent actions. This presupposes that the soldiers’ 
action is a response, thus understandable. What the representations obfuscate, 
however, is that the event took place in Al-Ram city in the West Bank which is under 
the PA’s control. As a Palestinian, I can say that Israeli invasions usually involve 
closing the entrances to cities and towns, imposing partial or full curfews, and 
randomly arresting young people. This is basically what leads to a Palestinian 
response in which demonstrators throw stones at Israeli soldiers. So the Israeli forces 
could thus presumably have avoided killing the man simply by not entering a 
Palestinian city and provoking its Palestinian citizens. All these details are not made 
clear, especially when Israeli forces are represented as trying to avoid targeting 
Palestinians. For instance, a process in JP activates soldiers as acting on an inanimate 
Goal warning shots, which represents the action as cautionary and responsible. This 
notion is further explicated in the subsequent process in which the forces act on the 
Recipient the lower extremities of the rioters. 
 
(120) [JP] [The soldiers {Agent} fired {Material Process} warning shots {Goal}] [and fired {Material 
Process} at the lower extremities of the rioters {Recipient}].  
 
In a stark contrast to JP and Ynet, Haaretz represents the actions of Palestinian 
demonstrators as non-violent. For instance, the newspaper uses the intransitive 
process took the streets to refer to the action of demonstrating which has no effect on 
other (Israeli) actors. Moreover, the actors are referred to by the neutral collectivizing 




(121) [Haaretz] In the West Bank {Circumstance}, people {Agent} took the streets {Material Process} 
Sunday {Circumstance} in Jenin and Ramallah {Circumstance}. 
 
In addition, a verbal process in Haaretz contextualizes the action by linking it 
to the war on Gaza.  
 
(122) [Haaretz] People {Sayer} calling for {Verbal Process} a cease-fire and international protection 
for the Palestinian people {Matter}.  
 
The Matter participant a cease-fire and international protection for the 
Palestinian people represents a legitimate reason for the demonstration. More 
importantly, using a verbal process gives voice to the demonstrators by letting them 
express their human and political rights. 
4.5.2 There is no clear geo-political distinction between Israel and Palestine.  
JP is distinguished by having an aspect of representation that backgrounds the 
geo-political independence of Palestine. As example (120) above shows, JP uses the 
nomination rioters to refer to Palestinians in the West Bank. Unlike the clear geo-
political distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in representing events and actors in 
Gaza, the references riot and rioters represent the events as internal actions of 
disturbance, blurring the geo-political boundaries of Israel and backgrounding those of 
Palestine. This aspect of representation is also realized by the nomination Samaria 
that refers to the West Bank in the following example. 
 
(123) [JP] A terrorist shooting {Agent} left {Material Process} an Israeli teenager {Goal} injured 




The reference Samaria is used by Israeli right-wingers and settlers to 
emphasize that the West Bank is part of the Biblically promised land of Israel (see 
Sections 1.6.2 and 1.7.1). This is made explicit by the hardliner Oded Revivi (2014), 
who says that such references are better used in order to express the Jewish ownership 
of the land.  
So far, the study has been dealing with macro-strategies that are variably based 
on the distinction between Palestinian and Israeli social actors. The analysis has 
identified a number of macro-strategies that reveal political and ideological 
differences in representing the war and the struggle in general. The following two 
macro-strategies, however, deal with less obvious dichotomous contexts. They 
involve representations of Jewish and Arab Israelis. These representations are not 
found in JP’s analysed data. Therefore, the analysis below deals with news reports 
from Ynet and Haaretz only. 
4.6 Arab and Jewish Israelis are two different ethnicities: in-group vs out-group.  
Ynet represents Israeli actors based on the ethnic distinction between Arabs 
and Jews. As the following aspects of representation show, Ynet adopts a stereotypical 
and essentializing representation in which one group is represented as homogeneously 
violent, while the other is represented as homogeneously peaceful.  
4.6.1 Arab Israelis are violent: de-contextualized representation. 
The first aspect of representation in Ynet activates the anti-war Arab Israelis as 
doers of violent actions that disrupt public order. This is mostly represented by 
transitive material processes with inanimate Goals such as to throw and had blocked 
off in the following examples. The first is directed against the Recipient police forces 
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while the other disrupts the normal flow of life by directly affecting the Goal, a main 
road. They are, therefore, illegitimate actions. 
 
(124) [Ynet] [Hundreds {Agent} emerged {Material Process} from the angry crowd {Circumstance}] 
[to throw {Material Process} rocks {Goal} at police forces {Recipient}].  
(125) [Ynet] The rioters {Agent} had also blocked off {Material Process} a main road {Goal} through 
the city {Circumstance}.  
 
The protesters are also delegitimized by the way they are referred to. The 
collectivizing nomination angry crowd filters down into the psyche of the protestors, 
making their violent actions predictable to the reader. Similarly, the functionalizing 
reference rioters implies that the actors are involved in illegal acts of civil 
disturbance.  
This aspect of representation foregrounds the alleged violence of Arabs but 
backgrounds the context of their demonstration. Instead of representing their actions 
as legitimate civil actions that aim to stop the war, the newspaper represents them as 
the violent actions of a group that is identified with the enemy. For instance, the 
reference rioters is used interchangeably with the identification reference 
Palestinians, thus dissociating the actors from their civil citizenship by distinguishing 
them based on their ethnicity. 
 
(126) [Ynet] Thousands of Palestinians {Agent} took to the streets {Material Process} in Nazareth 
{Circumstance}.  
 
As First (2010) puts it, this is a twofold otherness that distances Arab Israelis 
from the ‘Self’ and associates them with the ‘Other’. 
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4.6.2 Jewish Israelis are peaceful: goal-oriented political representation.   
In this aspect of representation, Ynet represents the actions of Jewish Israelis as 
peaceful. In most of the processes, the actions of pro-war Jewish Israelis are 
represented by intransitive processes, thus having no effect on other actors or the 
public order.  
 
(127) [Ynet] Israelis in favour of the IDF's military action in the Strip {Agent} also made an appearance 
{Material Process} Monday evening {Circumstance}. 
(128) [Ynet] When some 200 people {Agent} showed support {Material Process} in front of the Kiryah 
army headquarters in Tel Aviv {Circumstance}.   
 
The process made an appearance in example (127) represents the action as 
smooth and peaceful and limits its potential to cause a disturbance. It is very different 
from blocked off the main road as it does not show any negative effect on other actors 
or the flow of public life. Similarly, the process showed support in example (128) is 
non-violent. These processes have a representation that is goal-oriented. They 
represent the goal the Jewish Israelis want to fulfil: supporting the army in the war, 
contrary to the de-contextualization of Arabs’ actions which backgrounds their goal to 
stop the war. Furthermore, no functionalizing or ethnic identifying references are used 
to refer to Jewish demonstrators. Ynet uses only the overarching identification 
reference Israelis which conflates the civil identity of all Israeli actors with the 
ethnicity of Jewish actors.  
The aspects of representations in Ynet show that representing Arab and Jewish 
Israelis is confined to what van Dijk (1998) calls the ideological square. On the one 
hand, Ynet foregrounds the good actions of the in-group (the Jewish Israelis) and the 
bad actions of the out-group (Arab Israelis). On the other hand, the representation 
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backgrounds the bad actions of the in-group and the good actions of the out-group. 
First (2010) argues that this ethnic and stereotypical representation of Israeli actors is 
a general tendency in almost all media outlets in Israel, including Haaretz. However, 
the analysis of the following macro-strategy reveals unexpected findings in Haaretz’ 
analysed data that challenge First’s claims.  
4.7 Israeli actors are distinguished, based on universal political values.  
Contrary to Ynet, Haaretz represents Israeli social actors according to their 
political orientations which are realized by the universal distinction between right and 
left. As the following aspects of representation show, Haaretz does not refer to the 
ethnic origins of each side. Instead, political groups can include social actors of 
different ethnicities.  
4.7.1 Rightist protestors are violent.  
Most of the grammatical constructions that refer to pro-war demonstrators in 
Haaretz are transitive material processes that represent violent actions against anti-
war demonstrators. For instance, pro-war demonstrators are activated in the following 
clauses and represented as doers of violent actions attacked and threw, while anti-war 
(Arab and Jewish) demonstrators are passivized as direct or indirect receivers of those 
actions.   
 
(129) [Haaretz] Right-wing activists {Agent} attacked {Material Process} left-wingers {Goal}.  
(130) [Haaretz] The war’s supporters {Agent} threw {Material Process} plastic bottles {Goal} at the 
other side {Recipient}. 
 
Note the shift from Goal to Recipient on the part of left-wingers in the above 
examples. Transitivity analysis shows that the former is a direct receiver of the action, 
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while the latter is an indirect receiver. However, in semantic analysis, the other side in 
(130) would still be the Goal and plastic bottles would be a Theme. This means that 
the effect of the action on social actors is remarkably preserved.  
Unlike Ynet, the references right-wing activists and left-wingers in Haaretz 
identify social actors according to their political affiliation. They are both assumed to 
belong to the overarching political system Israel. Moreover, Haaretz denounces the 
position of pro-war demonstrators by using the reference war’s supporters. Contrary 
to the euphemized reference action in Ynet, the war is associated with violence and 
aggression, and thus supporting it is abnormal.  
4.7.2 Anti-war protestors are peaceful and defensive. 
Another aspect of representation in Haaretz emphasizes the peacefulness of 
anti-war protestors. The actors, who are individualized and referred to by their proper 
names, are activated in intransitive material processes that have no effect on other 
actors. When the processes entail another party, as example (132) shows, the 
processes represent the actions as defensive. 
 
(131) [Haaretz] “Luckily he {Agent} didn’t fall down {Material Process}”. 
(132) [Haaretz] [Assad {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [he {Agent} tried to fight back {Material 
Process}].  
 
Other processes in Haaretz characterize a Jewish Israeli woman who tried to 
prevent right-wingers from attacking left-wingers. These processes are mostly quoted 
from the woman herself and serve the journalist who indirectly denounces the actions 
of right-wingers. For instance, the Attribute not used to things like that in Haifa in the 
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process below refers to the negative stance of the woman towards the right-wingers’ 
illegitimate action. 
 
(133) [Haaretz] I {Carrier}’m {Attributive Relational Process} not used to things like that {Attribute} 
in Haifa {Circumstance}”.  
 
The Attribute gives the event a wider context. It constructs co-existence 
between Arabs and Jews in Haifa as a permanent state of being. It is made clear then 
that the stance of the right-wingers is not representative of all Jewish Israelis. On the 
contrary, Haaretz adopts a political distinction between actors and actions. It is a 
distinction that legitimizes or delegitimizes the actors based on what they do and not 
on whom they are. Since the study deals with a limited number of news articles, it is 
hard to claim that this representation is representative of Haaretz’s general discursive 
strategies. However, this macro-strategy marks an important difference from Ynet in 
reporting actions and actors in a critical and controversial major event, whether it is a 
general discursive strategy or not.  
4.8 Overview of representation in the Israeli press 
In this chapter I have analysed three online Israeli newspapers JP, Ynet and 
Haaretz, in their coverage of the 2014 Gaza War. The analysis has revealed that the 
newspapers’ reporting of actions and actors is complex and reflects internal tensions 
in Israel. The newspapers use different macro-strategies of representation that reflect 
their reliance on or deviance from the shared knowledge of the Israeli majority. While 
JP and Ynet adopt hegemonic narratives that frame the reader’s explanation and 
evaluation of events, Haaretz extensively contextualizes events to explain and 
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evaluate them based on practical and human considerations. The newspaper covertly 
challenges the narratives that JP and Ynet draw upon.   
First, JP and Ynet adopt the official narrative that invokes the right of self-
defence to justify the war. To represent the war as a legitimate retaliatory action, the 
two newspapers employ macro-strategies of representation that maintain 
proportionality and distinction. Much of this representation is based on 
presuppositions. For instance, Hamas is represented as using tunnels to attack Israeli 
civilians. Although this never happened during the war, this claim is a starting point 
from which the Israeli military actions are evaluated. JP further constructs a false 
balance by exaggerating the Palestinian threat and representing Gaza as militarily and 
geo-politically equivalent to Israel. On the other hand, Israeli military actions are 
represented as affecting Palestinian fighters, while their massive effect on Palestinian 
civilians is backgrounded or excluded. A paradox, therefore, appears in representing 
Gaza as militarily equivalent to Israel while simultaneously emphasising Israel’s 
military superiority.  
In referring briefly to Palestinian causalities, Ynet emphasizes that the victims 
are regrettable but unavoidable. A substantial part of this representation is based on 
what politicians and officials in Israel claim to be true, which reflects the rightist 
political point of view that frames the newspapers’ coverage. 
To validate the rightness of the war, JP and Ynet emphasize the efficiency of 
military action in achieving desirable objectives. This is based on emphasizing Israel’s 
military superiority. Israel is represented as deciding the start and end of the war on its 
own terms and for the sake of its own interests. All representations that might 
challenge this view are excluded or backgrounded, especially military losses. 
However, since the complete exclusion of killed and wounded soldiers is not possible, 
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the newspapers normalize the war by representing it as an essential social practice. 
The war validates the true belonging of individuals to their communities. By and 
large, these representations appear in speeches of ordinary people who align with the 
hegemonic political culture. One important aspect of this representation in JP is the 
emphasis on the religious characteristics of soldiers and their families. The religious 
discourse and its role in obfuscating expansionist Zionist policies also appears in JP’s 
representation of the West Bank. It excludes Palestinian political independence by 
representing Palestinian lands as part of Israel. Finally, Ynet adopts an ethnic-based 
representation of different groups in Israeli society. This involves a positive 
representation of the majority, Jewish actors, and a negative representation of the 
Arab minority based on stereotypical associations. 
JP seems to primarily address Jewish communities in the West to provide the 
basic premise of how to defend Israeli narratives that justify the war. This explains the 
extensive use of presuppositions that draw on religious and cultural values. The 
targeted audience is assumed to share the basic assumptions that underlie JP’s 
reporting. Ynet, on the other hand, seems to be interested in addressing a wider 
audience, both locally and internationally. This is realized by some representational 
ambivalences which reflect competing values (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The 
newspaper combines different discourses, though all compatible with Zionist 
ideology, to address different Israeli groups. This might also be intended to produce 
more balanced reporting for international readers.  
Haaretz, in contrast, represents the war based on practical and human 
considerations. The newspaper foregrounds the rightist political decisions behind the 
war. It chooses to cover the actual effects of the war on both sides, and not what the 
war is intended to achieve. As such, military action is represented as being able to 
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destroy Gaza but not to achieve victory. For instance, Haaretz highlights the massive 
impact of the war on Palestinian civilians. Its language choices build into a 
humanizing representation that explicates the suffering of civilians and sheds light on 
different aspect of their misery. So while JP and Ynet prioritize the value of Israeli 
lives and the need to protect Israeli civilians, Haaretz represents the lives on both 
sides as worthy. It is the only newspaper that refers to individual Palestinian victims 
or families and gives a close-up representation of their suffering.  
Haaretz also focuses on the negative consequences of the war for Israeli 
society. It represents Israeli soldiers as human beings who suffer due to their 
involvement in military action. No reference, however, is made to any major 
achievements that ensure security for the Israeli people and make the suffering of the 
soldiers understandable. Haaretz’s deviance from the hegemonic discourse also 
appears in its representation of the different groups in Israel. This representation is 
politically based, it distinguishes between two universal political groups that can 
include different ethnicities.  
Haaretz seems to address the local audience by providing a contextualized 
image of the war that shows how it negatively affects their lives. The humanizing 
discourse representing Palestinian civilians might, on the other hand, be targeting the 
international audience. As I explained in Section 4.2, this representation is capable of 
giving reasons to intervene and stop the war.  
In sum, news reporting in the three Israeli newspapers is motivated by 
different political and journalistic objectives. The study has been able to detect 
differences between the newspapers based entirely on language choices made at the 
clause level, not by looking at the newspapers’ statements about themselves or the 
statements of others about them. In this section I have explained the main political and 
186 
 
journalistic interests served by the different representations. In Chapter Six I give 
further framing of these differences to explain how they function as an indicator of the 




CHAPTER 5: Analysis of Palestinian news websites.  
In this chapter I analyse three Palestinian news websites: Maan News Agency 
(Maan), the Palestinian Information Centre (PIC), and the Palestine News and 
Information Agency (WAFA). Similar to Chapter Four, the analysis is organized into 
five main salient macro-strategies which are realized by different aspects of 
representation, while linguistic choices are demonstrated by using indicative 
examples.  
In dealing with these macro-strategies, a focus is put on the subtle differences 
between the newspapers in representing pivotal aspects of the struggle. The first two 
macro-strategies show how the three news websites differ in their emphasis on the 
victimhood of Palestinian civilians and the agency of Israeli military action. They also 
show that WAFA represents Palestinian civilians as merely receivers of military 
action, while PIC and Maan construct two roles for civilians: a receiver role that 
associates them with victimhood, and a responsive role that represents their attitude 
towards some acts of Palestinian resistance. However, as the third and fourth 
strategies show, PIC and Maan differ in representing Hamas and its military actions in 
relation to the Palestinian people. Finally, the fifth macro-strategy is shared by Maan 
and WAFA and reveals some ambivalences in representing Arab Israelis.  
By explicating the macro-strategies by a number of aspects of representation, 
the analysis maps out the differences between the newspapers to reveal internal 
political and ideological tensions in Palestine. As Section 5.6 below shows, the 
findings also reflect the outlets’ preferences for addressing their target audience. 





5.1 Palestinian civilians are the victims of military action 
The most salient macro-strategy on the three Palestinian news websites 
represents Palestinian civilians as the main, if not the only, victims of the war. This 
may not be surprising in light of the large numbers of Palestinian civilian fatalities. As 
I explained in Chapter One, the war caused massive damage to civilian society in 
Gaza, which was the focus of all Palestinian and most foreign media agencies. 
However, although the Palestinian news websites share some aspects of 
representations in this anchoring strategy, they differ in emphasizing particular aspects 
of the events. Eventually, the analysis will show how these differences emanate from 
political tensions and strive for different political objectives. 
5.1.1 Palestinian civilians are the main/ only receivers of Israeli military action. 
The first aspect of representation that gives rise to the macro-strategy at hand 
foregrounds Palestinian civilians as the main receivers of Israeli military action. This 
is basically realized on the three websites by passive material processes which put 
emphasis on the foregrounded Goal. These processes highlight the effects of such 
actions more than the agency of the doer. 
  
(1) [Maan] Ten others {Goal} were injured {Material Process} in the attack {Circumstance}. 
(2) [WAFA] [At least 11 people {Goal} were killed {Material Process}] [including {Identifying 
Relational Process} 7 children {Token/ Identifier}] [and more than 20 others {Goal} were injured 
{Material Process} mostly in critical situation {Circumstance}]. 
 
The same applies to PIC. It uses passive processes that foreground Palestinian 
civilians as receivers of violent military action. However, PIC maintains a doer-
receiver presentation by highlighting Israeli agency even when structurally 
backgrounded. This will be discussed in more detail later. Here I just refer to one 
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material and one mental process which intensify Israeli agency by the use of pre-
modifiers, barbaric and savage, respectively. 
 
(3) [PIC] [More than 60 Palestinians {Goal} were killed {Material Process}] [and 400 others {Goal} 
wounded {Material Process} in an Israeli barbaric shelling of a small Gaza neighbourhood 
{Circumstance}].  
(4) [PIC] [The ministry {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that most of the half million students in the 
Gaza {Senser} have been traumatized {Mental Process} due to the savage Israeli military campaign 
{Circumstance}]. 
 
In contrast to PIC, the passive processes on WAFA focus on civilians’ 
suffering and not the violence of Israeli military action. Only one example on WAFA 
evaluates a nominalization that contains Israeli agency. The adjective appears in scare 
quotes in a subsequent process. 
 
(5) [WAFA] [Journalist Khalid Hamed, of Continue TV Production, {Goal} was killed {Material 
Process}] [while covering {Material Process} the ‘barbaric’ Israeli bombardment and the attempted 
ground incursion into Shuja’iyya {Goal}].  
 
Although the scare quotes might function to emphasize the adjective, they can 
also function as a hands-off strategy that distances the journalist from the quoted 
source. They confer a sense of objectivity on the report by drawing a line between the 
journalist’s own choices and the most forceful expressions of the source (Semino & 
Short, 2004).  
Other grammatical configurations on PIC embed the agency of Israeli forces in 
subsequent processes in which the forces are foregrounded as the doer. Consequently, 
the roles of social actors are emphasized in separate processes; first, emphasis is put 
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on the Goal by the use of passive processes; then, emphasis is put on the Israeli forces 
as a doer in the following processes. 
 
(6) [PIC] [At least 12 Palestinians {Goal} were killed {Material Process} on Monday night 
{Circumstance}] [when Israeli warplanes {Agent} bombed {Material Process} a residential tower 
{Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance}]. 
 
WAFA and Maan also emphasize the effects of actions on civilians by using 
active material processes which are typically used to emphasize the doer. The Agents 
of these processes are nominalizations which themselves contain other military 
actions. The social actors responsible for the nominalized actions as well as the 
actions included in the processes are not explicitly mentioned.  
 
(7) [Maan] Earlier {Circumstance}, an Israeli airstrike {Agent} killed {Material Process} 11 members 
of the Siyam family {Goal} in Rafah {Circumstance}. 
(8) [WAFA] Air attacks on Ash-Shoka area {Agent}, northwest of Rafah City {Circumstance}, killed 
{Material Process} at least 11 family members {Goal}. 
 
By transforming verbs/ actions into nominalizations with an Agent role, the 
processes highlight how the actions are carried out. Unlike some nominalizations that 
emphasize the violence of actions on PIC, Maan and WAFA do not include pre-
modifiers that evaluate Israeli actions/ actors. Again, this does not mean that the doers 
of the actions are mystified, it means rather that newspapers focus on a victim image 
of Palestinian civilians more than a perpetrator image of Israeli forces.  
The three news websites also include frequent passive processes which include 
inanimate Goals. The processes represent actions in which Israeli forces target civilian 
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property, especially houses, mosques and schools. Here, too, emphasis in put on the 
effect of such action.  
 
(9) [WAFA] [The Red Crescent headquarters in Ezbat-Abed-Rabbu {Goal}, near Beit Hanoun 
{Circumstance}, was bombed {Material Process}] [and destroyed {Material Process}], [reported 
{Verbal Process} Awwad {Sayer}]. 
(10) [Maan] [Three mosques {Goal} were demolished {Material Process} by Israeli raids {Agent} 
between midnight and Tuesday morning {Circumstance}], [locals {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} Maan 
{Receiver}]. 
(11) [PIC] [Another nearby tower {Goal} was also significantly damaged {Material Process} during 
the attack {Circumstance}], [the sources {Sayer} added {Verbal Process}]. 
 
In updating readers on the mounting human and property losses, the journalists 
might be using passive processes to avoid repeating the same information and 
focusing instead on revealing the results of these actions. The Goals of these processes 
are thus foregrounded as the most important part of the news, whereas the doer is 
backgrounded. One difference between the newspapers, however, lies in the different 
emphases they put on Israeli agency as the only reason for Palestinian suffering. As 
the examples above show, PIC emphasizes Israeli agency even when the doer is 
backgrounded. In later sections, the analysis will reveal more ideological differences 
between the newspapers in relation to the political and strategic value of Palestinian 
suffering.   
The three websites also foreground the effects of military action on civilians 
by using relational processes. These processes usually involve restructuring material 
processes, thus leaving out the doers of actions and focusing on the results. For 
instance, the attributive relational process had sustained in example (12) represents 
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the material process of wounding by the Attribute wounds, while the Israeli agency is 
backgrounded in the Circumstance in an earlier Israeli bombing. 
 
(12) [WAFA] Wounds {Attribute} he {Carrier} had sustained {Attributive Relational Process} in an 
earlier Israeli bombing {Circumstance}. 
 
Similarly, examples (13) and (14) are circumstantial attributive and identifying 
relational processes on PIC and Maan that explicate civilians’ state without referring 
to the doers of actions. 
 
(13) [PIC] As a number of casualties {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} still under the 
rubble {Attribute}. 
(14) [Maan] Among the victims {Identifier/ Value} was {Identifying Relational Process} 
photojournalist Khalid Hamid and paramedic Fuad Jabir {Identified/ Token}. 
 
One final note in this respect is the extensive spatial contextualization of these 
processes on Maan and WAFA compared to active processes. As the examples below 
show, many of the passive constructions include more precise references to places 
where actions were carried out. 
 
(15) [Maan] His brothers Muhammad, 30, and Hamzah, 21 {Goal}, were killed {Material Process} in 
al-Juneina neighbourhood of Rafah {Circumstance}.  
(16) [Maan] Bilal Abu Daqqa and Abdul-Rahman al-Qarra {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in an 
airstrike {Circumstance} on the al-Mughrabi family home east of Khan Younis {Circumstance}. 
 
This contextualization informs the reader about the circumstances of actions 
and adds more information about the victims, which mostly indicates their innocence, 
while the agency of Israeli forces is backgrounded.  
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5.1.2 The war is massively disproportionate.  
The second aspect of representation that foregrounds Palestinian civilians as 
victims is the emphasis on the disproportionate use of power. In representing Israeli 
forces, many active material processes on the three news websites have metonymical 
Agents as doers of military action directed against civilians or civilian property. 
According to the ergative perspective, these are instances of INSTRUMENT FOR 
AGENT metonymy which substitutes social actors with the tools they use. They 
emphasize the military advances of the Israeli army as being unreasonably directed 
against civilians. 
 
(17) [PIC] [Eyewitnesses {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that Israeli F16 fighter jets {Agent} bombed 
{Material Process} on Monday {Circumstance} a 12-story residential tower {Goal} in Gaza city 
{Circumstance}], [Quds Press {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].  
(18) [Maan] Israeli warplanes and artillery {Agent} targeted {Material Process} Palestinian homes 
{Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance}.  
(19) [WAFA] Israeli jet fighters {Agent} further targeted {Material Process} the city of Rafah {Goal}. 
 
Typical for active material processes, the most important participant in the 
instances above is the Agent. However, having civilians on the other end of these 
processes also highlights their suffering by putting them face to face with the military 
machinery of a massive power. This is further emphasized by representing some 
vulnerable aspects of those civilians. For instance the Goals a 12-story residential 
tower and Palestinian homes on PIC and Maan, respectively, are places where 
families live. Similarly, the Goal the city of Rafah on WAFA is presumed to refer 
collectively to Palestinian civilians. When these Goals are affected by advanced 
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military equipment, the reader will most probably think of disproportionate power 
unjustly leading to heavy civilian losses on the Palestinian side.  
5.1.3 Most of the victims are vulnerable social actors.  
The Palestinian news websites emphasize the victimhood of Palestinian 
civilians by representing some social groups as particularly illegitimate targets due to 
their vulnerability. They quite often emphasize that many civilian victims are women, 
children, journalists and medical staff, who should be avoided during military action. 
This is mostly realized by identifying relational processes that define the victims as 
belonging to those vulnerable social classes.  
 
(20) [Maan] The majority of the injured {Identified/ Token} [arriving {Material Process} in the al-
Shifa hospital {Circumstance}] were {Identifying Relational Process} women and children {Identifier/ 
Value}.  
(21) [PIC] 5 of whom {Identified/ Token} were {Identifying Relational Process} children in addition to 
their father, mother and siblings {Identifier/ Value}. 
(22) [WAFA] Among the wounded {Identified/ Value} were {Identifying Relational Process} medical 
practitioners, nurses, patients {Identifier/ Token}. 
 
Interestingly, unlike PIC which in some instances emphasizes the cruelty of 
Israeli military action, some processes on WAFA emphasize the innocence and 
victimhood of Palestinian civilians. For instance, the following example is a passive 
process in which the foregrounded Goal civilians is pre-modified as innocent. The 
process foregrounds and highlights the vulnerability of civilians more than the 
violence of the doer. 
 
(23) [WAFA] More than 50 innocent civilians {Goal} were killed {Material Process} today on Sunday 




WAFA and Maan also emphasize the suffering of Palestinian civilians by 
representing their own actions. This is basically realized by material processes in 
which civilians are Agents of involuntary actions. The processes represent what 
civilians do under the direct effect of military action. For instance, the process fled in 
both clauses below is not a happy choice by civilians to move from one place to 
another, but an involuntary action due to the military action inflicted on them. 
 
(24) [Maan] Residents who {Agent} fled {Material Process} their homes in Shujaiyya {Circumstance} 
“under fire” {Circumstance} to the hospital for shelter {Circumstance}. 
(25) [WAFA] [Hundreds of patients, doctors and nurses and even nearby residents {Agent} fled 
{Material Process} the violent airstrikes {Circumstance}] [seeking {Material Process} a safer refuge 
{Goal} in Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital {Circumstance}]. 
 
In other processes on WAFA civilians are Agents of processes where they have 
a receiver role. For instance, the process succumbed below describes an action in 
which a civilian is a receiver. The process highlights the actor’s suffering by 
foregrounding his undesirable resultative attribute without referring to the doer of the 
action.  
 
(26) [WAFA] [Al-Qidra {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [22-year-old Mahmoud Salim Mustafa Daraj 
{Agent} succumbed to his wounds {Material Process} in Jabalia refugee camp {Circumstance} in the 
northern Gaza Strip {Circumstance}]. 
 
By and large, the analysis above reveals that WAFA and, to a lesser degree, 
Maan persistently emphasize the huge suffering on the part of civilians in Gaza. If no 
other representations were also introduced, especially those concerning Palestinian 
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fighters, this representation would lead to the conclusion that the war is being fought 
merely between the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians.  
5.1.4 Palestinian medical and civil services are insufficient. 
This aspect of representation emphasizes the hardship that Palestinian medical 
and rescue crews encounter when giving help to civilians. The processes that 
contribute to this aspect are frequent on Maan and WAFA but relatively infrequent on 
PIC. The few processes on PIC are mostly transitive material in which rescue and 
medical staff successfully act on civilians. They represent the ability of those staff to 
deal with urgent situations. In the following material process, for instance, the Agent 
civil defence is acting on the Goal survivors in a way that meets what people expect of 
civil defence. The present continuous tense of the verbal group is working represents 
the immediacy of the action – as if it were happening now – conveying a sense of 
urgency on the process, while the process to find survivors foregrounds the relevance 
of the action of helping people. 
 
(27) [PIC] [Civil defence {Agent} is still working {Material Process}] [to find {Material Process} 
survivors {Goal} throughout Gaza {Circumstance}].  
 
Similar processes are also found on Maan and WAFA. However, Maan and 
WAFA also include processes that represent the inability of medical and rescue staff to 
deal with the situation, which further emphasizes the suffering of civilians. For 
instance, the process and the Attribute in example (28) from Maan refer to the 




(28) [Maan] [Palestinian medical sources in al-Shifa Hospital {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} Maan 
{Receiver}] [that the hospital {Carrier} was unable to cope with {Attributive Relational Process} the 
large numbers of residents {Attribute}]. 
 
WAFA, on the other hand, foregrounds afflicted social actors and highlights their 
undesirable resultative attribute.  
 
(29) [WAFA] Cancer, thalassemia and kidney patients in Gaza hospitals {Carrier} are also facing 
{Attributive Relational Process} severe difficulties {Attribute} due to mass shortage of medical 
supplies and drugs {Circumstance}. 
 
Notice how the Circumstance due to mass shortage of medical supplies and 
drugs attributes their suffering to a lack of medicines, which is the responsibility of 
the hospital and the Ministry of Health in Gaza, without referring to Israel and its 
responsibility for preventing those medicines getting into the Strip. 
In this sense, the suffering of civilians as represented on Maan and WAFA has 
two causes: they are receivers of disproportionate Israeli military action, and they 
receive insufficient medical and civil help. As the processes show, there is no direct 
criticism of Hamas and its performance in the war. The processes, instead, suggest a 
direct criticism of Israel as the one responsible for these bad circumstances. However, 
when different aspects of representation emphasize the inability of civilians to cope 
with Israeli military action, some questions might arise about the reasonableness of 
getting involved in a war with Israel. This is particularly distinctive of WAFA’s 
reporting, which focuses merely on the human aspect of Palestinian suffering. For 
instance, WAFA includes a detailed representation of civilians that constructs 
provocative images and a state of urgent human crisis. It adopts what Chouliaraki 
(2006) calls a mode of representation that evokes empathy with the sufferers by 
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focusing on their state and explicating their suffering. However, this representation 
provokes an emotional affiliation of the audience to the victims but not indignation 
towards the persecutor (Boltanski, 1999). This is mainly realized by material 
processes with metonymical Goals that refer to places. As the adjective battered in the 
following example shows, some Goals emphasize collective suffering by highlighting 
the shocking resultative attributes on the part of the receivers.  
 
(30) [WAFA] Israeli warplanes {Agent} continued bombing {Material Process} the battered Shuja’iyya 
neighbourhood {Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance}. 
 
Furthermore, unlike Maan and PIC, most of the material processes on WAFA 
which represent the actions of Palestinian rescue staff are passive. As the following 
example shows, they foreground the shocking resultative attributes for civilians.  
 
(31) [WAFA] The bodies of 28 Palestinians {Goal} were recovered {Material Process} from under the 
rubble of their three-story house {Circumstance}.  
 
More processes have the victims themselves as Agents of involuntary actions. 
These, as the following example shows, give a detailed description of the image of the 
victims due to military action.  
 
(32) [WAFA] [Hospitals across the Gaza Strip {Sayer} reported {Verbal Process}] [that they {Agent} 
have received {Material Process} dozens of cases of injuries and deaths {Goal}] [where bodies 
{Agent} reached {Material Process} the hospital {Goal} charred, body parts blown off, or amputated 
limbs {Resultative Attribute}], [most {Identified/ Token} belonging to {Identifier Relational Process} 




The Agent hospitals is involuntarily acting on the Goal dozens of cases of 
injuries and deaths. The same relationship is then restructured in the subsequent 
process where bodies is the Agent of the involuntary action reached, while hospital is 
the Goal. Then, the resultative attributes charred, body parts blown off, or amputated 
limbs give further information and construct a shocking description of the victims. 
The above instance exemplifies an evocative representation based on 
‘explication of emotion’ (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 157). It details the results of actions 
with little emphasis on the agency of the doers or their political and ideological 
motivation. Unlike PIC, for instance, WAFA does not seem to be preoccupied with 
intensifying the violence of Israeli actions as deliberately targeting Palestinian 
civilians. With the absence of any reference to Palestinian fighters, whether as doers 
or receivers of military action, this gives rise to the notion that the two sides of the 
war are only the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians. WAFA’s elaboration of 
civilians’ victimhood may overemphasize feeling ‘at the expense of rationality’ 
(Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 179). In other words, it may lead the reader to think about the 
effects of actions more than the political and ideological implications of the war. This 
does not mean negating or obfuscating Israeli agency, but it does mean highlighting 
the suffering of civilians based on human considerations, whereas the Israeli war is 
represented as the general context of Palestinian suffering. Central political issues, 
such as the siege imposed on the Strip, thus remain irrelevant given the urgent need to 
stop the human crisis resulting from the war. As such, there seems to be no national, 
political or practical value for this suffering. On the contrary, these representations 
highlight the negative effects of the war on the Palestinian people without explicitly 
denouncing the resistance to it. Yet, in light of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas, 
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WAFA might be aiming to undermine Hamas’s attempts to represent itself as a 
protector of the Palestinian people by engaging in military resistance. 
5.2 The Israeli army targets Palestinian civilians: emphasis on agency and 
political motivation. 
The first macro-strategy above revealed the variable focus of the Palestinian 
websites on Palestinian suffering and the degree to which it is associated with other 
aspects of the war. I explained how even when referring to human suffering, PIC 
maintains a considerable emphasis on the Israeli agency that is responsible for 
Palestinian suffering. In this macro-strategy I analyse all aspects of representation on 
PIC and, to a lesser degree, Maan which represent the Israeli army as intending to 
target civilians. Unlike WAFA which highlights the human aspect of the war, this 
macro-strategy reveals that PIC is preoccupied with emphasizing the Israeli violence 
which, as further macro-strategies show, justifies Palestinian military resistance. 
Moreover, analysts tend to believe that the intensification of the brutality of Israeli 
military action is intended to address an international audience. As Zeitzoff (2013) 
argues, representing the conflict as asymmetric might make an international audience 
put pressure on the stronger side to avoid civilian casualties. Zeitzoff claims that 
Hamas’s intensification of the brutality of Israeli actions was efficient in previous 
confrontations when Israel was pressured into decreasing the intensity of some its 
operations. More importantly, these representations legitimize Hamas’s involvement 
in the war by representing the Israeli actions as politically and ideologically 
motivated.   
5.2.1. Israeli forces violently and intentionally act on civilians. 
This aspect of representation on PIC foregrounds the violence of actions and 
the intentionality of Israeli forces targeting Palestinian civilians. Similarly to the 
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previous macro-strategy, this representation necessarily constructs civilians as 
victims. However, unlike the emotion-evocative mode of representation on WAFA, 
PIC’s representation is based on a ‘denunciation of the persecutors’ (Chouliaraki, 
2006, p. 157), which emphasizes Israeli agency and explicates how actions are 
intentionally carried out. To put it differently, the representation situates the war in the 
context of a siege and occupation of the Palestinian territories. This, as Chouliaraki 
argues, gives the reader further reasons to intervene by revealing the political 
implications of actions within their wider context.  
This aspect of representation is basically realized by material processes in 
which Israeli forces are foregrounded as doers of violent actions. Unlike the passive 
processes, these are typically used to introduce the Agent as the most important part of 
the processes. For instance, the following example emphasizes the intentionality of the 
Israeli army in targeting civilians by the Circumstances with a direct rocket and 
without a prior warning. 
 
(33) [PIC] Israeli forces {Agent} had targeted {Material Process} al-Qassas family {Goal} to the west 
of Gaza City {Circumstance} with a direct rocket {Circumstance} without a prior warning 
{Circumstance}.  
 
Unlike the extensive contextualization of resultative attributes of the victims 
on WAFA, these Circumstances explicate the actions themselves to emphasize that 
they were meant to kill civilians. Other processes include adverbs that modify 
processes and represent them as intentional in the sense that they are meant to achieve 
specific goals. This is bluntly stated in the following process, quoted from a Hamas 




(34) [PIC] [Israel {Agent} is deliberately targeting {Material Process} Gazan civilians and children 
{Goal}] [after failing to confront {Material Process} Palestinian resistance fighters {Goal}], [he 
{Sayer} added {Verbal Process}]. 
 
The Agent Israel foregrounds the Israeli agency over the action, while the 
adverb deliberately emphasizes the intentionality of the Agent in targeting the Goal, 
Gazan civilians. The purpose of this intentional action is then explained in the 
Circumstance after failing to confront Palestinian resistance fighters. These 
processes, therefore, devalue the Israeli army both morally and militarily: it fails to 
confront Palestinian resistance, so it acts on civilians to pressure the resistance. It is 
also important to notice the presuppositions included in the process above. Not only 
do they introduce a homogenous violent ‘Other’ by the synecdoche Israel, but they 
also imply a collective Palestinian resistance that is associated with all Palestinians. 
This interplay between Hamas and all other Palestinians will be discussed later. 
Suffice to mention here that such representations do not clarify whom the social actors 
referred to as Palestinian resistance are. Instead, it builds on assumed public 
knowledge about this social group. In other words, the representations are based on 
presuppositions that emanate from the hegemonic discourse and its political and 
cultural narratives. The distinction between a civilian body and a military body on the 
Palestinian side also marks a major difference from WAFA, which represents the war 
as having two parties only: the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians. 
PIC also distinctively uses a number of referring strategies that function as 
micro-argumentative schemes (see Section 3.2.2.2). In the processes where the 
website refers explicitly to Israeli actors as doers of military material actions, actors 
are referred to by the nomination Israeli Occupation Forces, which is then followed 




(35) [PIC] Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) {Agent} committed {Material Process} a new massacre 
{Scope} on Monday {Circumstance}.  
 
Regardless of what the actors do, the nomination and the acronym represent 
Israeli forces as part of the illegitimate occupation, which is contrary to the reference 
adopted by the Israeli side that identifies the forces as having a defensive role: Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF). Unlike Maan and WAFA, this is another example of how 
representations of the war draw on the wider political context.  
PIC also highlights the violence and intentionality of Israeli actions by using 
evaluative lexical choices in referring to actions of the Israeli army. For instance, PIC 
employs nominalizations that function as Agents of material processes. As the 
following example shows, the nominalizations are pre-modified by adjectives that 
express how violent the Israeli actions are. 
 
(36) [PIC] The Israeli army’s vicious attack {Agent} on the Palestinian people {Recipient} in Gaza 
{Circumstance} ruthlessly {Circumstance} targeting {Material Process} civilians and their homes 
{Goal}. 
 
The nominalization Israeli army’s vicious attack contains another action about 
which very little information is provided. However, the nominalization emphasizes 
the notion that targeting civilians is intentional and very brutal. The same applies for 
the adverb ruthlessly which modifies the process targeting; while targeting represents 
the intentionality of the action, ruthlessly intensifies its brutality and inhumanity.  
In other processes, the nominalizations are Agents of intransitive material 
processes. Nonetheless, the actions are evaluated and civilians are passivised in a 
Recipient role. As the following example shows, the focus is put on the brutality of 
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the actions more than the innocence of civilians. The reference Palestinian people 
may be emotionally loaded by invoking the different social groups affected by the 
actions. However, unlike WAFA, these nominations are hardly modified by adjectives 
that emphasize the vulnerability of the actors. 
 
(37) [PIC] Israeli army’s vicious attack {Agent} on the Palestinian people {Recipient} in Gaza 
{Circumstance} was escalating {Material Process}. 
 
In a similar vein, PIC intensifies the violence and intentionality of the Israeli 
forces by using material processes that have a Scope as a second participant. In the 
example (38) below, the Scope war crimes is by itself evaluative, while the Scope 
aerial bombardment in example (39) is pre-modified by the intensifying adjective 
ferocious. In both cases, the brutality of the actions is represented as directly affecting 
civilians who are passivised in a Recipient role. 
 
(38) [PIC] [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that the Israeli occupation forces {Agent} had 
committed {Material Process} war crimes {Scope} against Gazan civilians {Recipient}]. 
(39) [PIC] Israel {Agent} launched {Material Process} two weeks ago {Circumstance} a ferocious 
aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip {Scope}.  
 
Similarly, the Circumstance on the heads of their inhabitants in the passive 
material process below contextualizes the process was destroyed. It foregrounds the 
notion that the army intended to act against those inhabitants. 
 





It could be argued, therefore, that the representation of the effects of the 
military action on PIC is mostly contingent. PIC seems to be preoccupied with 
ascribing a criminal role to the forces more than a victim role to Palestinian civilians. 
It is a presentation that mobilizes ‘indignation towards the unfairness of the event’ 
(Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 157), rather than evoking the emotions of the reader towards 
the sufferers. This mode of representation is oriented towards action, in that it 
necessitates the identification and accusation of the persecutor (Boltanski, 1999).  
By comparison, foregrounding the brutality of Israeli actions and the 
intentionality of Israeli forces to act against civilians is not very frequent in Maan. It 
appears only in material processes which are quoted from Hamas leaders and 
undefined eyewitnesses. As the following examples show, the evaluation of Israeli 
actions in these processes is realized by Scope participants. 
 
(41) [Maan] “[The Israeli occupation {Agent} is committing {Material Process} a war crime {Scope} 
in the full sense of the word {Circumstance} in Gaza City {Circumstance}]”, [he {Sayer} charged 
{Verbal Process}]. 
(42) [Maan] [Residents {Sayer} say {Verbal Process}] [invading Israeli forces {Agent} committed 
{Material Process} “a new massacre” {Scope} in the Shujaiyya neighbourhood of Gaza City 
{Circumstance}]. 
 
In a more stark difference from PIC, some lexical choices on Maan and WAFA 
exclude a great deal of the violence of Israeli actions and merely focus on the results 
of these actions. For instance, example (43) from Maan refers to military action by the 
verbal group brought which is semantically void of any vestiges of violence. The 
process lacks important contextual information concerning how the attacks resulted in 




(43) [Maan] The latest Israeli attacks {Agent} brought {Material Process} the Palestinian death toll 
{Goal} to 587 {Resultative Attribute}.  
 
Similarly, the following intransitive process ended up from WAFA is non-
violent, although it refers to military action, while violent action is embedded in the 
nominalization the killing which has a Circumstance function.  
 
(44) [WAFA] Israeli bombing {Agent} on Nasr quarter in Rafah City {Recipient} also ended up with 
{Material Process} the killing of Khadra Tailakh, and the injury of two other Palestinians {Resultative 
Attribute}.  
 
Although the violent nature of the process is recovered from the Circumstance, 
and the Israeli agency in the action is evident in the co-text of the process, this process 
establishes a weak link between the action and the effect. It does not seem to 
problematize Israeli intentionality over the actions as much as it emphasizes the 
results of the action. This marks a crucial difference from PIC which tries consistently 
to link the huge number of fatalities with the intentionality of the forces attacking 
Palestinian civilians.  
More surprising representations in Maan are reported from Israeli sources. The 
following clause is a transitive material process with a Scope as a second participant. 
Although the process is indirectly quoted, which means that the journalist could 
reword it in a way that expresses its violence, the positive connotations of the process 
are preserved and conveyed by the Scope progress. 
 
(45) [Maan] Israeli forces {Agent} made progress {Material Process} in their invasion {Circumstance} 




Since the process does not include a Goal, the affected actors are completely 
backgrounded. It exemplifies Maan’s tendency not to problematize actions when they 
are reported from Israeli sources. This will be discussed more in later sections.  
The macro-strategies discussed so far are concerned with two main groups of 
social actors: Israeli forces and Palestinian civilians. The analysis has revealed how 
different grammatical realizations and lexical choices emphasize variably different 
aspects of military action and foreground different contextual associations and 
political/ human implications. The analysis concludes that WAFA includes consistent 
representations of the war being between the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians. 
However, this is not exactly the case with PIC and Maan. The following macro-
strategy reveals how a third party, Palestinian fighters, has a decisive role in the war 
according to PIC and Maan. Yet, the news websites differ in their construction of a 
relationship between fighters and civilians. This reveals differences in the ideological 
narratives they draw upon and the political objectives they attempt to achieve.  
5.3 The war is between two military sides. 
Although PIC and Maan are interested in showing the massive effect of Israeli 
military action on Palestinian civilians, both websites represent the war as being 
basically conducted between two military sides: the Israeli army and Palestinian 
fighters. In doing so, PIC and Maan construct a considerably wider image of the war 
by representing one of its main aspects that is ignored on WAFA. This macro-strategy 
is realized by the following aspects of representation.  
5.3.1 Palestinian fighters act against Israeli soldiers.  
The first aspect of representation that constructs the war as being between two 
military sides foregrounds the role of Palestinian fighters while acting against Israeli 
soldiers. This is articulated in news reports by different grammatical realizations. 
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First, PIC and Maan include processes in which the effect of military action against 
soldiers is foregrounded, while Palestinian fighters as doers are completely 
backgrounded. Some of these processes do not assert the role of Palestinian fighters 
due to the way social roles are realized. For instance, Israeli forces appear as an Agent 
in the following process although they are the receivers of actions. The process 
completely backgrounds Palestinian fighters. 
 
(46) [PIC] [Earlier in the day {Circumstance}, the Israeli occupation {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [it 
{Agent} lost {Material Process} 27 troops {Goal} in its ongoing ground offensive {Circumstance} in 
Gaza {Circumstance}]. 
 
Backgrounding fighters also appears in the Circumstance in its ongoing 
offensive. The possessive pronoun its attributes military action to one party only: 
Israeli forces. Similarly, the following intransitive material process from Maan has the 
killed soldiers as an Agent of the involuntary action died, leaving out the doer of the 
action of killing. 
 
(47) [Maan] 27 soldiers {Agent} have died {Material Process} in the past four days {Circumstance}. 
 
Nonetheless, the co-text and context of these processes can help the readers 
infer that the processes refer to military actions carried out by Palestinian fighters. 
Consequently, they would assign a new role to the Israeli army; not only it acts on 
Palestinian civilians, but it also receives military actions. 
Other processes background the doers but have the Israeli forces as Goals of 
the actions. As the following example from PIC shows, the process were wounded 




(48) [PIC] 50 others {Goal} were wounded {Material Process}. 
 
Some processes in Maan imply that there are two military sides in the war by 
the way they are contextualized. For instance, the following process includes the 
Circumstance in intense fighting which leaves no doubt that the war is between two 
military sides that have considerable military capabilities. It is important to notice here 
that this process is reported from an Israeli military source. 
 
(49) [Maan] [An Israeli military spokeswoman {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} Maan {Receiver}] [that 
13 soldiers {Goal} have been killed {Material Process} in intense fighting {Circumstance} in the Gaza 
Strip {Circumstance} on Sunday alone {Circumstance}]. 
 
Maan also includes active processes that foreground the fighters as acting 
against Israeli soldiers or inanimate Goals that refer to Israeli military equipment. In 
example (50) below, the material process foregrounds the doer the armed wing of 
Hamas as acting against an Israeli soldier. Similarly, example (51) foregrounds the 
fighters’ agency in acting against military equipment, presumably affecting the 
soldiers inside it. 
 
(50) [Maan] [The armed wing of Hamas {Sayer} claimed {Verbal Process}] [it {Agent} kidnapped 
{Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal}]. 
(51) [Maan] [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that the fighters {Agent} destroyed {Material 
Process} an Israeli military jeep {Goal}]. 
 
As it appears in the examples above, Maan uses some processes from Israeli 
and Palestinian military sources, conferring a sense of objectivity on reporting or at 
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least a sense validation of what is reported. It is quite surprising, however, that some 
lexical choices have negative connotations in representing Palestinian actions. The 
verbal group kidnapped in example (50) is associated with immoral unacceptable 
criminal actions, usually against civilians. In other instances, Maan uses the reference 
militants to refer to Hamas fighters. Like the previous example, this backgrounds the 
political legitimacy of the actors by merely identifying them based on what they do. 
 
(52) [Maan] Palestinian militants {Agent} have engaged {Material Process} the Israeli military {Goal} 
in fierce fighting {Circumstance} across the Gaza Strip {Circumstance}.  
 
These choices are not used on PIC which seems more alert to the role of 
lexical choices in (de)legitimizing Palestinian actions. It is thus consistent in using 
choices that have positive associations. For instance, in covering the event reported on 
Maan in example (50), PIC uses the verbal group captured instead of kidnapped. The 
semantic meaning of this choice is different as it draws on legitimate military action. 
It is thus pragmatically, and morally, acceptable.  
 
(53) [PIC] [He {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that the soldier {Goal} was captured {Material 
Process} in the battle {Circumstance} in Shujaia suburb {Circumstance}]. 
 
In a more interesting case, Maan reports the same event from both sides by 
using different choices that construct the same event differently.  
 
(54) [Maan] [It {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that early Monday {Circumstance} 12 al-Qassam 




(55) [Maan] “[Hamas terrorists {Agent} infiltrated {Material Process} Israel {Goal} through two 
tunnels {Circumstance} from north Gaza {Circumstance}]”, [Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner {Sayer} 
wrote {Verbal Process} on his official Twitter feed {Circumstance}]. 
 
Both processes are transitive material processes in which Palestinian fighters 
act against inanimate Goals that refer to places. However, the processes differ in the 
way Palestinian fighters are referred to. While the indirect reporting of the Palestinian 
source includes a (positive) reference al-Qassam fighters, the direct reporting of the 
Israeli source has a negative reference, Hamas terrorists, infiltrating Maan’s 
gatekeeping and conveying an Israeli viewpoint. 
Furthermore, the Palestinian source represents the action as targeting an Israeli 
military site, which is a legitimate action directed against soldiers. In contrast, the 
Goal that is quoted from the Israeli source is the collectivizing synecdoche Israel, 
which conveys a negative meaning as the action might be directed against civilians. 
This is another site on which Israeli discourse finds its way into Maan’s reporting to 
counterbalance the Palestinian, especially the Hamas, narrative.  
The above examples show that Maan maintains a clear distinction between 
Palestinian civilians and Palestinian fighters. Although this might not be surprising, 
the distinction between the two groups is later compared with a completely different 
representation on PIC. Furthermore, some instances on Maan blur the Israeli 
intentionality of targeting civilians. For example, the Palestinian civilians in the 
following example are foregrounded as the Goal. The Circumstance in ongoing 
fighting contextualizes the event as resulting from military action between two 
military sides: Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters. The process does not provide any 
clues about who is responsible for killing civilians, which obfuscates Israeli agency 




(56) [Maan] Three others {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in ongoing fighting {Circumstance} 
in the besieged Shujaiyeh neighbourhood of Gaza City {Circumstance}. 
 
Similar uncertainty appears in the following example where Maan refers to 
Palestinian fatalities by using the collectivizing reference Palestinians which is 
functionally parallel to Israeli soldiers. 
 
(57) [Maan] At least 140 Palestinians and 13 Israeli soldiers {Goal} were killed {Material Process} on 
Sunday {Circumstance}. 
 
Without additional information, it is quite difficult to infer whether the 
Palestinians are civilians or fighters. But the functional parallelism between 
Palestinian actors and Israeli soldiers suggests that the former are fighters.  
Finally, Maan exclusively refers to the effects of Palestinian military action on 
Israeli civilians. Almost all of these representations background one part of the 
process. For instance, the following process is a passive construction that foregrounds 
the affected Goal, two Israeli civilians, while the doer is backgrounded and substituted 
by the metonymy rocket fire.  
 
(58) [Maan] Two Israeli civilians {Goal} have also been killed {Material Process} by rocket fire 
{Agent}. 
 
Even in active processes, the doer is usually backgrounded. In the following 
process, the doer of the action is represented by the metonymical Agent 116 rockets, 




(59) [Maan] 116 rockets {Agent} hitting {Material Process} Israel {Goal} on Monday {Circumstance}. 
 
Other processes have Israeli civilians as doers of intransitive material 
processes. In the following example, the actors are referred to as residents, which 
affirms their civilian status. They are the Actor in the involuntary process to stay 
which represents an action presumably carried out to avoid a threat. 
 
(60) [Maan] Residents in Kissufim and nearby areas in southern Israel {Actor} were told {Process:-} to 
stay {Material Process} in their homes {Circumstance}.  
 
In sum, Maan represents the war as being between the Israeli army and 
Palestinian fighters in which the affected actors are mostly Palestinian civilians. This 
distinction will be compared later with the ideological conflation of fighters and 
civilians on PIC. 
5.3.2 Hamas is a military adversary. 
Another aspect of representation that constructs two military sides in the war 
on PIC and Maan represents Hamas as a military adversary that enjoys considerable 
public support. This has a deep impact on the overall representation of the war. 
Foregrounding the military achievements of the Palestinian resistance would 
necessarily change the perceptions of human losses as well as the perceptions of Israel 
as the absolute power in the confrontation.  
One grammatical realization of representing Hamas as a military adversary is 
transitive material processes in which fighters act against Israeli soldiers. These are 
either active processes that foreground the doer, or passive ones that foreground the 
Goal and the effects of actions. For instance the verbal group complex had been 
forced to retreat in the process below represents the forces as militarily inferior to the 
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Palestinian resistance. The forces have an Actor role in the process to retreat, while 
the fighters have an implied Initiator role in the process forced.  
 
(61) [Maan] [Eyewitnesses {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that Israeli forces {Actor} had been forced 
{Process:-} to retreat {Material Process} from Beit Lahiya {Circumstance}]. 
 
PIC also includes processes that represent the resistance as more powerful. For 
instance, the passive process below includes the Circumstance against the 
occupation’s will which explicates how the action is carried out.  
 
(62) [PIC] [Saying {Verbal Process}] [that they (Palestinian prisoners) {Goal} will be liberated 
{Material Process} against the occupation’s will {Circumstance}]. 
 
The process, therefore, allocates the fighters a powerful position to decide the 
future course of actions. 
Representing the resistance as powerful also appears in the example below. 
The verbal process warned represents Palestinian fighters as confident about their 
military superiority from which they judge and predict future events. The mental 
process heed, on the other hand, brings the reader closer to the inner world of the 
Israeli forces to represent their failure to act responsibly. 
 
(63) [PIC] “[We {Sayer} have warned {Verbal Process} the Israeli enemy {Receiver} against such 
invasion {Matter}], [but it {Sensor} did not heed {Mental Process} our warning {Phenomenon}]”, [he 
{Sayer} said {Verbal Process}]. 
 
In less rhetorical terms, PIC and Maan intensify the military ability of Hamas 
by reporting highly challenging, but successful, military actions. For instance, in 
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reporting an event in which fighters captured an Israeli soldier, PIC dramatizes the 
action and intensifies its operational complexity. The verbal complex managed to 
capture is a conventional implicature that represents the difficulty of achieving a goal 
which is set in advance. Therefore, doing the action means achieving one of Hamas’s 
objectives. 
 
(64) [PIC] [Hamas’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigade, {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} on Sunday 
{Circumstance}] [that it {Agent} managed to capture {Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal} 
during the heavy clashes east of Gaza city {Circumstance} Saturday night {Circumstance}]. 
 
The complexity of the action at the operational level is also constructed in the 
Circumstance during the heavy clashes which represents the fighters as an adversary 
to be reckoned with. It is important to mention here that this action is one of the very 
few in which reference is made specifically to Hamas fighters, precisely the Qassam 
Brigades, and not to Palestinian resistance as I explained in previous examples and as 
I will discuss in more detail in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3.  
Similarly, in reporting the killing of two Israeli soldiers by Hamas fighters, 
Maan uses the nominalization Hamas-cross border raid as the Agent. It backgrounds 
the social actors but highlights the way the action was carried out, which poses a big 
challenge for the Israeli forces.  
 
(65) [Maan] Hamas-cross border raid {Agent} into Israel {Circumstance} Sunday {Circumstance} 
killed {Material {Process} two Israeli soldiers {Goal}.   
 
The process foregrounds one of what Hamas boasts of as ‘surprises’ during the 
war, the movement’s ability to carry out military action beyond Israeli military sites 
(Attaher, 2014). Maan also includes intransitive processes which represent the success 
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of Palestinian fighters in implementing military action ‘beyond the borders’, as Hamas 
likes to call them. As the following examples show, these processes explicate the 
military activities of Palestinian fighters in different contexts. This represents them as 
decisively directing events according to their objectives.  
  
(66) [Maan] The other group {Agent} clashed {Material Process} with Israeli special forces 
{Circumstance}. 
(67) [Maan] Two {Agent} returned {Material Process} safely {Circumstance}.  
 
It is worth referring to the linguistic relevance of the verb clashed in example 
(66) above. Although it is syntactically intransitive, it usually necessitates mentioning 
the other part involved in the action, thus functioning semantically like a transitive 
verb. As such, the process helps in emphasizing the action itself, but at the same time 
keeps the two military sides in the process evident. 
In a similar vein, PIC and Maan represent the (positive) public response to 
some of the resistance actions. In doing so, they emphasize the role of Palestinian 
military action in changing some realities relevant to the Palestinian people. This 
mainly appears in material processes in which Palestinian civilians are Agents. The 
processes represent their happiness with some actions, especially capturing an Israeli 
soldier, and the relevance of these actions for their lives or the lives of their relatives 
in Israeli prisons. This is exemplified by the following example from PIC.  
 
(68) [PIC] The announcement (of capturing an Israeli soldier) {Goal} was met {Material Process} with 
great joy {Circumstance} in the Palestinian street {Circumstance} in Gaza Strip {Circumstance}.  
 
The Goal the announcement is foregrounded as the most important part of the 
process, while the process was met is intensified by the Circumstance with great joy. 
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This representation emphasizes the political and practical relevance of the action for 
the Palestinian people, who are collectively represented by the metonymy the 
Palestinian street.  
Similarly, the following processes in Maan have Palestinian civilians as 
Agents of actions that represent their positive response towards the same event. The 
first is a transitive material process with an inanimate Goal, while the second is an 
intransitive process. The processes are motivated by actions of the resistance and 
basically represent psychological states of affairs and not actual changes in the 
material context. 
 
(69) [Maan] [Hundreds of people in Ramallah, Hebron and Bethlehem {Agent} […] honking {Material 
Process} their car horns {Goal}] [and launching {Material Process} fireworks {Goal} following news 
of the capture {Circumstance}]. 
(70) [Maan] [Palestinians across the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip {Agent} celebrated 
{Material Process} late Sunday {Circumstance} following an announcement by Hamas’ military wing 
{Circumstance}] [that it {Agent} had captured {Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal}]. 
 
Maan also includes a relational process that refers to civilians’ positive attitude 
towards capturing an Israeli soldier. As the following example shows, these processes 
are typical in showing that civilians’ actions do not bring about important changes in 
the material world as much as they reflect their response to the fighters’ actions.  
 
(71) [Maan] [In Hebron {Circumstance}, the families of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons 





The Attribute happy with the news demonstrates the emotional state of 
civilians towards the action. The Sayer the families of Palestinians being held in 
Israeli prisons refers to a specific group of social actors who are identified in relation 
to Palestinian prisoners. This highlights the practical value of the action by 
foregrounding its potential in changing particular realities: releasing Palestinian 
prisoners held in Israeli jails. 
By and large, the two aspects of presentation discussed above activate 
Palestinian fighters as doers of military actions that affect Israeli actors. The following 
section discusses processes from Maan in which Palestinian fighters as well as Hamas 
(civilian) members are passivised as receivers of Israeli military action, which also 
represents the war as being between Hamas/ fighters and the Israeli army. This 
representation is completely excluded from PIC. 
5.3.3 Israeli forces act against fighters/ Hamas members 
A distinctive aspect of representation in Maan foregrounds the effects of 
Israeli actions on Palestinian fighters. This is realized by material processes in which 
Israeli forces and the Palestinian fighters are Agents and Goals, respectively. 
Remarkably, most of these processes are reported from Israeli military sources. As I 
explained earlier, some lexical choices convey the political and ideological 
connotations of the source by using the functionalizing reference terrorists to refer to 
Palestinian fighters and the abbreviation IDF to refer to Israeli forces, which contrasts 
sharply with PIC’s attempt to circulate the counter-argumentative nomination Israeli 
Occupation Forces (IOF). When processes are indirectly reported, as the following 
example shows, the journalists use neutral references such as fighters which are 
usually modified by Hamas to make clear the political orientation of the actors. This 




(72) [Maan] [Israel’s army spokesman {Sayer} confirmed {Verbal Process}] [that 10 Hamas fighters 
{Goal} were killed {Material Process}]. 
 
In a more surprising representation, a process in Maan uses the generalizing 
Goal targets which is later explained as referring to buildings used by Palestinian 
fighters.  
 
[73] [Maan] [The Israeli army {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [it {Agent} had targeted {Material 
Process} some 310 targets {Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance} in the last 24 hours {Circumstance}]. “[An 
additional mosque {Goal} used {Material Process} by the PIJ {Agent} as a rocket storage facility 
{Circumstance}], [operations room, and gathering point, {Goal} was targeted {Material Process}]”.  
 
The process foregrounds the notion that some civilian facilities could 
genuinely be targeted because they were used for military purposes. This claim is 
conveyed from an Israeli source but, surprisingly, not problematized by Maan.  
A distinction between different groups of Palestinian actors in Maan appears 
also in the reference to ‘Hamas actors’: politicians and civilians but not fighters. In a 
material process that represents an event in the West Bank, Maan uses a reference that 
identifies the political affiliation of actors. 
 
(74) [Maan] A massive assault {Agent} against Hamas {Recipient} in the West Bank {Circumstance} 
left {Material Process} more than 600 Hamas-affiliated individuals {Goal} in prison {Circumstance}. 
 
Although the civilian status of the actors is not negated, the reference 
distinguishes them from all other Palestinians. Such a choice represents the Israeli 
action as being limited to those who are assumed to have taken part in actions related 
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to Hamas and its practices in the West Bank. In other words, the action is somehow 
understandable by presupposing the correctness of categorizing actors as Hamas-
affiliated. Moreover, the process left itself mitigates the action arresting by leaving it 
implicit. 
Other processes refer to civilians and politicians by the generalizing reference 
Hamas. In the following example, the material process refers to an event similar to the 
one in example (74) above: Israeli forces act against civilians and politicians in the 
West Bank who have no involvement in military activities. However, collectivizing 
them as Hamas limits the target of the Israeli forces to a specific group of people who 
are known already to be an enemy of Israel. This deems the action understandable or 
at least expected.   
 
(75) [Maan] Israel {Agent} launched {Material Process} a massive assault {Scope} against Hamas 
{Recipient} in the West Bank {Circumstance}. 
 
Finally, Maan includes material processes in which Israeli forces act against 
inanimate Goals, mostly the houses of Hamas political leaders. As the following 
example shows, the process usually refers to actors by their proper names and political 
affiliation to the movement. 
 
(76) [Maan] Earlier on Tuesday morning {Circumstance}, an Israeli reconnaissance drone {Agent} 
fired {Material Process} missile {Goal} at home of Ziad al-Thatha deputy prime minister of the former 
Hamas-run government {Recipient}. 
 
I do not claim that Maan justifies the actions because they target ‘less’ civilian 
social actors. Instead, the analysis attempts to show systematically how Maan 
maintains a clear distinction between the different groups of social actors. In contrast, 
221 
 
the data analysed from PIC do not include processes in which Israeli forces act against 
Palestinian fighters. Moreover, only one process in PIC refers to an Israeli action that 
targets the house of a Hamas leader. 
 
(77) [PIC] [Israeli warplanes {Agent} blasted {Material Process} the house of Hamas leader Emad al-
Alami {Goal} in Gaza City {Circumstance} at dawn Monday {Circumstance}] [with no casualties 
{Goal} reported {Material Process} in the incident {Circumstance}]. 
 
It can be argued that both PIC and Maan distinguish between two major 
groups of Palestinian actors: civilians and fighters. However, some differences 
between PIC and Maan arise concerning the relationship they construct between these 
groups. The analysis so far has revealed that both news websites construct two roles 
for civilians in terms of military action. The first is a receiver role that associates 
civilians with victimhood, and the second is a responsive role that represents civilians’ 
attitude towards some actions of the Palestinian resistance. Both actions are passive as 
they emanate from the doings of other actors. Consequently, they do not lead to 
substantial changes in the context of the war. However, in the fourth macro-strategy 
below I explain how PIC attributes civilians a more dynamic and active role to the 
war, shifting their representation from a victim to a hero image.  
Finally, it is important to reiterate that all representations of Hamas-affiliated 
actors or Palestinian fighters are excluded from WAFA. As explained earlier, the only 
group of Palestinians WAFA constructs is innocent civilians who are victims of 
military action. In the very few incidents where complete exclusion seems impossible, 
WAFA backgrounds the military or the political role of actors by using generalizing 
references that background their identities. For instance, one process in WAFA uses 
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the reference a group of people that makes it impossible to tell whether the actors 
killed are civilians or fighters. 
 
(78) [WAFA] An unmanned reconnaissance aircraft {Agent} targeted {Material Process} a group of 
people {Goal} in Khan Yunes City {Circumstance}.  
 
Another process in WAFA refers to killing the sons of a Hamas leader. The 
clause identifies all the victims by their proper names. 
  
(79) [WAFA] [A family of four {Goal} was also killed {Material Process}], [including {Identifying 
Relational Process} the father, Osama al-Hayya, his wife Hala Abu-Hein, and their two children 
Omama and Khalil {Identifier/ Token}].  
 
However, unlike Maan and PIC, and even in contrast to some Israeli 
newspapers that reported the event, WAFA does not mention that this actor is affiliated 
to Hamas. It backgrounds the notion that Hamas members and their families are also 
targeted by Israeli forces. 
5.4 Hamas military action is legitimate and representative of all Palestinians: 
passive and active forms of resistance. 
This macro-strategy is mainly found on PIC and involves all aspects of 
representation that foreground one or more of the reasons that deem Palestinian 
military action to be legitimate. The website employs a set of representations that 






5.4.1 The Palestinian resistance aims to achieve legitimate human and political needs. 
In this aspect of representation, the Palestinian involvement in the war is 
contextualized in the wider context of a struggle in which the political and human 
needs of Palestinians are at stake. 
This aspect is operated in Maan by a few grammatical choices. As explained 
earlier, Maan represents some actions of the Palestinian resistance as positively 
influencing basic Palestinian issues. For instance, the mental process hope in the 
following example exposes the state of mind of many families in relation to capturing 
an Israeli soldier.  
 
(80) [Maan] [Many families {Sensor} hope {Mental Process}] [that their relatives {Goal} will be 
released {Material Process} in exchange for captured Israeli soldiers {Circumstance}]. 
 
The processes in Maan do not explicitly legitimize the actions of Palestinian 
fighters. They show rather the political value of these actions for the Palestinian 
public. Maan merely contextualizes them in their wider context so that their strategic 
relevance becomes clear. In contrast, PIC clearly states that the Palestinian actions 
have specific legitimate needs that must be met. For instance, the following example 
has a verbal and a projected relational process that identify Hamas’s priority. The 
verbal process affirmed expresses the authoritative position of Hamas in dictating its 
conditions, while the relational process identifies these conditions as stop the Israeli 
aggression and meet the resistance’s demands. 
 
(81) [PIC] [Hamas Movement {Sayer} has affirmed {Verbal Process}] [that its top priority at present 
{Value/ Identifies} is {Identifying Relational Process} to stop the Israeli aggression on the Palestinian 




Unlike WAFA, PIC emphasizes that these needs are not merely human, e.g. 
stopping the Israeli operations, but also political. In this respect, Hamas is represented 
as pursuing collective Palestinian rights. While the Sayer in the verbal process is 
Hamas movement, the political demands in the relational process are affiliated with 
the collectivizing resistance with which all Palestinian may identify. In this sense, 
Hamas is represented as a movement that is interested in achieving collective 
Palestinian rights, which ultimately legitimizes involvement in the war. 
In another ideological representation, the demands are represented not only as 
aiming to serve the Palestinian people, but also as being dictated by them. The 
following example is a relational process that is followed by three material processes. 
Each of the material processes identifies one of the Palestinian demands. 
 
(82) [PIC] [Deputy Chairman of Hamas’s political bureau Ismail Haneyya {Sayer} said {Verbal 
Process} Monday {Circumstance}] [that the Palestinian people’s demands for ceasefire {Carrier} are 
{Attributive Relational Process} clear {Attribute}]: [stop {Material Process} the aggression {Goal}], 
[do not repeat {Material Process} it {Goal}], [and lift {Material Process} the siege on Gaza {Goal}]. 
 
In the above example, the immediate, political and strategic demands are made 
clear: stopping the war and lifting the siege on Gaza. No one can argue that these are 
not Palestinian rights. However, what matters for the analysis is how these rights are 
used by Hamas to represent the war as consensual, and thus legitimate. In this sense, 
the human losses on the Palestinian side are perceived to be understandable when 
targeting supreme collective aims. This is made explicit by the following relational 
process. The speaker, a Hamas official, vows that Palestinian fatalities will never stop 
the pursuit of Palestinian demands. Palestinian victims are referred to by the national/ 
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religious nomination martyrs which in itself implies that the victims voluntarily or 
involuntarily sacrifice their lives for supreme goals.  
 
(83) [PIC] “[Our martyrs’ blood {Carrier} will never go {Attributive Relational Process} in vain 
{Attribute}]” [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}]. 
 
In contrast, different grammatical realizations on WAFA represent stopping the 
suffering of civilians as the ultimate goal of political and diplomatic endeavours, 
downplaying the calls for political investment in the war before reaching a ceasefire. 
For instance, the following material process has the PA official Nabil Abu Rdainah as 
Initiator, while the Israeli government is the Actor in the process stop its aggression. 
In this sense, the process represents what the official wanted Israel to do, not what it 
did. Nonetheless, representing the official as the Initiator allocates him the high 
ground of power and responsibility, while the action is meant to save the lives of 
Palestinians who are collectivized by the metonymy Gaza Strip.  
 
(84) [WAFA] Presidential spokesperson, Nabil Abu Rdainah {Initiator} demanded {Process:-} the 
Israeli government {Actor} to stop {Material Process} its aggression {Goal} on the Gaza Strip 
{Circumstance} immediately {Circumstance}. 
 
These representations in WAFA exclude completely the role of Hamas or the 
resistance in deciding on the course of action. Instead, they foreground the PA as the 
only party which has the legitimacy and political capacity to save Palestinian lives. 
For instance, the following process represents the political role of the Palestinian 
President as a legitimate and representative actor. His political action is represented by 




(85) [WAFA] [Abu Rdainah {Sayer} noted {Verbal Process}] [that President Mahmoud Abbas {Agent} 
has been exerting {Material Process} all necessary efforts {Scope} since the first day of aggression up 
until the moment {Circumstance} with the Arab and international community {Circumstance}].  
 
The political role of Abbas is emphasized by the Circumstance which not only 
indicates the continuity of political efforts, but also the distinctive role of Abbas as the 
one who can deal with the Arab and international communities. This is best 
understood in light of Hamas’s bad relationship with Egypt, the most influential Arab 
country during the war, and its limited diplomatic relations with the most influential 
international states. Hence, Abbas’s actions represent not only what he and the 
Palestinian authority can do, but also what Hamas presumably cannot do. More 
specifically, the ultimate goal of the political endeavours is to stop the war, with no 
reference to any further political demands. For instance, the following example has 
Abbas as the Initiator while the international community is an Actor. Abbas is referred 
to by the political identifying reference the President of the State of Palestine 
Mahmoud Abbas which emphasizes his role as representative of all Palestinians, 
although his term as president expired in 2009. 
 
(86) [WAFA] [The President of the State of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas {Initiator} on Sunday 
{Circumstance} appealed to {Process:-} the international community {Actor} to promptly 
{Circumstance} intervene to stop {Material Process} the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip {Goal}], 
[and to impose {Material Process} a cease-fire {Goal}].  
 
The actions that Abbas urges the international community to take relate only to 
the immediate context and primarily aim to save ‘the lives of the innocent’ (Al-Hindi, 
2014). Unlike Hamas’s demands, this does not include any Palestinian conditions 
concerning the siege and future policies towards the Strip.  
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In contrast, a few processes in PIC represent the political role of Hamas and its 
important position locally and regionally. As the following example shows, these 
processes refer to the same event and represent Hamas’s response to an Egyptian 
invitation to visit Cairo. 
 
(95) [PIC] [Political bureau chairman of Hamas Khaled Mishaal {Agent} has turned down {Material 
Process} an invitation {Goal}] [to visit {Material Process} Cairo {Goal}] [to discuss {Verbal Process} 
the Egyptian ceasefire initiative in Gaza {Matter}]. 
 
Although the Egyptian authorities denied it, PIC represents the action as a 
reality and not a disputed opinion. It allocates Hamas a position from which it 
practises its authority as an important political player. The representation is used by 
Hamas to introduce itself as a viable entity in the new regional order in which it leads 
the Palestinian political system (Joudeh, 2012).  
The representation of the different goals of both sides reveals deep political 
strife between the two main Palestinian factions. While Hamas tries to represent its 
actions, including military resistance, as the means to achieve Palestinian objectives, 
Fatah and PA downplay the achievements of the resistance compared with the civilian 
losses, thus preventing Hamas from boosting its popularity amongst Palestinians. 
5.4.2 Resistance is a collective Palestinian body. 
One of the most salient aspects of representation on PIC conflates Palestinian 
fighters with Palestinian civilians. When the line between the two groups is blurred, 
the actions of the resistance are legitimized as having a wide national affiliation. For 
instance, the material process being injured in the following example, which is 
reported from the Israeli newspaper Ynet, represents a military action carried out by 




(87) [PIC] [30 Israeli soldiers {Goal} were transferred {Material Process} to hospitals {Circumstance}] 
[after {Circumstance} being injured {Material Process} during clashes {Circumstance} with resistance 
fighters {Circumstance}], [Yediot Ahronot Hebrew newspaper {Sayer} added {Verbal Process}]. 
 
The Goal 30 Israeli soldiers is foregrounded while the doer is embedded in the 
Circumstance. What matters the most is the way the fighters are referred to. Unlike 
Hamas fighters, the reference resistance fighters gives a wider affiliation to the actors 
with which all Palestinians can identify. Their action is thus legitimate, being 
representative of a major Palestinian body: the resistance.  
In another example, Palestinian resistance appears as the Sayer in a verbal 
process, while the projected relational process states a fact about the losses of the 
Israeli army. Although the reference does not specify who exactly announced this 
proposition, it presupposes that there is an identified body called the Palestinian 
resistance which is expected to address the audience and provide trustworthy 
information about the events. 
 
(88) [PIC] [Palestinian resistance {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that Israeli casualties {Carrier} are 
{Attributive Relational Process} far greater than declared {Attribute}]. 
 
When the boundary between Hamas and all other Palestinians is obscured, the 
movement and its actions are legitimized as being consensual. As Druckman (2001, p. 
228) suggests, the use of different, but logically equivalent, lexical choices creates a 
‘considerable change in the preference of the audience when the same issue is being 
produced and presented in different vocabularies’. This also sends a clear message to 
Israel that Hamas is ‘an adversary to be reckoned with, rather than an unrecognized 
regime that can be forcibly removed’ (Joudeh, 2012). Ultimately, these 
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representations are meant to increase the public support for Hamas as a movement that 
manages Palestinian affairs.   
More ideologically, PIC uses references that completely blur the distinction 
between the civilian body and the resistance body. For instance, the following 
relational process includes the synecdoche Gaza to refer to fighters. The process does 
not represent a particular event but introduces a proposition. The Attribute a 
graveyard for its invaders refers metaphorically to the ability of the resistance to act 
against the Israeli army and defeat it in Gaza. However, the Carrier Gaza does not 
specify the fighters or distinguish them from other Palestinians. 
 
(89) [PIC] “Gaza {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a graveyard for its invaders 
{Attribute}”.  
 
In sum, PIC emphasizes that Hamas is a resistance movement, which is a basic 
reason for the movement’s popular legitimacy (Hroub, 2006). However, at this critical 
moment, its legitimacy is enhanced by representing military resistance as a popular 
Palestinian choice. This, in addition to legitimizing Hamas’s actions as being 
representative of all Palestinians, backgrounds its discrete decision to wage the war, 
which is a major conflictual point between Hamas and Fatah. 
5.4.3 Active and passive forms of resistance are correlated. 
One of the most ideological aspects of representation on PIC that serves to 
legitimize Hamas’s military actions and normalize civilian losses is the interplay 
between the voluntary actions of fighters and the involuntary actions of civilians. In 
many cases, the boundary between the two groups is obfuscated and so one collective 
body of Palestinians is constructed. 
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The conflation between civilians and fighters is mostly realized by material 
processes quoted from Hamas leaders. Some of these processes have the inclusive 
pronoun we as Agent. For example, it is not clear who the Agent we in the following 
example refers to exactly, neither is it clear whether the process are now working to 
stop represents a military or a political action. 
 
(90) [PIC] “We {Agent} are now working to stop {Material Process} Israeli aggression {Goal} on 
Gaza {Circumstance}”. 
 
Even if the reader assumes that we refers only to Hamas, the process is 
directed at the interests of all Palestinians, which makes it an emancipatory action. In 
another example, the action is explicitly stated as military, yet the conflation of 
civilians and fighters is more ideological.  
(91) [PIC] “[We {Agent} decided to end {Material Process} Gaza siege {Goal} by our blood and 
resistance {Circumstance}]”, [he {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}]. 
 
The process decided to end describes a voluntary action carried out by the 
Agent we, which does not draw a clear boundary between Hamas/ fighters and other 
Palestinians. Moreover, the Circumstance juxtaposes the suffering of civilians, by our 
blood, with the military action of the fighters, resistance, representing them as one 
action that represents all Palestinians. The verbal complex decided to end associates 
the mental state of the actors with their material action. It represents the deliberate 
involvement of civilians in the war, as if they voluntarily chose to sacrifice their lives 
to end the siege. This legitimizes the actions of the fighters and normalizes civilians’ 
suffering as seeking to achieve a necessary goal.  
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Other processes have the Israeli forces as an Agent acting against Goals that 
collectivize fighters and civilians. For instance, the following process has the 
evaluative nominalization Israeli crimes as an Agent and the Palestinian steadfastness 
and resistance as a Goal. Yet the process is negated so that the Israeli army is 
represented as failing to cause a change in the Goal. 
 
(92) [PIC] “[Israeli crimes {Agent} will never succeed to break {Material Process} Palestinian 
steadfastness and resistance {Goal}]”, [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} in its statement 
{Circumstance}]. 
 
A conceptual shift in this representation conflates the voluntary acts of fighters 
with the involuntary receptive role of collective civilians. Similar to the examples 
above, the representation combines passive and active forms of resistance (Singh, 
2012). On the one hand, steadfastness is a signifier of passive/ popular resistance 
which refers to preserving a presence on Palestinian lands, accompanied by patience 
over the hardships caused by the Israeli occupation (van Teeffelen, 2016). It includes 
challenging the occupation through all everyday practices (Halper, 2006). In this 
context, however, it basically means civilians enduring Israeli military action during 
the war, and accepting the fact that large numbers of people will be killed or wounded. 
Although civilians have a receptive involuntary role, the term steadfastness represents 
their role as a deliberate and voluntary act of defiance. Resistance, on the other hand, 
is active/ military work that aims to change the political reality on the ground. 
Alongside the term steadfastness, resistance is modified by the generalizing adjective 
Palestinian which blurs the boundary between combatants and civilians. More 
importantly, the juxtaposition represents passive (civilian) steadfastness as a correlate 
to militarily active resistance. This normalizes the ‘heroic warfare’ of Palestinians 
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which ‘embodies a certain tolerance for casualties’ (Singh, 2012, p. 535) and forms 
‘resistance capital’ which Hamas utilizes in its struggle over the representation of the 
Palestinian people (Hroub, 2008, p. 67). 
In other processes, the legitimacy of some of Hamas’s actions is derived from 
the supreme goals they seek to achieve. This appears mostly in relational processes 
that introduce propositions as given facts. For instance, the Token/ Identified 
participant Gaza in example (93) below is identified by the Value/ Identifier the 
bridge to the liberation of Jerusalem.  
 
(93) [PIC] “[Gaza {Identified/ Token} is {Identifying Relational Process} the bridge to the liberation of 
Jerusalem {Identifier/ Value}]”, [he {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].  
 
Jerusalem, which is a key element of the Palestinian national identity, 
functions here as an ideological symbol that links military action with national 
aspirations that invoke collective Palestinian experiences (Singh, 2012, p. 536). 
Moreover, the relational process is a metaphorical configuration of a material action, 
which could be reworded as Gaza/ Gazan resistance is fighting to liberate Jerusalem, 
for instance. However, the relational process does not only refer to the strategic goal, 
liberating Jerusalem, but also to the important position Gaza occupies in this process. 
It is the bridge through which achieving the goal is possible. In this sense, Hamas 
propels an identification of legitimacy that involves ‘furthering national goals and 
enhancing the resistance strategy against Israeli occupation’ (Hroub, 2008, p. 67). 
This forms the ‘symbolic capital’ from which the group and its leaders derive 
authority (Singh, 2012, p. 534). Similar to previous instances, the process also blurs 
the line between civilians and combatants by using the reference Gaza which 
represents civilians as part of the victory and not only a beneficiary of it. Unlike the 
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victim image of civilians which is basically directed at an international audience, this 
message is mainly directed to a local audience for whom Hamas is represented as 
fighting for/ with all Palestinians. 
Since civilian suffering is represented as part of the resistance, the success of 
Palestinians is measured by the continuity of their defiance regardless of the large 
numbers of fatalities. This appears in the following negated process failing to score 
which underlines the main goal of the Israeli operation by the Scope any military 
achievement. 
 
(94) [PIC] Israeli occupation forces {Agent} failing to score {Material Process} any military 
achievement {Goal}. 
 
PIC backgrounds Palestinian suffering and foregrounds the notion that 
Palestinian military defiance remains intact. This is an Israeli failure and, of necessity, 
a Palestinian success. In other words, the civilian losses are not considered strategic 
losses as long as the resistance still has its military capability.  
In sum, PIC’s representation of Palestinian actors alternates between a victim 
image of civilians as receivers of military action and a heroic image of civilians as 
participants in the resistance. This might arise from the website’s attempts to address 
different audiences: Palestinian, Arab, international and Israeli. Tensions arise 
between the victim image, which is directed at an international audience, and the 
image of Hamas as a powerful movement that controls and leads the events which is 
directed at a Palestinian audience. The conflation of Hamas and all other Palestinians 
also helps the movement to legitimize its military actions, especially when Israel sees 
them as a pretext for its large-scale attacks that lead to large numbers of civilian 
casualties. This representation is very different from WAFA where civilians are 
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constructed as helpless sufferers. It is also different from Maan which maintains a 
distinction between civilians and fighters and their social roles.  
5.5 Arab Israelis identify with other Palestinians: representational ambivalences.  
The final macro-strategy in this chapter is concerned with the ambivalent 
representation of Palestinian Israelis in Maan and WAFA. The aspects of 
representation that give rise to this strategy are realized by a few grammatical choices. 
Therefore, it is hard to draw solid conclusions from this section. Nonetheless, the 
analysis helps to uncover some political uncertainties in representing this groups of 
actors. Moreover, the analysis can be a starting point for more comprehensive 
research focusing on representations of different ethnic groups in Israel. 
5.5.1 Arab Israelis politically identify with Gazans: synchronic contextualization. 
The representation of Palestinian Israelis on the Maan news website is realized 
by a few transitive and intransitive material processes. The transitive processes 
describe peaceful actions of demonstration, such as held up in the following example, 
which are contextualized in the context of the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip. As they 
aim to stop illegitimate atrocities against Palestinians, these demonstrations are 
understandable and legitimate. 
 
(96) [Maan] [Demonstrators {Agent} held up {Material Process} placards {Goal}] [reading {Verbal 
Process} “Israeli army commits genocide in Gaza” {Verbiage}]. 
 
In contrast, the intransitive processes describe violent actions, such as clashed 
with in the following example. 
 
(97) [Maan] [Palestinian citizens of Israel {Agent} clashed {Material Process} with police 
{Circumstance} in the northern city of Nazareth {Circumstance} on Monday {Circumstance}], [police 
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{Sayer} said {Verbal Process}, at the end of a protest against Israel’s deadly military strikes in the 
Gaza Strip {Circumstance}]. 
 
By making the actors the Agent of the process, they are represented as 
initiators of violent action, while the Israeli police are passivised in the Circumstance. 
However, the process is conceptually shifted by the Circumstance at the end of a 
protest against Israel’s deadly military strikes in the Gaza Strip. It portrays the 
demonstration as a powerful sign of sympathy with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, 
which represents the action as understandable. This link between the two groups of 
actors is also evident in the reference Palestinian citizens of Israel.  
5.5.2. Arab Israelis historically identify with other Palestinians: diachronic 
contextualization 
In these relational processes, Maan provides historical information about 
Palestinian Israelis in which their actions with/ against Israeli forces are 
contextualized and, more or less, legitimized. For instance, the Palestinian Israelis 
referred to above as doers of material processes are defined in terms of a critical 
historical point: the creation of Israel. 
 
(98) [Maan] [They {Token/ Identified} are {Identifying Relational Process} the descendants of 
160,000 Palestinians {Value/ Identifier}] [who {Agent} managed to remain {Material Process} on their 
land {Circumstance}] [when Israel {Goal} was created {Material Process} in 1948 {Circumstance}]. 
 
The historical contextualization of the actors’ current actions explains their 
antagonism towards Israel in a wider context. Not only does it emphasize their 
national affiliation with Palestinians in Gaza, it also confers uncertainty on their 
relationship with the state of Israel, which ultimately makes their actions 
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understandable. Moreover, this identification reveals Maan’s focus on an international 
audience, as it is unlikely that this is meant to address a local audience that is familiar 
with this historical information. 
One process in this aspect of representation appears on WAFA. As the clause 
below shows, the Goal is first referred to as Israeli Palestinians in which a distinction 
is established between citizenship (Israeli) and national identity (Palestinians). 
 
(99) [WAFA] Israeli police {Agent} arrested {Material Process} around 36 Israeli Palestinians (1948 
Palestinians) {Goal} during confrontations inside Israel {Circumstance}. 
 
However, this reference is followed by a historical-national identification, 
1948 Palestinians, which emphasizes that these Palestinians are the ones who 
remained on their lands when Israel was established in 1948. It is unlikely that the 
reference has an explanatory function. Rather, it appeals to those who negate the 
legitimacy of Israel by constructing one political body of Palestinians. This discourse 
is quite the opposite of that of the PA, with whom WAFA is affiliated, which 
maintains that Palestinians inside Israel are nationally linked to Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza, but politically affiliated to another state.  
As mentioned above, these representations are quite few and need further 
analytical support to draw trustworthy conclusions. However, they may give us an 
important clue about the political and ideological tensions involved in representing 
Palestinian Israelis. On the one hand, almost all Palestinian movements employ a 
populist discourse that identifies those actors as ethnically and politically affiliated to 
the rest of Palestinians. However, the policies of some factions, such as Fatah, are 
based on political dissociation from Israel in order to validate a two-state solution. 
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Therefore, further research is necessary to investigate how journalism discourse deals 
with these political uncertainties.  
5.6 Overview of representation in the Palestinian press 
In this chapter I have analysed the micro-level language choices on three 
Palestinian news websites: WAFA, PIC and Maan. The analysis has identified a set of 
differences that build into different representations of the war. On WAFA and PIC, the 
representations are consistent with the world views adopted by Fatah and Hamas, 
respectively, and reflect the political tension between the two movements over 
legitimacy and representativeness. The analysis has also shown that different language 
choices on these three news websites are meant to address different audiences.  
First, WAFA represents the war as being between the powerful Israeli army 
and helpless Palestinian civilians. It constructs a humanizing image of the victims by 
explicating their devastating situation more than the causes leading to their suffering. 
When accompanied by an emphasis on Israel’s disproportionate use of power, 
Palestinians are passivised as merely receivers of actions. They have no role in opting 
for the war or supporting the party which chose it, which makes the decision to 
confront Israel militarily unwise and irresponsible. Hamas, therefore, might be 
implied as failing twice in dealing with the crisis: it failed to take the right decision to 
avoid an unbalanced confrontation, and when the war happened it failed to protect 
civilians. This negative attitude towards Hamas is constructed by downplaying and 
trivializing its political role through a systematic process of exclusion. Moreover, 
WAFA backgrounds all issues that may justify Palestinian involvement in the war. For 
instance, no reference is made on the website to the siege of the Strip or Israeli 
military action prior to the war. This exclusion enhances the claim of the PA that the 
siege is a result of Hamas’s control over Gaza and the war with Israel will not lead to 
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changes to this issue. The representation also excludes all actions of the Palestinian 
resistance. WAFA seems to downplay the ability of the resistance to save civilians, 
challenge Israel and achieve anything of political or strategic value. However, it does 
all this without directly criticizing the resistance.  
The humanizing discourse on WAFA seems to address an international 
audience by touching on universal human values. It enhances the international 
community’s isolation of Hamas and introduces the PA as a legitimate and moderate 
alternative. The same rhetoric is used to address the Palestinian audience. 
Backgrounding any value to the war enhances the Palestinians’ dissatisfaction with 
the decisions of Hamas as the ruling power in the Strip. The PA, in contrast, is 
introduced as a party that works to save Palestinians and offer them a better life.  
PIC, in contrast, represents the war as being between Israel and the Palestinian 
people: both civilians and fighters. It represents the war as part of the general 
Palestinian struggle by maintaining a perpetrator image for Israel and giving the 
Palestinians reasons to act against the occupation. Hamas, therefore, is not to be 
blamed for human losses. On the contrary, it is a legitimate and representative power 
that leads the Palestinian action in which human losses are understandably part of the 
national struggle. As the analysis in Section 5.4.3 reveals, what matters most is that 
Hamas’s military capability remains intact. Emphasis, therefore, is put on the role of 
resistance in acting against the Israeli army, leading to significant changes in the 
socio-political context. Consequently, any party that does not support the resistance is 
implied as being against the Palestinian collective and its national rights. 
PIC juxtaposes different, and sometimes ambivalent, representations that 
address international, Israeli and Palestinian audiences. First, it encourages an 
international audience to intervene and stop the war by adopting a humanizing 
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discourse that emphasizes the suffering of civilians. Second, PIC targets an Israeli 
audience by constructing a powerful image of Hamas. With the exclusion of the PA’s 
political role, Hamas is represented as the only political authority that decides the 
course of action. Any attempt to put an end to the continuing conflict should take 
Hamas into account. More importantly, a war that is meant to provoke Gazans to turn 
against Hamas is doomed to failure. So, Israel has to use other ways to deal with the 
movement. Internally, PIC affirms to the Palestinians that Hamas is their powerful 
and legitimate representative. This is basically realized by reporting Hamas as the 
leader of military resistance via which it can achieve Palestinian aspirations.  
Finally, Maan represents the war as being between Israel and Hamas, in which 
Palestinian civilians bear the vast majority of losses. It incorporates different 
representations of the war without fully adopting any of the Hamas or Fatah 
narratives. On the one hand, the representations on Maan refer to crucial contextual 
issues, especially the Israeli siege of the Strip. Although the war and the siege are not 
emphasized as contingent, the representation gives the reader a wider view that may 
render Palestinian involvement in the war understandable. It also refers to the 
Palestinian resistance, its role in acting against the Israeli army and bringing about 
important changes for the Palestinian people. On the other hand, Maan maintains a 
clear distinction between the active role of the resistance and the recipient and 
responsive role of civilians. In addition, resistance is not represented as the only way 
to achieve Palestinian objectives. It is clearly associated with Hamas and thus stands 
for one particular political scheme. Since Maan foregrounds the political role of the 
PA, resistance does not mean the automatic legitimization of Hamas as a 
representative of the Palestinians.  
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By avoiding any internal controversial issues, Maan seems to address the 
Palestinian audience inclusively. Neither of the aspects of representation seems 
threatening to any Palestinian movement. So it attempts to be an outlet with which all 
Palestinians can identify. Maan also seems to be interested in a relatively more 
balanced coverage that addresses an international audience. For instance, it is the only 
news outlet that writes about the effects of Palestinian actions on Israeli civilians. The 
website, therefore, may appear to provide a wider coverage which is necessary for an 
international audience to get a more comprehensive view of the war.  
In sum, the analysis in this chapter has shown that Palestinian news outlets 
have different political and journalistic objectives. The differences were made explicit 
merely by analysing language choices at the clause level, not by interpreting news 
websites’ statements about themselves or by my own attribution of their positions. In 
Chapter Six I provide further contextualization of these differences and discuss more 
aspects of the political tensions in Palestine.   
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
6.1 General review 
This study was a language-based analysis of the political and ideological 
tensions in Palestine and Israel, as manifested in journalism discourse. The study was 
politically motivated; it was not interested in language per se, but in the functions of 
language in its socio-political context. It aimed to shed light on the calamity of 
oppressed Palestinians, especially those who live under devastating circumstances in 
the Gaza Strip. As a Palestinian, I was concerned with the role of language in 
constructing the conflict in particular ways which influence the course of events in the 
occupied territories. The way people perceive the conflict via language is vital for 
(de)legitimizing actions that directly affect the lives of millions of Palestinians.  
In this study I aimed to identify discourse fissures and irregularities that 
reflected political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel. To achieve these 
objectives, I used transitivity, social-actor model, and referential strategies to conduct 
a micro language analysis. I also made use of the indexing hypothesis and cascading 
activation as general frameworks to distinguish between the voices incorporated in 
news reporting and their role in constructing their experiential functions. By the same 
token, I proposed cascading interruption as a framework that described newspapers’ 
deviation from the hegemonic political culture.  
The research interest of this study was addressed by answering three 
overarching research questions. In question one I examined the role of journalism 
discourse in the political and ideological debate in Israel by analysing news articles 
from three Israeli online newspapers Haaretz, Jerusalem Post (JP) and Yediot 
Aharonot (Ynet), in reporting the 2014 Gaza war. As Chapter Four shows, I first 
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identified the different micro language choices the newspapers used in representing 
actions and actors. These choices were then classified into a set of aspects of 
representation that served varying world views. By interpreting these aspects of 
representation in the socio-political context, and by categorizing them with other 
similar aspects, I worked out the different macro images the newspapers constructed 
for the war. Finally, I identified the political, ideological and journalistic frames that 
each newspaper operated in its representation. For instance, in section 4.1.2 I 
explained how the Israeli newspapers JP and Ynet represented the war as targeting 
Palestinian fighters and, therefore, leading to desirable results. This aspect of 
representation and similar others constructed a macro strategy that represented the war 
as an inevitable, legitimate and efficient military action against a threat from Hamas 
(see section 4.1). In contrast, language choices in Haaretz served different world 
views. The war, as section 4.2.1 shows, was represented as primarily affecting 
Palestinian civilians. A set of aspects of representation built into a macro strategy of 
representation in which the war was represented as merely destroying Gaza but not 
achieving political or security objectives (see section 4.2). By working out a number 
of macro strategies in the three newspapers, I mapped the different representations of 
pivotal aspects of the war, which reflected subtle political and ideological tensions in 
Israel. For instance, the analysis showed how JP reproduced a discourse that 
supported the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, while Haaretz 
articulated some basic human and political rights of Palestinians. 
In question two, I examined the political tensions in Palestine as manifested in 
journalism discourse of three Palestinian news websites Maan News Agency (Maan), 
the Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) and The Palestine News and Information 
Agency (WAFA), in reporting the 2014 Gaza war. By identifying the different 
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language choices on each website, and by classifying them according to their 
discursive functions, I captured the different world views they conveyed about actions 
and actors. The different world views were then classified to work out the macro 
images each news website constructed for pivotal aspects of the war. For instance, the 
Fatah-affiliated website WAFA represented only two sides of the war: the powerful 
Israeli army and the powerless Palestinian civilians, emphasizing the disproportionate 
power between both sides and the unnecessary suffering of civilians (see sections 
5.1.1 and 5.1.2). In contrast, the Hamas-affiliated website PIC represented three 
parties: the Israeli army, the Palestinian civilians, and the Palestinian fighters (see 
section 5.3.1). However, as section 5.4.3 shows, PIC sometimes blurred the 
distinction between the different Palestinian actors. The different aspects of 
representation constructed different macro strategies of representation which served 
different political objectives. For instance, WAFA downplayed the role of resistance in 
saving Palestinians or achieving any political or strategic objectives, which 
diminished Palestinian uprisings as a plausible choice to confront Israel. In contrast, 
PIC represented the resistance as the only way to achieve the Palestinian national 
objectives, and that Hamas was representative of the Palestinian people because it led 
the military struggle against the occupation. Ultimately, the analysis reflected some 
aspects of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah over legitimacy and 
representativeness.  
The analysis provided an answer to the third research question, in which I 
tackled the role of transitivity, social-actor model, and referential strategies in 
examining issues of representation. Supported by the findings of Chapters Four and 
Five, I claim that language analysis at clause level can give the reader a view of the 
political tensions in a given polity. In other words, by using linguistic models that 
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linked language use with language functions in actual contexts, language analysis 
provided another angle to study socio-political phenomena, such as the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, by investigating subtle internal political and ideological tensions. This 
was achieved by a bottom-up method in which textual analysis regulated discursive 
analysis, which was in turn situated in a socio-political context.  
The detailed analysis, however, raised some challenges that could not be 
sufficiently addressed in this study. First, the grammar-driven analysis was restricted 
to the clause level. In a few cases I had to refer to other adjacent clauses to better 
explain the discursive functions of a particular clause. In this sense, it was still 
necessary to go beyond the clause level in analysing some instances. There must, 
therefore, be a method that maintains grammar as the driving force of analysis while 
accounting for the way processes successively build into macro-discursive strategies. 
Second, the method of this study required very close manual analysis, so it cannot be 
adapted to larger collections of texts.  
These challenges, nonetheless, were limited and did not undermine the claims 
I made from the analysis. The study was still reliant on separate grammatical choices 
and a systematic categorization of these choices. By careful contextualization in a 
socio-political context, analysing a limited number of texts revealed the political and 
ideological workings of language use. This study, as far as I know, was the first that 
made empirically supported claims about the internal conflicts in Palestine and Israel 
by conducting critical language analysis. Even readers not initially familiar with the 
socio-political context will be able to understand the political and ideological tensions 
in both polities. Moreover, the study provided new insights that specialists in media, 
sociology and discourse could not detect in previous research.  
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In sections 4.8 and 5.6 I discussed the political discourses the Israeli and 
Palestinian media outlets, respectively, reproduce or challenge. I also summarised the 
main journalistic objectives and explained how each media outlet targeted particular 
audience(s). In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I give further 
contextualization of the findings. I intend to provide a wider understanding of the 
differences and state final claims about the ideological and political debates and 
conflicts on each side. I also provide a cross-societal review of the findings in order to 
shed more light on the discursive strategies of hegemonic and marginal ideologies, 
and how they contrast according to their position in the social structure. Finally, I 
suggest some other contexts in which the method of this study may lead to new 
findings. 
6.2 Political and ideological implications 
This study found that Israeli and Palestinian media coverage of the war 
produced a more complex representation than a positive ‘Self’ and a negative ‘Other’. 
In Chapters Four and Five, I explained this complexity and showed how 
representations revealed internal political tensions. In this section I provide further 
contextualization of the findings in which I identify a set of political and ideological 
implications by reflecting on the different news outlets analysed in this study. On the 
one hand, the study revealed that post-Zionism did not disappear from Israeli polity. It 
has, rather, changed its discursive strategies to implicitly raise challenges to the 
hegemonic ideology. The analysis also explained how Ynet and JP reproduced 
(neo)Zionist hegemonic narratives by relying on the shared knowledge of the majority 
of Israelis. Haaretz, in contrast, challenged these narratives by providing 
contextualized representations of particular events based on post-Zionist values. On 
the other hand, the study showed how different representations on the Palestinian 
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news websites WAFA and PIC reflected a deep conflict between Fatah and Hamas, 
while those on Maan were less affected by this political cleavage and more interested 
in addressing an international audience. It also explained how the representations 
revealed Fatah and Hamas’s recent perceptions of pivotal issues, such as the role of 
military resistance in the Palestinian national struggle.   
6.2.1 Israeli online newspapers 
The analysis revealed that a hegemonic Zionist discourse operated variably 
across the three Israeli newspapers. This was realized either by an overt adoption of 
Zionist narratives to explain events, or by abstaining from articulating counter macro- 
(anti-Zionist) narratives that could provide a completely different understanding of 
events. However, the detailed analysis revealed that Ynet was the only newspaper that 
adopted a full-scale Zionist discourse, whereas JP and Haaretz leaned towards neo-
Zionism and post-Zionism, respectively. Furthermore, due to the different 
relationships that neo-Zionism and post-Zionism have in relation to the social 
structures in Israel, the ideologies operated in the newspapers in contrastive directions.  
First, news reporting in Ynet seemed to fit perfectly with the hegemonic 
Zionist ideology in representing the war and its socio-political context. The newspaper 
was committed to a national role for Israeli media in times of conflict and avoided any 
kind of criticism of Netanyahu or his government. On the contrary, politicians played 
a major role in constructing the world view of the newspaper. It was also 
distinguished by representational fissures that reflected the ideological uncertainties of 
Zionism in recent decades. The newspaper massively suppressed the political 
dimension of the Palestinian struggle and constructed actions in the occupied 
territories from a security point of view. The war on the Strip was thus a legitimate 
response to the threat raised by Hamas. The representation was based on a set of 
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presuppositions that associated social actors with stereotypical and essentialized social 
roles. As I explained in Section 4.1.1, Hamas was assumed to use tunnels to attack 
Israeli civilians, although this never happened before or during the war. Yet, this 
assumption was basic in legitimizing military action against the Strip. 
Presuppositions, therefore, enabled the writer to construct external realities and 
exclude crucial contextual information that could challenge their representations. For 
instance, if the fact that most of the victims in the war were innocent Palestinian 
civilians was made clear, the macro-narrative that Israel was fighting a filthy enemy 
would lose its credibility. Instead, the newspaper only briefly referred to Palestinian 
victims and represented them as collateral damage. This representation kept the 
Zionist narrative intact and obstructed any intervention on the part of the international 
community to stop the war.  
Ynet also reflected the Zionist uncertainty in its representation of the West 
Bank. Although it demonized Palestinians and backgrounded completely the context 
of occupation, it did not explicitly articulate Israeli/ Jewish ownership of Palestinian 
territories. Internally, Ynet included a set of representational fissures due to 
incorporating Zionist and universal values in representing the effect of the war on 
Israeli soldiers. On the one hand, the newspaper normalized the war by emphasizing 
Zionist convictions that view militancy as an essential part of the Israeli social fabric. 
The death of soldiers was celebrated as a heroic practice based on out-of-context 
narratives incorporated via the voices of ordinary people. Again, this lacked crucial 
contextual information and depended on people’s presuppositions and prevailing 
frames of interpretation. On the other hand, Ynet referred to challenges that the Israeli 
army encountered in the war, either by representing soldiers as receivers of actions or 
representing challenging military contexts. This included undesirable consequences of 
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the war but not to the extent that these challenged the hero image of soldiers or the 
effectiveness of the war for solving Israel’s ‘security’ problems.  
Finally, Ynet’s news reporting reflected and reproduced a Zionist discourse in 
emphasizing a secular Zionist identity. The newspaper did not focus on the religious 
aspects of Jewish identity as a distinctive characteristic of a collective ‘Self’. Rather, it 
adopted the prevailing national construction of Israeli identity that incorporates 
religious elements, but within an overall primordialist discourse. As a newspaper that 
has a wider range of readership, Ynet adopted a general Zionist perspective which is, 
more or less, inclusive of the different Jewish groups in Israel. However, it excluded 
Arabs who are the biggest minority. It demonized, essentialized and represented them 
as affiliating with the enemy. Similar to the above aspects of the struggle, the 
representation of Arabs was based on de-contextualized stereotypical distinctions 
shared by the majority of Jewish Israelis.  
Second, JP leaned towards neo-Zionism in representing these pivotal aspects 
of the struggle. The war was represented as merely acting on legitimate goals which 
posed a threat to Israel. Although the vast majority of Palestinian victims were 
civilians, JP backgrounded Palestinian suffering almost completely. This 
representation lacked most of the contextual information about the immediate event 
and the overall context of the struggle. It could be argued, therefore, that JP’s news 
reporting reflected and reproduced the political unrealism and fanaticism of neo-
Zionism which excluded even the basic human rights of Palestinians.  
This particularistic neo-Zionist discourse also appeared in JP’s representation 
of the West Bank. Unlike Ynet, JP seemed to be more decisive in reviving the notion 
of a greater Israel by affirming the Jewish ownership of Palestinian lands. 
Interestingly, JP did not contextualize its propositions to counter any potential 
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unacceptability amongst an international audience. Rather, it presupposed that Israeli 
ownership of the occupied territories is something that the audience is expected to 
know and agree with. As I explained in Section 4.8, this may reflect JP’s focus on 
addressing Jewish groups outside Israel, especially those who have strong Zionist 
affiliations in the USA and Europe.  
Similar to Ynet, JP revived Zionist narratives that normalized the war and 
represented it as an essential social practice. However, JP differed from Ynet in that it 
backgrounded most of the context-bound representations of killed and wounded 
soldiers. So, a major aspect of the war remained, surprisingly, obfuscated. JP was also 
distinguished by emphasizing religious elements in the construction of Israeli/ Jewish 
identity. The religious characteristic was not merely one value of Israeli identity, it 
was also an important driving force of everyday practices that build up a desired 
social fabric. This was also enhanced at a global level by establishing a close 
relationship between Judaism and Zionist nationalism; Jewish people around the 
world validate their true Jewishness by ‘returning’ to the land of Israel. It is important 
to notice here that these representations were quite detached from the context of the 
war. They primarily relied on out-of-context narratives that assumed shared 
knowledge amongst the readers.  
It could be claimed, therefore, that JP functioned in a similar way to the 
hegemonic Zionist ideology; it employed top-down discursive strategies in 
constructing events according to a neo-Zionist world view. This may basically arise 
from the close relationship between Zionism and neo-Zionism. The basic convictions 
of neo-Zionism are not categorically rejected by Zionism though they have been 
downplayed in recent decades due to political pressures and ideological sociocultural 
changes. In addition, as I explained in Chapter One, neo-Zionism has managed to 
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infiltrate Israeli social structures. It builds on people’s shared knowledge to evaluate 
unfolding events. Therefore, the newspaper did not seem to be challenging the 
hegemonic discourse.  
Haaretz, in contrast, seemed to stand at the other end of the ideological 
spectrum by adopting a post-Zionist perspective. This appeared not only in adopting 
the values of post-Zionism, but also in reflecting its ideological and political 
uncertainties, such as its ambivalent relationship with Zionism (see Section 1.7.1.2). 
For instance, Haaretz considered Palestinian resistance as a form of violence and, in 
some cases, terrorism. Accordingly, Haaretz and post-Zionism in general did not 
contemplate absolute justice for Palestinians. Nonetheless, the newspaper gave a 
much more moderate representation of the war that articulated some basic human 
rights of the Palestinian people. First, Haaretz did not represent the war as the best 
solution to a political struggle. Although it referred to some Israeli actions that might 
be considered as achievements, Haaretz did not represent the war as a success. On the 
contrary, the newspaper highlighted Palestinian suffering to a considerable extent, 
which was basically realized by contextualized reference to actions and their effects 
on Palestinian civilians. It is important to reiterate that these representations did not 
denounce Israeli actions. In other words, Haaretz did not explicitly problematize 
Israeli responsibility for these actions. Rather it explicated in some detail contextual 
information about Palestinian civilians and the devastating circumstances under which 
they lived. This built into a humanizing discourse that associated Palestinian civilians 
with victimhood, without emphasizing the agency of the Israeli army.  
Another prevailing macro-strategy in Haaretz highlighted the negative 
consequences of the war for Israel, especially by referring to killed and wounded 
Israeli soldiers. Haaretz deviated from sociocultural narratives that represent soldiers 
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as heroes. Instead, it maintained a context-bound representation that foregrounded 
their suffering. Finally, in representing the different groups in Israel, Haaretz 
advocated civil and liberal values in the construction of Israeli identity. Israeli 
citizenship was inclusive of both Arabs and Jews and the only distinction was based 
on universal political values. As explained in Chapter One, this is one of the basic 
objectives of post-Zionism.  
Interestingly, the analysis revealed that the post-Zionist discourse that operated 
in Haaretz had a completely different discursive strategy from that of the neo-Zionist 
discourse. It showed that Haaretz did not overtly challenge the official Zionist 
narrative. It did not, for instance, doubt the truthfulness of representations reported 
from Israeli political and military officials, neither did it adopt an anti-Zionist position 
that recognized full political rights for Palestinians. Rather, the newspaper reported 
different aspects of the war and, in general terms, maintained a context-bound 
representation. The ideological functions of its news reporting were embedded in 
language choices at the clause level. Since the newspaper did not rely on socio-
political narratives to interpret current events, it explicated the contextualization of 
events to construct them differently from what the majority of Israeli people believe. 
The micro-level choices built up into a different reality, but without being framed 
within clear political schemes or ideological frames. This may affect people’s 
evaluations of these events and, in the long run, change their way of thinking about 
the whole struggle. As such, contrary to the wide belief that post-Zionism was 
dispensed with in the 2000s, this study found that this ideological trend was still 
functioning, but via less visible discursive mechanisms; it took a bottom-up direction 




6.2.2 Palestinian news websites 
The analysis of Palestinian news websites showed that WAFA, PIC and Maan 
proliferated different discourses and thus constructed different realities concerning the 
war and its human and political implications. Each newspaper had different discursive 
strategies that may index its journalistic, political and ideological objectives.  
First, WAFA adopted a humanizing mode of representation that focused mainly 
on civilian victims and their suffering due to the war. The newspaper explicated the 
circumstances of Palestinian civilians and their undesirable image as the (only) 
receivers of military action. A good deal of WAFA’s representations emphasized the 
disproportionate power of the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians who appeared to 
be the only sides in the war. However, WAFA put less emphasis on Israeli agency and 
the intentionality of forces to target civilians. It did not problematize the brutality of 
military action as much as it put emphasis on the vulnerability of civilians. More 
surprisingly, the news website completely excluded any representations of Palestinian 
fighters, whether as doers or receivers of military action. It also backgrounded the 
political affiliation of social actors if they belonged to the political wing of Hamas.  
Hardly ever did WAFA associate civilians’ suffering with the Palestinian 
political struggle against the occupation. In other words, no political or strategic 
objectives were sought from the war. In addition, the newspaper excluded important 
contextual factors, such as the Israeli siege of the Strip, and focuses instead on the 
consequences of military action. This, alongside the humanizing discourse, reflected 
important aspects of the conflict between Fatah/ the PA and Hamas, as well as the 
more subtle struggle between the PA, represented by Mahmoud Abbas, and some 
trends in Fatah. First, WAFA’s strategies seemed to devalue Hamas as a legitimate and 
representative power in Gaza. It completely excluded the political role of the 
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movement before and during the war. It also excluded the role of the resistance in 
directing the course of action or achieving any objectives relevant to the Palestinian 
people. By focusing on the destructive consequences of the war for civilians, Hamas 
was implied as failing to lead in the Strip and avoid Palestinians being involved in a 
war against a much more powerful enemy. Stopping the war and saving civilians was, 
instead, associated with the political endeavours of the PA which was represented as 
the only legitimate representative of Palestinians to take responsible actions. 
Moreover, WAFA backgrounded the siege and its role in the war based on the 
assumption that the siege was an internal Palestinian issue. While Hamas insisted that 
the siege is the main reason for the war, the PA claimed that the siege was due to 
Hamas’s control of the Strip. Therefore, the siege was not a valid justification for 
getting civilians involved in a disproportionate war. This, however, did not necessarily 
mean ignoring the role of Israel as an occupying force. But it meant that the misery of 
Palestinians in the Strip was basically caused by Hamas policies, contrary to the PA 
which had international support and utilised political pragmatism in dealing with 
Israel.  
Internally, the analysis showed that the PA, which is a semi-state polity, 
dominated Fatah which is a movement of liberation. The newspaper undermined the 
role of military resistance, although some trends in Fatah believe that resistance is still 
essential to the movement’s doctrine (see Section 1.7.2.1). More importantly, 
backgrounding resistance and dissociating Fatah from military action obfuscated the 
fact that many factions affiliated to Fatah were fighting in Gaza. WAFA, therefore, 
adopted the position of Mahmoud Abbas, the PA’s president, who rejects all forms of 
military struggle or a popular civilian uprising. The PA was represented as the only 
representative of Palestinians which can lead their national struggle due to its position 
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as an internationally-backed semi-state. Fatah has thus had to change its perspective as 
a movement of liberation. The role of the people is not to support resistance by 
tolerating occupation practices. They should instead be protected by the ruling 
authority which needs to adopt practical and pragmatic political schemes that offer 
them a better life. This may justify the relatively minor emphasis on Israeli agency in 
targeting Palestinian civilians. WAFA avoided giving Palestinians (especially in the 
West Bank) reasons to engage in a new uprising and focused instead on representing 
the negative consequences of a disproportionate confrontation. WAFA seemed to be 
aware of the fact that a large-scale Intifada might lead to the collapse of the PA and 
the rise of Hamas in the West Bank. This was translated into tough measures on the 
ground by the PA to prevent any changes to the political reality. For instance, PA 
security forces suppressed Palestinian demonstrations and prohibited all forms of 
support for Palestinian resistance.  
I believe, therefore, that a basic objective of WAFA’s representation was to 
maintain the status quo in which the PA acts as the only representative of Palestinians. 
However, since an explicit denunciation of resistance, especially during violent 
confrontations, was not possible, WAFA relied on extensive contextualization of 
human suffering. It did not openly challenge the Palestinian political culture in which 
resistance is an essential means of liberation. Instead, it employed bottom-up 
discursive strategies that provided a challenging evaluation of particular events. The 
concentration on one aspect of the war, i.e. human suffering, and the exclusion of any 
achievements of resistance may change people’s perceptions of the value of military 
action as a useful method to confront Israel. Ultimately, the representation presented 
the political and diplomatic actions of the PA as the only pragmatic strategy that can 
save Palestinians from disproportionate wars.  
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In contrast, PIC constructed a different image of the war based on hegemonic 
narratives and collective Palestinian political and strategic objectives. It was a war 
between Israel, an occupying force, and all Palestinian people. The war was 
represented as massively affecting Palestinian civilians. However, PIC employed a 
political mode of representation that was based on denouncing the perpetrator – Israeli 
occupation. The main emphasis in PIC was put on the brutality of Israeli military 
action and the intentionality in targeting civilians. The war was not represented as a 
general context where Palestinians were killed and wounded. Rather, actions were 
consistently associated with their political and military context. For instance, PIC 
represented the Israeli army as targeting civilians due to its failure to act against 
Palestinian resistance. This means that, unlike WAFA, the Israeli army was not 
represented as the absolute power but as a coward and immoral army that deliberately 
targets civilians.  
Another major difference from WAFA was the representation of Palestinian 
resistance. Fighters were represented as causing serious losses to the Israeli army and 
leading to important changes in the war and the wider context. However, this 
representation did not always distinguish between civilians and fighters. Rather, it 
drew on national narratives that represent resistance as a collective Palestinian action. 
So, PIC represented the involuntary passive role of Palestinian civilians as a voluntary 
action of steadfastness and resistance. This normalized Palestinian fatalities as having 
supreme national objectives, such as lifting the siege and liberating Jerusalem. It also 
mitigated the criticism of Hamas since it represented the war as a consensual 
Palestinian decision.  
The political objectives of the representations in PIC seemed to counter those 
in WAFA and reflect a struggle for legitimacy and representativeness. PIC drew on a 
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hegemonic national culture in which resistance is celebrated as an essential means of 
liberation. PIC, accordingly, represented Hamas as the legitimate power based on its 
ability to lead the military resistance. Any party that stands against resistance was 
presupposed to oppose collective Palestinians. Excluding PA and Fatah, therefore, 
may mean that they were neither representative nor influential in current events due to 
their failure to meet Palestinian expectations.  
Internally, the representations in PIC revealed that Hamas, though an authority 
in the Gaza Strip, did not act as a ruling power that needs to protect people. It was 
rather a movement of resistance that was partially dependent on Palestinians’ 
sacrifices and tolerance of occupation practices. This representation backgrounded the 
movement’s responsibility for securing a better life for Gazans. That is why, for 
instance, the legitimacy of the movement, based on elections, was massively 
backgrounded and the focus instead was on its role in leading the military resistance. 
Hamas seemed to alternate between different discourses according to political 
developments. While the movement came to be pragmatic and relatively flexible after 
the 2006 elections (see Section 1.7.2.2), in a state of war it adopted a revolutionary 
discourse that represented the resistance as inclusive of all Palestinians. As such, PIC 
used top-down discursive strategies that drew on hegemonic national narratives. The 
news website did not evaluate events based only on their immediate contextual 
relevance but also in terms of already established representations that explain events 
and justify actions. That is why, for instance, many representations on PIC seemed to 
be ambivalent. For instance, the website contextualized the suffering of Palestinian 
civilians and represented them as victims. In other representations, victims were 
represented as deliberate sacrifices to achieve supreme national objectives. I believe 
that the main reason for such ambivalence was PIC’s attempt to address different 
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audiences via different discourses. While the victim image was directed at an 
international audience, the heroic one was directed at the local Palestinian audience 
(see Section 5.6).   
The comparison between the discourses of PIC and WAFA shows that the 
Palestinian internal conflict is political, over legitimacy and representativeness. There 
was very little evidence that the conflict is ideological; between secular and religious 
discourses adopted by Fatah and Hamas, respectively. The political and contextual 
factors discussed in this study, such as changes to the Hamas discourse after the 2006 
elections, and the interest in addressing an international audience via a political 
discourse based on universal values, definitely played a role in giving the conflict a 
political nature. In addition, Fatah and Hamas competed to be representative of all 
Palestinians. They expressed their political schemes in broad political terms that 
backgrounded any particularistic or exclusive aspects of their ideologies.  
Finally, the Maan news website represented the war as being between Hamas 
and Israel but referred to civilians as the main party affected by military action. It 
differed from WAFA and PIC in that it did not reflect the political cleavage in 
Palestine. It referred to the two sides of Palestinian polity, the PA/ Fatah and Hamas, 
without getting involved in controversies over representativeness and legitimacy. On 
the one hand, Maan highlighted the human aspect of the war by explicating 
Palestinian civilian suffering. Similar to WAFA, Maan emphasized that the war was 
disproportionate and that Palestinian civilians were facing a sophisticated military 
machine. However, Maan represented three different groups involved in the war. In 
addition to Israeli forces and Palestinian civilians, it represented Palestinian fighters as 
doers and receivers of military action. A more political representation appeared in the 
distinction the website established between the people of Hamas and the rest of 
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Palestinians. However, Maan did not show any negative attitude towards Palestinian 
resistance. On the contrary, it showed the positive attitude of the Palestinian public 
towards some Palestinian military actions. It did not frame these actions within super 
national narratives, but it showed their immediate impact on current Palestinian issues, 
such as Palestinian prisoners. It was thus left to the reader to evaluate the war in light 
of the political and strategic objectives it may achieve. 
It seems, therefore, that Maan’s primary concern was to address the widest 
range of readership. It focused on an extensive contextualization of events in order to 
clarify their immediate consequences, especially for Palestinian civilians. But it also 
foregrounded some contextual complexities, such as the Israeli siege of the Strip. As I 
explained in Section 5.6, the inclusive representation might be intended to appeal to 
all Palestinians regardless of their political affiliations. It also addressed an 
international audience by covering further aspects of the war, such as the effects of 
actions on Israeli civilians. Although it did not negatively evaluate these actions, 
merely writing about them may associate Palestinian military action with potential 
violence against civilians, which may shake the image of Palestinians as the only 
victims of the war. 
Another distinctive feature of Maan’s coverage was its incorporation of 
representations that carried the Israeli point of view. In reporting Israeli sources, some 
language choices were not modified. Instead they had experiential functions as 
intended by their sources. Knowing that it was impossible for Maan to refer to 
Palestinian fighters as ‘terrorists’ on its Arabic website, these representations revealed 
the deep impact of the international audience and its expectations on the website’s 
journalistic practices. I believe, however, that these representations also reflect a low 
level of professionalism and experience on the part of Palestinian journalists. They 
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seemed to be unaware of the decisiveness of micro-language choices in representing 
events in a particular way. Unlike PIC’s journalists, who seemed aware of the role of 
particular language choices in representing actions and actors, Maan journalists 
focused on macro-narratives and general themes. They ignored some micro-choices 
that could change the functions of texts by loading them with an unintended 
ideological perspective.  
6.3 Cross-societal comparison 
Although this study was interested in comparing and contrasting different 
media outlets in the same community, the analysis revealed a number of cross-societal 
discursive similarities in Palestine and Israel. More precisely, there appeared to be 
discursive similarities between Haaretz and WAFA, JP and PIC, and Ynet and Maan. 
The similarities, obviously, did not reflect similar political or ideological stances. 
Instead, they reflected similar positions of the news outlets in relation to the social 
structure, i.e. whether they produced hegemonic or marginal ideologies. Besides, the 
study showed that when media outlets had similar journalistic objectives, especially in 
relation to their target audience, they adopted similar discursive strategies that drew 
on different discourses. 
First, JP and PIC adopted top-down discursive strategies. They drew on 
hegemonic narratives in representing events and (de)legitimizing actions. In other 
words, they drew on what the majority of people in both societies believe to be true. 
Therefore, the two outlets used presuppositions in representing events and explaining 
their political or ideological relevance. Their representations were goal-oriented; they 
undermined some contextual peculiarities by linking actions with ultimate desirable 
(national) goals. This can blur the line between what happened and what was meant to 
happen. Consequently, people did not evaluate events based only on their contextual 
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relevance, but also according to already established categorizations of social relations 
and social roles, which left considerable space for stereotypical and essentialized 
representations. For instance, JP’s representation and legitimization of military action 
was based on the presupposition that Hamas and the Palestinian resistance wanted to 
attack Israeli civilians. Although no evidence for this claim was derived from the 
immediate context of the war, it drew on a widespread narrative that Israel is a 
threatened nation and, therefore, justified the use of massive power against the 
besieged Strip. Similarly, PIC presupposed that Palestinians were willing to support 
the military resistance because it is essential in the Palestinian national struggle. The 
war was thus represented as a consensual Palestinian decision, which backgrounded 
crucial contextual information about the role of Hamas as the responsible authority in 
the Strip. These presuppositions were basically realized by language choices that 
constructed external realities, such as attacking Israeli civilians through tunnels in JP, 
or those which have national connotations such as Palestinian resistance in PIC.  
JP and PIC consistently associated the suffering of the ‘Self’ with the agency 
of the ‘Other’. They adopted a mode of representation that was based on a 
denunciation of the enemy on two levels: a moral level that represented the enemy as 
targeting civilians, and a political/ military level that represented the enemy as failing 
to achieve its objectives. This justified the actions of the ‘Self’ and represented 
involvement in the war as a necessity.  
JP and PIC also drew on hegemonic narratives to normalize the war. First, 
they backgrounded the suffering of actors by changing the involuntary passive role of 
actors into voluntary acts of heroism. Second, they represented the war as an essential 
practice that validates the individual’s belonging to the collective ‘Self’, or as an 
inevitable means to achieve collective objectives and aspirations. In this sense, the 
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two news websites emphasized a particularistic view of the in-group. What makes a 
person good is their commitment to unique social practices associated with a 
particular group of social actors, and not to universal values that might be shared by 
different communities.  
In contrast, Haaretz and WAFA employed bottom-up discursive strategies. 
They adopted a mode of representation that implicitly challenged major constructs of 
hegemonic ideologies by extensive contextualizations of events. The two news outlets 
seemed hesitant to articulate explicit objections to what the majority of people believe 
in. Therefore, they relied on context-bound representations in which they evaluated 
events according to their immediate contextual relevance, especially their effects on 
social actors. Their representations built into a humanizing discourse which 
represented the war as a human crisis without focusing primarily on the agency of the 
perpetrator or the political or practical achievements of the war. This discourse was 
assumed to address its audience based on universal human values that denounce the 
involvement in military confrontations to solve political conflicts. For instance, 
Haaretz did not highlight what the war was intended to achieve. Rather, it maintained 
a contextualized coverage which showed the consequences of military action on social 
actors. Similarly, WAFA foregrounded the high number of Palestinian victims and 
extensively reported the devastating circumstances of civilians without associating 
their suffering with supreme national objectives. This was particularly realized by 
emotionally-loaded language choices that emphasized the innocence and vulnerability 
of social actors.  
The humanizing discourse in Haaretz and WAFA did not assume clear political 
framings of events. Nonetheless, it may provoke negative attitudes on the part of the 
reader towards military action based on pragmatic treatment of the consequences of 
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war. If the same events are not satisfactorily explained by hegemonic narratives, the 
representations in Haaretz and WAFA may shake people’s beliefs and change their 
way of thinking. For instance, if the Israeli audience is persistently exposed to the fact 
that the war may not provide security for Israel, they might start to question the value 
of wars that cost human and economic losses. Later, Israelis may change their political 
preferences and choose a government that adopts peaceful strategies to deal with the 
Palestinians. By the same token, with WAFA’s consistent comparison of the huge 
human losses and the very limited achievements of the war, Palestinians may change 
their attitude towards military resistance as a sufficient strategy to deal with Israel, at 
least for the time being. In the long run, they may adopt different frames of 
interpretations that support, for instance, political strategies which do not involve 
them in disproportionate wars.  
Finally, Ynet and Maan seemed to have similar discursive strategies due to 
their focus on the widest range of readership. To address readers with different 
preferences, the two news outlets drew on different discourses that, in some cases, had 
competing world views. For instance, Ynet adopted a Zionist ideology in its 
representation of the war. However, since it addressed most Israeli groups that may 
not share all the convictions of Zionism, and since it addressed an international 
audience as a source of wider coverage, it incorporated some representations that drew 
on universal values, especially those related to the representation of soldiers as 
vulnerable human beings. Similarly, Maan incorporated some representations that did 
not fit the Palestinian narrative as they convey the perspective of Israeli sources. 
While this might be intended to produce a balanced coverage, it led to fissures of 
representation due to the tensions between different world views. I reiterate here that 
these journalistic interests are not the only factors that define the policies of Ynet and 
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Maan. As I explained in the previous section, there are different political motivations 
that play a role in their choice of what events to cover and how to cover them. Yet, I 
claim that when they address readers with different political backgrounds, they 
necessarily draw on different values which feature in fissures and ambivalences of 
representation.  
In sum, the position of the media outlets on the political and ideological 
landscapes decides much of their discursive tendencies. The closer the newspapers are 
to social structures, the more they rely on macro-narratives in representing actions and 
actors. By the same token, the further they are from social structures, the more they 
rely on extensive context-bound representations that produce different realities but 
without overtly challenging what people believe to be true. Moreover, the study 
showed that outlets that had a specific and limited target audience, such as JP, had 
more consistent representations. They usually operated with one discourse which has 
one world view. In contrast, outlets that targeted readers with different preferences 
drew on different discourses. Their coverage was distinguished by fissures and 
tensions due to the different values they incorporated. I emphasize here that these 
findings were based on comparing nuances of representations at the clause level. It 
was the method, a detailed linguistic analysis, that made it possible to capture these 
nuances.  
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
This study demonstrated that the analysis of language choices at clause level 
was rewarding in detecting fissures and irregularities of representation. It was useful 
in identifying political and ideological tensions in and across communities as 
manifested in journalistic discourse. Therefore, I recommend this method for use in 
other contexts where explicit and implicit political and ideological tensions are 
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involved. For instance, the method can be useful in analysing representation in 
different Lebanese newspapers. This may make explicit the different aspects of the 
political and religious (sectarian) conflict in Lebanon as well as the ideological 
objectives served by different representations. Analysts might also use this method to 
study the tension between China and the US. This could reveal some aspects of the 
political and economic rivalry between the two states that the audience are not 
familiar with. Finally, analysts can use the method to examine the 
(mis)representations of migration in Europe. It can attribute the different language 
choices used in reporting migrants and refugees to particular world views that stand 
for particular discourses/ ideologies and identify the immediate political objectives 
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